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This dissertation explores a set of antebellum authors’ ambivalent responses to the 
increasing specialization of intellectual labor, and the corresponding proliferation of 
professions and vocations, in the context of the ongoing market revolution. In chapters on 
Edgar Allan Poe, Herman Melville, and Martin Delany, I show how these writers 
engaged with, and critiqued, the intensifying specialization incubated by a splintering 
scientific discourse that militated against the new nation’s relative flattened social 
hierarchy. This crucial but gradual development in the antebellum division of labor – 
wherein the principle organizing social inequality shifted from the top-down model of 
mercantilism, to a liberal-individual market of entrepreneurs and aspirants – fostered, in 
knowledge-workers of all sorts, an imperative to appear institutionally legitimate in the 
eyes of the lay-public. The cultivation of this professional legitimacy depended on the 
creation of a perceived public need, and thereby a public market, for the specialist’s 
privileged information about some segment of reality that could be manipulated for the 
benefit of the non-professional, but not by the non-professional. As all three writers liked 
to point out, individual confidence (or gullibility) and tacit public consensus were all that 
distinguished legitimate experts from humbugs and hucksters. As a qualified rejection 
and partial appropriation of professional ideology, I argue, Poe, Melville, and Delany 
endeavored to generate what I call “expertise effects,” following Roland Barthes’s 
concept of the “reality effect,” those descriptive superfluities in French realist novels that 
create the illusion of reference, of connection to the real. In other words, these writers 
challenge the reader to experience, and in some ways to produce through interpretive 
labor, the impression that their texts outmaneuver and undermine putative expert 
 iii 
discourses through their sheer overfreighting of formal indices of mastery and 
evasiveness. The characteristic double-gesture – critiquing disciplinary 
instrumentalization while assuming themselves a posture of access to a zone of 
privileged, esoteric acumen – is here particularly vexed, since these writers claim no 
concrete object of knowledge, no positive doctrine or quantifiable field of data. The 
aesthetic strategies of indirection and concealment – well documented, particularly in 
Melville’s case, by the critical tradition that valorizes ambiguity as the lodestone of 
literary quality – dovetail with their rhetorical strategies of argumentative obliquity and 
occult implication. While their French contemporaries aimed at creating an autonomous 
sphere of pure art and detached artists, this American vein of rhetorical jugglery renders 
the boundaries between aesthetic and civil discourses – art and critique, fiction and 
philosophy, poetry and politics – porous. The weakening of boundaries, of course, 
facilitated appropriation and invasion. 
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GILDED LILIES, PAPER TIGERS, AND IRON CAGES: 
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA’S INVENTION OF EXPERTISE 
 
 
 A month before the publication of Walden (1854), his friend Thoreau’s masterpiece 
of “protest against the dogma that the division of labor is beneficial to the individual,” 
Emerson scribbled this semi-satirical, if factually accurate, list in his journal: 
The new professions. The phrenologist; the railroad man; the landscape 
gardener; the lecturer; the sorcerer, rapper, mesmeriser, medium; the 
daguerreotypist. Proposed: The Naturalist, and the Social Undertaker.1 
 
Assuming for a moment that this list was both accurate and comprehensive – in the years 
since Samuel Johnson had stressed, in 1773, that the term profession “is particularly used 
of divinity, physick, and law,” the professional field had grown literally exponentially.2 
The decades surrounding midcentury saw an explosion in the possible forms of 
professional vocation, which offered – in the authority-vacuum left by the deflation of the 
“liberal” professions – new paths of upward mobility as well as new sources of truth. 
“More than novel and imaginative solutions,” writes Arthur Wrobel, antebellum 
intellectuals of all political stripes “desired some form of authority. To many of them, 
phrenology, spiritualism, and mesmerism had the potential to design institutions based on 
                                                 
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1820-1872, vol. 8, ed. Edward Waldo 
Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912), 574.  
 
2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 4th edition (London, 1773). For the development 
of professionalism in Britain, see W.J. Reader, Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes in 
Nineteenth-Century England (London: Weidenfeld, 1966). Though it begins well after my own period 
concludes, Harold J. Perkin’s The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (London: Routledge 
1989) is massively influential for studies of this type. 
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the finest intellectual tools available and to offer sound analyses of human nature.”3 Just 
as importantly, these fringe disciplines were on the cutting edge of scientific method – 
they were empirically redoubtable – when judged against the prevailing standards of the 
time. “For the first time,” writes Wrobel, “men seemed close to discovering empirical 
proof supporting ontological and teleological premises that their age had inherited from 
eighteenth-century discourses on natural law – that system of universal and invariable 
laws which sustain the visible creation.”4 
 The mid-nineteenth century serves as a crucial turning point in the history of 
expertise as a concept and a rhetoric. The field was filled, rather abruptly, with “new 
specialisms”: “accountants, surveyors and architects, scientists and engineers, opticians, 
and dentists – not to mention many on the fringes of professional status, such as actors, 
artists, writers, poets, journalists.”5 More than just new occupations, these new 
professions, quasi-professions, and even pseudo-professions promised new solutions to 
the problems of modernity – solutions mediated by increasingly specialized forms of 
expertise.  
 In a sense, of course, expertise is a relatively new description of an immemorially 
old thing – as Tzvetan Todorov notes, “a notion may be legitimate even though no 
corresponding word may as yet exist to designate it.”6 Theories of expertise – and 
                                                 
 
3 Arthur Wrobel, “Introduction,” Pseudo-Science and Society in 19th-Century America, ed. Arthur Wrobel 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 10.  
 
4 Wrobel, Pseudo-Science, 7.  
 
5 Penelope J. Corfield, Power and the Professions in Britain 1700-1850 (London: Routledge, 1995), 28. 
 
6 Tzvetan Todorov, “The Notion of Literature,” New Literary History 38.1 (2007): 1-12, 1.  
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theorists posing as experts – seem in retrospect to saturate Western history. Four hundred 
years before Christ, Sophists wandered the streets of Athens, selling private lessons in 
rhetoric to the private citizens who would buy. As the titular sophist of Plato’s Gorgias 
argues, “Rhetoric is the only area of expertise you need to learn. You can ignore all the 
rest and still get the better of the professionals!”7 This idea horrified Plato’s Socrates, for 
whom rhetoric was not a technē (an art or a skilled craft) but a “a phantom of a branch of 
statesmanship” that aimed to flatter and persuade the listener without teaching anything.8 
In the archive of proto-experts, the sophistic rhetors, Socrates, with his indomitable 
technê, and Aristotle’s phronimos, the wise man of virtuous deliberative action, join the 
Kant of the categorical imperative, and Shaftesbury, the exemplary connoisseur of moral 
beauty.   
 In the antebellum era, expertise had not yet entered into the zone of autonomous 
abstraction that would characterize specialization at the turn of the twentieth century: “In 
nineteenth-century America,” writes Paul Lucier, “an expert was generally considered to 
be a person (invariably a man) with experience and skill, both of which were gained 
mainly through manual rather than intellectual work.”9 The “expert” and his or her 
“expertise” were still, you might say, pre-reified – still in the process of assuming their 
modern forms as abstractions. Raymond Williams opens his luminous Culture and 
Society with the observation that, over the course of the nineteenth century, the terms 
“industry” and “art” transformed, on almost isomorphic patterns, from their earlier, 
                                                 
 
7 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24.  
 
8 Plato, Gorgias, 30.  
 
9 Paul Lucier, “The Professional and the Scientist in Nineteenth-Century America,” ISIS 100.4 (December 
2009): 699-732, 703.  
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shared meaning – both were synonyms for personal skill – into names for quite distinct, 
essentially autonomous zones of specialization. Before being saturated by the resonances 
of factory labor and commodity production, industry “was a name for a particular human 
attribute, which could be paraphrased as ‘skill, assiduity, perseverance, diligence.’”10 In 
the nineteenth century, this meaning was supplemented, and rather quickly overtaken, by 
a new, and significantly more abstract, sense: “Industry, with a capital letter, is thought of 
as a thing in itself – an institution, a body of activities – rather than simply a human 
attribute” (CS, xi). The word was abstracted further still when, in the 1830s, the whole 
system of industrial institutions came collectively to be known as “Industrialism” (CS, 
xii). “Art” followed a similar course of development-by-abstraction: from its eighteenth-
century upbringing as yet another “skill,” it flowered into a whole world-apart of 
aesthetics, poetry, and taste.  
 The term “expert” follows this pattern with shadowy exactitude. (This observation 
will perhaps not surprise readers familiar with Williams’s entry for “expertise” in 
Keywords: “It appeared in English, as an adjective, in lC14, at the same time as the 
closely related experience. It is characteristic that it began to be used as a noun – an 
expert – from eC19, in an industrial society which put increasing emphasis on 
specialization and qualification.”)11 The implication, perverse as it seems to suggest, is 
that the eventual identification of expertise with scientific inquiry and/or systematic 
rationality was not foreordained – or, as Mark Essig well puts it: “The distinction 
                                                 
 
10 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983 
[1957]), xi. Further citations will be given parenthetically in the text as CS.  
 
11 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1985 [1976]), 129.  
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between ‘the expert’ and ‘the public’ was not the natural or inevitable result of advances 
in knowledge. Rather, the distinction was laboriously constructed and served the interests 
of professional groups whose very existence depended upon distinguishing their 
knowledge and practices from those of the general population.”12 
 The term “expert” was almost never – with some notable exceptions – employed as 
a noun until after mid-century. (One such exception, to return to Emerson, can be found 
in Representative Men’s description of Plato, the representative philosopher: “He is more 
than an expert, or a schoolman, or a geometer, or the prophet of a peculiar message. He 
represents the privilege of the intellect, the power, namely, of carrying up every fact to 
successive platforms and so disclosing in every fact a germ of expansion. These 
expansions are in the essence of thought.”)13 As Charles Richardson’s widely-circulated 
1836 dictionary explained it, “An expert man is one who has the readiness, adroitness, 
presence of mind of experience, of much practice.”14 The definition is almost 
aphoristically vague: An expert man has seen plenty; he’s ready for just about anything. 
The thing to note is the kind of knowledge Richardson ascribes to the expert man. Indeed, 
it seems less that the expert man knows something than that he is predisposed to react in 
a certain way, or range of ways. In this common adjectival form, the word “expert” 
indicated some form of practical proficiency to the subject it modified. So, for instance, 
                                                 
 
12 Mark Essig, “Poison Murder and Expert Testimony: Doubting the Physician in Late Nineteenth-Century 
America,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 14.1 (2002): 177-210, 208. 
 
13 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Plato; or, The Philosopher,” Representative Men, in Essays & Lectures (New 
York: Library of America, 1983), 655-56. 
 
14 Charles Richardson, A New Dictionary of the English Language, vol. 1 (London: William Pickering, 
1836), 737. 
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in a bizarre sketch from James Kirke Paulding’s Salmagundi, a character named 
Launcelot Langstaff recollects receiving “the discipline of the birchen twig” from “the 
most expert flogger for fifty miles round” as punishment for stealing from an orchard as a 
child.15 Military, naval, and sporting competencies were among the most common fields 
designated by the term’s adjectival form. “By daily use and practice,” wrote English 
historian Sharon Turner, the cavalrymen of the Anglo-Saxon army became “so expert, 
that they could stop their horses at full speed down a declivity.”16 George Washington, 
noted biographer Jared Sparks, “was expert in the art of duck-shooting, and often 
practised it.”17 It was likewise typical for people to be classed experts in artisanal or 
mechanical occupations. In the Book of Mormon, the Nephites adapted to the 
deforestation of their adopted homeland, Zarahemla, by developing a novel architectural 
style: they became “exceeding expert in the working of cement; therefore did they build 
houses of cement, in the which they did dwell.”18 
 The theory of competence underpinning a phrase like expert flogger (or 
marksmen or swimmer) puts private experience and manual skill front and center. An 
expert swimmer is good at swimming, and this is so because, if it doesn’t quite make 
perfect, practice improves. Practice means engaging in the process of improving 
technique through disciplined repetition, which is to say, gaining experience. On the 
                                                 
 
15 James Kirke Paulding, “Hic Finis Fandi,” Salmagundi: Second Series, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1835), 297. 
 
16 Sharon Turner, The History of the Anglo-Saxons from the Earliest Period to the Norman Conquest, vol. 1 
(Paris: Baudry’s European Library, 1840), 42.  
 
17 Jared Sparks, The Life of George Washington (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1853), 105. 
 
18 The Book of Mormon, trans. Joseph Smith, Jr. (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 1921), 364. 
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other hand, practice means praxis, the exercise of skills, strategies, and social roles. The 
distinction between rehearsal and performance, the accrual of experience and the 
application of expertise, tends to break down. Practicing makes you a more capable 
practitioner, but acting as a practitioner counts as practice. The period’s instructional 
manuals presented tutorials on the Virgilian credo, “experto crede” – trust one who has 
experience. Eschewing abstract formalism, one sporting guidebook presented its training 
regimen for improved marksmanship on rigorously practical grounds: “After being expert 
in one position, change to another, until perfect in all.”19 A compendium of exploits and 
amusements for boys tantalized its more dogged disciples with a promise of simian 
agility: “By practice, the climber becomes so expert, that when the branches hang 
tolerably low… he may seize a branch, swing himself up, and then proceed from bough 
to bough, or even tree to tree, should they be planted close enough.”20 
Specialization & Scientificity 
 At the risk of over-generality, the discourse of expertise – social criticism, how-to 
manuals, encomia to masters, compendia of historical exemplars – experienced two 
(inextricably related) changes, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century: 
first, experts became expert in some occupational specialization; second, the essence of 
experts’ expertise was ascribed to some scientific basis. The magnetic attraction between 
expertise and occupation applied even when the occupation in question was not precisely 
legitimate (or legal). In his 1835 omnibus history of notorious trials, John Jay Smith 
                                                 
 
19 William H. Schreiner, Schreiner’s Sporting Manual (Philadelphia, 1841), 88. 
 
20 Samuel Williams, The Boy’s Treasury of Sports, Pastimes, and Recreations (London: D. Bogue, 1844), 
94. 
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describes the criminal education of famous Irish pickpocket Jenny Diver, née Mary 
Young, thus: “She now regularly applied two hours every day in qualifying herself for an 
expert thief, by attending to the instructions of experienced practitioners… In a few 
months she became so expert in her profession, as to acquire great consequence among 
her associates, who distinguished her by the appellation of Jenny Diver, on account of her 
remarkable dexterity.”21 What’s prophetic about this description is the way it implements 
some of the key terms of professionalization: education, conceived as both experiential 
instruction and credentialing (“qualifying”), together with a community of peers 
(“associates”) that serves as the evaluative body for the individual “in her profession.”  
 Though the genre of general interest primer – from The Expert Letter Writer 
(1830) to How to Become an Expert Shot (1875) – remained common throughout the 
century, instructional books turned to increasingly specialized spheres of vocational 
activity; the rhetoric of expertise grew ever more intimate in its spontaneous association 
with vocational or professional skill. After the Civil War, it became conventional to 
designate an individual as an expert, as opposed to expert at or expert in some field of 
endeavor. Expertise became concretized and embodied in the authors of case studies – 
The Handwriting of Junius: Professionally Investigated by Charles Chabot, Expert 
(1871) – and field reports – the Prospectus and Report of C.S. Miller, Mining Expert 
(1877). This trajectory, and the sheer proliferation of the term’s use suggests a culture-
wide tendency to accept the title “expert” as a carrier of professional distinction.  
                                                 
 
21 John Jay Smith, Celebrated Trials of All Countries, and Remarkable Cases of Criminal Jurisprudence 
(Philadelphia: L.A. Godey, 1836), 443.  
 9 
 The relatively straightforward understanding of expertise, as an index of an 
individual’s mastery of concrete skills and know-how, underwent a gradual but profound 
shift, as contributors to the great body of General Knowledge increasingly trumpeted the 
scientific foundations of their work. As the appeal to scientific basis became increasingly 
conventional, it became increasingly convincing, even to otherwise skeptical observers. 
Recounting a dockside conversation with a young English naturalist, Mark Twain 
observed, with uncharacteristic credulity, “I had a fair knowledge of his subject – 
layman’s knowledge – to begin with, but it was his teachings which crystallized it into 
scientific form and clarity – in a word, gave it value.”22 According to the implied 
economy of knowledge, here, even relatively well-cultivated lay-knowledge is basically 
worthless, at least if we take seriously Twain’s assertion that scientific instruction alone 
confers “value.”  
 To understand this, we need to make sense of the instability of “science,” as a 
concept, in antebellum American society. In the eighteenth century, the concepts of 
“science” and “literature” alike stood in almost direct opposition to the very ideas of 
specialization and professionalization. Even in the mid-nineteenth century, literature was 
not synonymous with the specialized conception of literariness as a world apart. In the 
context of what he calls British “Romantic Literary Professionalism,” Paul Keen urges 
critics to reconsider, with a fresh emphasis on historical particularity, the ways in which 
nineteenth-century authors and critics understood “literature,” since the term “was 
frequently used interchangeably with other words such as ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ to 
                                                 
22 Mark Twain, A Tramp Abroad, Following the Equator, Other Travels, ed. Roy Blount, Jr. (New York: 
Library of America, 2010), 476. 
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suggest a body of writings committed to the discovery of truth.”23 This generalist 
conception is strikingly exemplified by William Godwin:  
Literature has reconciled the whole thinking world respecting the great 
principles of the system of the universe, and extirpated upon this 
subject the dreams of romance and the dogmas of superstition. 
Literature has unfolded the nature of the human mind, and Locke and 
others have established certain maxims respecting man, as Newton has 
done respecting matter, that are generally admitted for 
unquestionable.24 
 
Godwin’s description attributes to literature a series of surprising effects: efficiency, 
public service, demystification, consensus-building, and scientific certainty. In this 
conception, “men of letters” and “men of science” were functionally interchangeable 
terms for those republican gentlemen who avowedly pursued their crafts as disinterested 
avocations – passions or hobbies conducted for the public good, rather than their own. 
 The best efforts of Locke and Hegel to sophisticate epistemology were, Sydney 
Ross writes, wasted on the English vernacular in the century’s first half: “The precise 
classifications of the philosophies and their constituent sciences were the technical jargon 
of the Universities: outside the classrooms… the terms philosophy and science were 
interchangeable in certain connections: e.g., the experimental science or experimental 
philosophy; and moral science or moral philosophy.” This “period of synonymity,” which 
Ross dates between “approximately 1800-1850,” was complicated but not undone by a 
growing tendency, “perhaps influenced by the example of French usage,” casually to 
group theology and metaphysics under the aegis of philosophy, and “the experimental 
                                                 
23 Paul Keen, “‘The Most Useful of Citizens’: Towards a Romantic Literary Professionalism,” Studies in 
Romanticism 41.4 (Winter 2002): 627-654, 640. 
 
24 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013 [1793]), 21. 
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and physical branches of knowledge” under the aegis of science.”25 The word “scientist” 
was coined in 1834 by Cambridge historian and philosopher William Whewell, though it 
did not receive full treatment until the 1840 publication of his The Philosophy of 
Inductive Sciences. Surprisingly, Whewell explained his neologism by an analogy to the 
idea of the “Artist”: “As we cannot use physician for a cultivator of physics, I have called 
him a Physicist. We need very much a name to describe a cultivator of science in general. 
I should incline to call him a Scientist. Thus we might say, that as an Artist is a Musician, 
Painter, or Poet, a Scientist is a Mathematician, Physicist, or Naturalist.”26 Gradually, 
Ross notes, science was “presented merely as another alternative profession; and the 
word scientist carried no less desirable connotations than did physician, lawyer, or 
clergyman.”27  
 Though perhaps no place or time in history has been epistemologically consistent, 
the formal and tacit protocols for organizing knowledge were particularly madcap in the 
United States of the mid-nineteenth century. The spontaneous philosophy underpinning 
Jacksonian Democracy was at once politically populist and metaphysically objectivist. As 
Thomas Bender puts it, the “style of thinking common to popular and scientific thought” 
was “a rather simple empiricism. It was concerned almost entirely with the direct 
observation of surface appearances. Its powers of explanation were quite limited, but it 
                                                 
25 Sidney Ross, “Scientist: The Story of a Word,” in Nineteenth-Century Attitudes: Men of Science (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 6. 
 
26 William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (London: John W. Parker, 1840), cxiii. 
 
27 Ross, “Scientist,” 2-3. 
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did have the advantage of being ‘democratic.’”28 (George H Daniels has, deliciously, 
described the era’s characteristic vulgar empiricism as “the reign of Bacon” in American 
science.)29 The representative thinkers of this period – Daniel Drake, Henry Ward 
Beecher, and P.T. Barnum – held, as a matter of principle, that “reality was generally 
accessible to common observation,” and that valid knowledge was “concretized in 
individual relationships to nature and society” (IPL, 13). If appearances could be 
deceiving, one needed only to look hard enough and long enough for a pure signal to 
emerge from the noise. Thomas L. Haskell gives a good summary of this outlook’s 
implicit metaphysical assumptions: “the social order is fundamentally rational and will 
reveal itself to the patient inquirer. Beneath the confused surface of events there is a 
harmonious order, a realm of ‘Truth,’ in which the interests of all members of society 
blend without friction.”30 
The Jacksonian Assault & Its Backlash 
 One of the great historical ironies of the 1840s is that its ideological embrace and 
rhetorical trumpeting of the principles of Democracy ran parallel with the first vigorous 
rumblings of the professionalizing movement that would pick up steam throughout the 
remainder of the century. The onslaught of populism in the century’s first third had 
                                                 
28 Thomas Bender, Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic Intellectuals in the 
United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997 [1993]), 25. Further citations will be given 
parenthetically in the text as IPL.  
 
29 George H. Daniels, American Science in the Age of Jackson (New York: Columbia UP, 1968), 
 
30 Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science 




created a climate of suspicion of the elitist implications of vocational expertise. Notes 
John Higham, “the intellectual specialist affronted egalitarian values: he dealt in secrets 
only a few could share. In Jacksonian America, disdain for esoteric knowledge and 
hostility toward any narrow delimitation of competence flourished.”31 This mistrust of 
differential access, both to information and to the ability to use that information, implied 
that each individual was her own best judge; unless it was transparent and legible to the 
layperson, the consensual and conventional wisdom of professionals – whether 
clergymen, lawyers, or doctors – was practically irrelevant. After 1830, writes Samuel 
Haber, an “egalitarian impulse” increasingly animated the culture’s interrogation of the 
“honor” and “gentlemanly authority” due the classical professions – the very qualities 
“that distinguished them from ordinary occupations” in the first place. By midcentury, the 
“classical” professions were “recoiling before great Jacksonian attacks on aristocracy and 
privilege.”32 
 More and more observers of the cultural scene found it increasingly self-evident 
that doctors, lawyers, and preachers stood in all-but-direct opposition to the real interests 
of their clients; professionals, everyone seemed to notice, became useful only when 
laypersons were faced with crises that outstripped their inner resources. In this spirit, P.T. 
Barnum quipped, “the learned professions depend solely for support upon the 
misfortunes, miseries, or foibles of mankind.”33 Awash in the democratic spirit of 
                                                 
31 John Higham, “The Matrix of Specialization,” The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 
1860-1920, ed. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1979), 11.  
 
32 Samuel Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-1900 (Chicago: 
Chicago UP, 1991), 93-4.  
 
33 P.T. Barnum, The Life of P.T. Barnum (Urbana: Illinois UP, 2000), 371.  
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exposure, people felt newly empowered to reject the claims of elites; knowledge was, or 
seemed to be, socialized, redistributed to the people as a natural consequence of 
America’s democratic principles. Caught up in a kind of overblown enthusiasm for 
individual capacities, writes Neil Harris,  
avid democrats assumed that any problem could be expressed clearly, 
concisely, and comprehensibly enough for the ordinary man to solve it. 
Secret information and private learning were anathema. All knowledge 
was meant to be shared. Contemporary pamphleteers delighted in 
ridiculing experts and specialists; the expert turned out frequently to be 
a pedantic ignoramus, easily fooled himself; the learned doctor was 
often a victim of scientific nonsense and deserved to be overruled by 
intelligent laymen.34 
 
If this were true, the esoteric nature of professional knowledge could only be an 
obscurantist cover-up, a needless complexification of problems that could be solved by 
common sense.  
There were, of course, problems endemic to this brand of epistemological 
populism. In Gordon Wood’s impossibly limpid formulation, “If men were all alike, equal 
in their rights and in their interestedness, then there were no specially qualified gentlemen 
who stood apart from the whole society with a superior and disinterested perspective. All 
people were the same: all were ordinary and all were best represented by ordinary people. 
That was democracy.35 If nobody knew better than anybody else, every person was his or 
her own best judge – which meant every person fell with full force on the sword of his or 
her mistakes. In the Jacksonian era, writes Neal Harris, self-reliant individuals, 
“accustomed to examining the truth or validity of every person, idea, object or act 
presented to them… became easy targets for pseudoscientific explanations, for detailed 
                                                 
34 Neil Harris, Humbug: The Art of P.T. Barnum (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 74.  
 
35 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992), 295.  
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descriptions of fictional machinery, for any fantasy that was couched in the bland 
neutrality of a technological vocabulary.”36 Without trustworthy advisors, those 
overconfident in their ability to decide for themselves were easy “prey for all the hoaxers, 
confidence men, and tricksters like Edgar Allan Poe and P.T. Barnum who soon popped 
up everywhere.”37 In the period’s conduct manuals, Karen Halttunen observes, the 
confidence man became “the archetypal man-on-the-make who threatened to contaminate 
all he encountered with the depravity of his own nature… In the open society, it was 
feared, because all men were on the make, all men were in danger of becoming 
confidence men, whose claims to a new and higher social status were a dangerous form 
of hypocrisy.”38  
 Whatever its reassuring populist implications, then, this observational style 
ultimately “betrayed a propensity to oversimplify and evade problems” (IPL, 26). The 
naive empiricism that insisted on the Jacksonian everyperson’s intellectual sovereignty 
from any trained savant or polymathic boffin was gradually swept away by a more 
sophisticated, and not a little dreadful, appreciation of the complexity of creation. No 
longer was reality thought to be buried just beneath the glaze of appearance; to reach it 
now necessitated complex negotiations, piloted by esoteric abstractions and arsenals of 
technique – the very things that would, in time, become characteristic of the new 
professions. As limitations of naive empiricism gradually became clear, there was “a 
growing sense that understanding must penetrate internal qualities, processes, and 
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structures” in order to yield anything but clumps of disorganized data. New schools of 
increasingly specialized thought relocated the access points for knowledge of reality to 
“forms and processes one step removed from direct human experience” (IPL, 13). This 
move to abstraction augured the demotion of private skill: gradually, “expert swimmers” 
became “strong swimmers”; “expert marksmen” became “good shots”; “expert floggers” 
became… well… less distinguished.  
 The middle years of the 1830s had “showed a spike in American prosperity like 
nothing ever seen before”; but the booms, as they will, heralded busts, and the Panic of 
1837 touched off a counter-cycle of recession and deflation that would linger until almost 
midcentury.39 The brace of hard times “focused everyone’s attention on the inconstancy 
of economic growth, the unpredictability of capitalist enterprise, and the capricious 
distribution of losses and gains that accompanied the market revolution.”40 People felt, 
more acutely than ever before, the precariousness of market dependence, and took up 
various spiritual and emotional orthopedics for support. In the muddy wake of the Panic, 
writes Sellers, “misgivings spread through the middle class… to multiply seekers for 
more satisfying spiritualities and social arrangements. Fad followed fad – mesmerism, 
phrenology, spirit rapping, animal magnetism, water cures,” not to mention apocalyptic 
cults and utopian communes.41 If these were “fads” (and of course they were) they were 
also market segments – niches of professional service carved into an ever-expanding, and 
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increasingly monolithic, culture industry. New markets made for a sharp uptick in the 
range of specialties theoretically available to those entrepreneurial men and women who 
found themselves unmoved by the drab enticements of wage-labor. All manner of 
aspirants stepped up to fill the void. Some were sincere seekers, earnest philanthropists 
and lovers of knowledge – but with them swarmed a horde of charlatans and false 
prophets. It was not always possible to tell the difference; in some cases there did not 
seem to be a difference. As the matrix of specialization grew denser and more forbidding, 
expertise became an increasingly key commodity – but demonstrating expertise became 
increasingly difficult, and increasingly necessary.  
 The effect of Jacksonian populism was not simply a leveling of cultural prestige, 
but the creation of new avenues of prestige that proved elitist in their own right. 
Democracy did not so much wipe its enemies from the field as force them underground to 
regroup, only to reemerge in even more concentrated forms. Building on Harris’s work, 
Thomas Bender designates the period from roughly 1820-1860 as the “Age of Barnum.” 
In this span, America’s urban culture offered “no coherent and demanding institutional 
structure for intellectual culture. Instead of a clearly articulated community of discourse 
that established intellectual authority, the urban intellectual, now standing essentially 
alone, faced a heterogeneous, anonymous, and vastly expanded audience” (IPL, 88). In 
place of the comparatively stable “mechanisms of recruitment into the professions and 
learned society” that had provided continuity on the basis of class status and family 
connections, “the Age of Barnum witnessed an intellectual free-for-all, as all manner of 
men sought an audience in the city’s public culture” (IPL, 89). Bender vividly describes 
the predicament: 
 18 
Lacking a solid impersonal basis for establishing a relationship with 
their audience, urban intellectuals relied on their personalities and the 
appearance of intimate disclosure to establish the trust and authority 
essential for intellectual community. But personality was a poor 
substitute for the shared intellectual framework and clear social 
categories that had earlier given shape to local intellectual life. In such 
a situation, the eighteenth-century penchant for argument gave way to 
the quest for ‘influence’ (IPL, 12).  
 
In this swirling milieu of circulation without authoritative foundations, authors and 
intellectuals were forced to cope with and capitalize on dual (and dueling) historical 
developments: on the one hand, the growing commodification of aesthetic concepts like 
personality, influence, and merit and, on the other, the culture-wide project of 
specialization in all forms labor that placed a premium on systematic rationality.  
 Because of the (perceived, if not actual) increase in the distance between 
metaphysics and science, anxiety over the utility of scientific foundations would afflict 
the ministry most pressingly. In the Popular Science Monthly of 1872, Henry Ward 
Beecher warned, “our profession is in danger, and in great danger, of going under, and of 
working effectively only among the relatively less informed and intelligent of the 
community… We are in danger of having the intelligent part of society go past us.42 If the 
religious orders had formerly enjoyed a near-monopoly on the authoritative 
understanding of human nature – and the doling out of advice, on a professional basis, 
that such a study afforded – this investigatory impulse was being redirected into different 
channels, and legitimated on alternative intellectual foundations. At the time of writing, 
however, Beecher could attribute to men of God at best a lay-understanding: “preachers 
are quite as well acquainted with human nature as the average of well-informed citizens, 
but far less than lawyers, or merchants, or teachers, or, especially, politicians… The study 
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of human nature is not going to be left in the hands of the church or the ministry. It is 
going to be part of every liberal education, and will be pursued on a scientific basis.”43 In 
contrast with medicine and law, the pressure on the clergy would only increase over the 
decades. 
 The discourse of “the female sphere,” or “women’s work,” exemplifies the 
relationship between the quest for legitimacy and the need for a basis in science in the 
new professions. By the century’s close, the rhetorical appeals of domestic treatises were 
increasingly grafted onto the discourse of vocational mastery: take, for instance, The 
Expert Waitress: A Manual for the Pantry, Kitchen, and Dining-Room (1894) and The 
Expert Cleaner: A Handbook of Practical Information for All Who Like Clean Homes, 
Tidy Apparel, Wholesome Food, and Healthful Surroundings (1899). The thinker most 
germinal to this tradition and its development was Henry Ward’s sister, Catharine 
Beecher – “America’s first female philosopher and theologian to publish her work in a 
systematic form,” according to Mark David Hall.44 The trajectory of Beecher’s career 
offers a powerful illustration of the shift in the discursive markers that lent legitimacy to 
social thought. In the preface to first edition of A Treatise on Domestic Economy (1842), 
Beecher, standing in for the reader, poses a question to herself, and essays an answer:  
 What qualifications has the writer, which entitle her to be 
received as authority on the various topics embraced in this work? 
 In reply to this, she would say, that, being the eldest of a large 
family, she has, from early life, been accustomed to the care of 
children, and to the performance of most domestic duties. It has also 
been her good fortune to reside, most of her life, in the families of 
exemplary and accomplished housekeepers, and under the supervision 
of such friends, most of the domestic operations, detailed in this work, 
have been performed by the writer.  
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 But much in these pages is offered, not as the results of her 
own experience, but rather as gleanings from the experience of the 
more competent to instruct in such matters; and in gaining them, the 
writer has often had to learn her own deficiencies, by the light of 
superior excellence in others. Nothing is here presented, which has not 
received the sanction of some of the most judicious and experienced 
mothers and housekeepers in this Nation.45 
 
Here, Beecher presents mastery of domestic work in traditional and experiential terms. 
She is qualified by her years of service to her own household, and by the intellectual 
contributions of women, whose “superior excellence” provides a normative ideal for 
individual advancement in the practice of domestic economy.  
 The Treatise’s third edition (1849), which omits the earlier preface, aims to found 
the book’s legitimacy on more objective – or, in Beecher’s terms, scientific and 
systematic – grounds. As Beecher writes in a new preface, because “young girls, 
especially in the more wealthy classes, are not trained for their profession,” the problems 
facing domestic life could best be remedied by placing 
domestic economy on an equality with the other sciences in female 
schools. This should be done because it can be properly and 
systematically taught (not practically, but as a science), as much so as 
political economy or moral science, or any other branch of study; 
because it embraces knowledge, which will be needed by young 
women at all times and in all places; because this science can never be 
properly taught until it is made a branch of study; and because this 
method will secure a dignity and importance in the estimation of young 
girls, which can never be accorded while they perceive their teachers 
and parents practically attaching more value to every other department 
of science than this.46  
 
In 1869, Beecher and her sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe, published The American 
Woman’s Home: or, Principles of Domestic Science, a significant revision of the Treatise. 
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Though much from the earlier volume – the emphasis on Christian faith, duty to the 
nation – remained, “a great portion of it is entirely new, embodying the latest results of 
science,” including “all that is properly embraced in a complete Encyclopedia of 
Domestic Economy.” In her introduction, Catharine Beecher describes her many years of 
activism as tending towards a common goal: “to promote the establishment of endowed 
institutions, in which women shall be properly trained for their profession, as both 
housekeepers and health-keepers.”47  
 Scientific principles, it turned out, conferred legitimacy only when they were 
matched with institutional apparatuses. In this way, experts became professionals, and so 
the modern professions were formed. Once minted as legitimate, the professions 
commoditize their credentials, offering special services for profit. Expertise gained social 
legitimacy by being interspersed throughout a community of competent practitioners. To 
the extent that such a community was successful, accepted, and embedded in the social 
system, it became professional.  
Hopeful Poison: Medical Jurisprudence & Deregulation, 1815-1840 
 Intriguingly, the legal concept of the expert (the man of science as expert witness) 
developed well before its occupational-professional cousin. Expert testimony sprouted 
from the complex interpenetration of medicine and law, based on inheritances and 
transformations of the English, German, and especially French traditions. As Tal Golan 
has shown, it had until the late eighteenth century been widely acceptable for “lay 
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witnesses to testify as to their opinion, if this was based on direct knowledge of the facts 
of the case.”48 In that century’s closing decades, however, opinion become the special 
purview of men of science, who in turn became (through the alchemy of credentialing) 
experts. The legal profession increasingly acknowledged that the best and most objective 
evidence was based on scientific knowledge. Consequently, “men of science” 
increasingly found themselves introduced into legal proceedings as “expert witnesses,” 
though their “scientific expertise was sold in an unregulated fashion on an open legal 
market” (LMLN, 151). Hired and paid by the side they represented rather than the state, 
expert witnesses were heavily incentivized to give partisan testimony. This meant the 
business of witnessing was subject to all the vicissitudes of entrepreneurial ambition, and 
experts were widely suspected and accused of acting in the base interests of personal 
profit and publicity: “The constant spectacle of eminent doctors, chemists, geologists, 
engineers, and other men of science contradicting each other on the witness stand,” writes 
Golan, “cast serious doubts on their integrity and on their science in the eyes of the 
public” (LMLN, 150).  
 Ideally, the expert witness’s role was to establish a baseline reality, an ontological 
fact of the matter about the authenticity or artificiality of a case; scientific mastery would 
peel back phenomena to expose “the hidden laws of nature, which ordained powers that 
no part of the earth’s surface was immune to” (LMLN, 30). In practice, this process was 
impeded from two angles: first, by the almost inevitable failure of scientific explanation 
to approximate the kind of heroic-visionary power fantasized for it; and second, by the 
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fact that the addressees of the witness’s expertise – the judge, jury, attorneys hostile and 
friendly, and sundry other courtroom personages – were not experts. The responsibility of 
the expert witness was precisely to translate the substance of esoteric knowledge into a 
form intelligible to (or, failing that, persuasive or authoritative-seeming to) a lay 
audience. Into the conceptual clown car of experts was stuffed a motley parade of the 
tradesmen and artisans: Henry Wade Rogers’s hefty 1883 tome, The Law of Expert 
Testimony, outlined the testamentary function of nautical men, railroad men, insurance 
men, civil engineers, surveyors, millers and mill-wrights, machinists, mechanics, masons, 
farmers and gardeners, painters and photographers, lumbermen, experts in patent, trade-
mark and copyright cases, and the cryptic category of “business men as to usage.”49 
 Naturally, expert testimony was based on the idea that expert witnesses knew 
something worth knowing, which was not always self-evidently true even to experts 
themselves. In 1898, an anonymous writer took to the pages of the Medical Era to rail 
against the corrupting influence of quacks and charlatans on the collective reputation of 
expert witnesses. The jeremiad doubles, perhaps unintentionally, as a gnomic verse 
meditation on sincerity and irony, authenticity and imposture: 
 There is much difference between an expert and an ‘expert.’ 
 The expert is familiar with his subject, and testifies to facts, as 
he sees them, regardless of consequences.  
 The ‘expert,’ on the contrary, pretends to knowledge that he 
does not possess, and favors the ‘side’ that fees him. 
 Then the undiscriminating public condemns expert testimony 
and ridicules the experts. 
 All through the fault of the ‘experts.’50 
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The seemingly constitutive ambiguity in definitions of the expert, as a concept or 
individual, fueled progressively more feverish attempts to pin them down. Expert 
testimony was already in wide use; the problem was not access, but legitimation. The 
opposition – the expert against the ‘expert’ – was endemic to the adversarial system the 
courts had adopted in the late eighteenth century, in which judges ceded control of 
argument and evidentiary presentations to the rival teams of attorneys representing the 
prosecution and defense. A zero-sum contest between two opposing parties, each 
adversary brought its own expert, or posse of experts; and, all things being equal, each 
expert could expect to be right (that is, to win) precisely half the time, a less-than-
dazzling ratio for a class of persons called for their competence, experience, and sagacity. 
Originally based on a kind of republican trust and fellow-feeling between gentlemen, 
expert testimony gradually degenerated into an acrimonious battleground of partisan 
attacks.  
 In order to bolster their legal bona fides, physicians rushed to theorize a system of 
“medical jurisprudence,” a field of study focused on the intersection between law and 
medicine. America’s early theorists of “legal medicine,” writes James Mohr, “hoped 
ultimately for structural changes that would sustain further development of their field and 
give them a secure economic foundation. To effect those structural changes they had from 
the beginning of the century looked to the state.”51 One early effort in this direction – the 
seminal 1811 lecture “On the Study of Medical Jurisprudence” – saw Benjamin Rush 
exulting in the potentially huge (and lucrative) overlap between medicine and law. If 
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physicians could manage to extend their domain of expertise to encompass a the statutes 
of common law, Rush gushed,  
the extent of the services you will thereby be enabled to render to 
individuals and the public: fraud and violence may be detected and 
punished: unmerited infamy, and death, may be prevented: the widow 
and the orphan may be saved from ruin: virgin purity and innocence 
may be vindicated: conjugal harmony and happiness may be restored: 
unjust and oppressive demands upon the services of your fellow 
citizens may be obviated; and the sources of public misery in epidemic 
diseases may be removed, by your testimony in a court of justice. Nor 
is this all. By cultivating the science I am now recommending, you may 
extend its benefits, beyond our courts of justice, to the legislatures of 
our country, and thereby become the means of obtaining laws… which 
shall place testimony… upon such a basis, as to relieve judges and 
jurors from the painful necessity of acting in a discretionary manner.52 
 
The ambition of such a declaration is to elevate medicine into a literally legislative entity, 
and the administering physicians into literal legislators. The passage gathers up all the 
ideological facets of antebellum professionalism: the cultivation of science (medical 
jurisprudence); claims of jurisdictional control (over medical treatment and law); 
securing a market for professional commodities (medical treatment, expert testimony in 
court, and ultimately governance); public service and noblesse oblige (alleviating public 
misery, protecting virgin purity). It is, of course, something of an aspirational, even 
utopian, fantasy of professional apotheosis – especially considering how few of the 
treatments doctors like Rush prescribed actually healed anything. 
 The intuitive binary between “legitimate” medicine and illegitimate quackery 
obscures more than it reveals. As vituperative a critic as any of what he designated 
“Homeopathy and Its Kindred Delusions,” the elder Oliver Wendell Holmes was still 
forced to admit, “if the whole materia medica, as now used, could be sunk to the sea, it 
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would be all the better for mankind – and all the worse for the fishes.”53 Though it seems 
inescapably counterintuitive in retrospect, regular practitioners wereno more capable of 
healing than were their alternative competitors. As historians have overwhelmingly 
demonstrated, in fact, the treatment regimes of “regular” medicine did a great deal more 
harm than good (and were, in fact, significantly more dangerous than its “fringe” 
competitors). Heroic medicine’s physical therapies consisted of such violences as 
phlebotomy (bleeding), blistering, sweating, cupping, and dehydration; its pharmacopeia 
consisted largely of poisons like calomel (mercury chloride), arsenic compounds, tartar 
emetic, ipecac, digitalis.  
A particularly harrowing window onto the madcap scramble that constituted even 
the most mainstream medical treatment can be glimpsed in a review of Benjamin 
Phillips’s A Treatise on the Urethra in the quintessentially orthodox American Journal of 
the Medical Sciences of 1834. The review excerpts Phillips’s most strident piece of 
negative advice for treating “acute urethritis” in his own words: “The application of 
leeches to the penis, recommended by some authors, is certainly an improper practice; it 
is frequently followed by ecchymosis, caused by the infiltration of blood into the lax 
cellular tissue of that organ, occasioning inflammation, and sometimes gangrene.” The 
reviewer is not only not convinced by this advice; he stages his counterpoint as the hard-
won fruits of practical experience accumulated: “Here we are compelled to differ entirely 
from Mr. Phillips – having directed the free application of leeches along the route of the 
urethra in numerous cases, with marked benefit, and without producing any unpleasant 
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symptoms.”54 As historian William G. Rothstein ironically observes, “it hardly need be 
observed that regular medicine was not scientific.”55  
 It makes little sense to speak of “mainstream medicine” in this context; in Andrew 
Abbott’s terms, “The ‘doing of healing’ became a free-for-all.”56 Few medical 
practitioners – even regulars – had attended medical school, and fewer still were 
credentialed medical doctors.  Despite their own ineffectuality, that is, the characteristic 
charge regular physicians leveled against their competitors was that of quackery – the 
inability to understand medical theory or perform medical practice. In 1849, a jaded 
Naval physician offered this portrait of the obstacles impeding the work of the legitimate 
medical establishment:  
It is well known, that all efforts to limit the exercise of the profession of 
medicine to those who have the abilities and acquirements essential to 
its proper understanding, have utterly failed; and ignorant and impudent 
pretenders, under a great variety of humbugging titles, come before the 
public with equal rights, and a better chance for popular favor, than the 
regular practitioner. The public, unfortunately, seems to consider all 
efforts to limit the practice of medicine to those of scientific attainment, 
as the attempt of a sect to monopolize rights, and to infringe upon the 
largest liberty. Under this latitudinarian license, we have Indian doctors, 
urine doctors, root doctors, water doctors, stream doctors, and 
homeopaths, preying upon the community.57 
 
In short, American medicine at midcentury would have been hilarious if it had not been 
so dangerous. This sounds for all the world like a concerned reformer, interested in 
nothing so much as the exposure of charlatans and elimination of quacks from public life. 
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And perhaps this is precisely what the Navy doctor was – his sympathies, though, fall, 
cleanly and clearly, on the side of “the regular practitioner,” whose disciple was what 
later came to be called “heroic medicine.” The practice of regular physicians was based 
less on rigorous empirical testing or laboratory verification than the inhospitable claim to 
traditional authority; as Whooley explains, “The crux of their position was to deny the 
public’s (and by extension, the legislatures’) capability to judge medical knowledge. 
Their hierarchical view of knowledge held that medical knowledge could emanate 
legitimately only from within the ranks of regular physicians.”58  
The Exception: Mental Health and State Support 
 If medicine’s quest for state support had not looked quixotic in the first third of 
the century, this “era of reasonably friendly relations and close ties among doctors, 
lawyers, and the state came to an abrupt end about 1830, as ordinary lay people began to 
fear what they perceived to be growing concentrations of power in what was supposed to 
be an egalitarian republic” (DL, 87). In no small part due to the regulars’ aggressive, and 
sometimes arrogant, advocacy of “heroic” and dangerous treatments, nearly three 
quarters of all medical journals founded around midcentury “were affiliated with less-
prestigious specialties or highly contested medical schools.” Orthodox medicine was 
challenged on all sides by homeopaths (who “espoused, among other novel ideas, the 
practice of not killing patients with treatment”), eclectics, Thompsonian herbalists, 
botanists, hydropaths, and other sects, all of whom demanded equal standing under the 
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law.59 And, in the Jacksonian assault on market regulation, they were granted this 
recognition by 1840, when virtually every state repealed its licensure laws; only three 
states retained even the most gestural stipulations on legitimate practice.60 All doctors – 
no matter how sophisticated their bedside manner, or how clearly cracked their favored 
cures – became equals under the law.  
 There was, however, an exception to the widespread deregulation of the 
antebellum market for medical services: the discipline of mental health, or what became 
known as “Asylum medicine.” According to David Rothman’s influential The Discovery 
of the Asylum,  
Jacksonian Americans experienced a crisis of confidence in the social 
organization of the new republic, fearful that the ties that once bound 
citizens together – the ties of community, church, and family – were 
loosening and that, as a consequence, social disorganization appeared 
imminent. Their fears were confirmed and exacerbated by the extent of 
the crime, poverty, delinquency, and insanity that they saw around 
them. In response to these perceptions, to an anxiety about the stability 
of the social order and an alarm about the extent of social deviancy and 
dependency, they discovered the solution of the asylum.61 
 
In 1841, the antebellum era’s most impactful mental health reformer, Dorothea Dix, 
began aggressively campaigned local, state, and federal bodies for the creation of new, 
publicly-funded mental hospitals: “There is,” she wrote, “but one alternative – condemn 
your needy citizens to become the life-long victims of a terrible disease, or provide 
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remedial care in a State Hospital.”62 Dix’s muckraking and rabble-rousing efforts were 
remarkably successful: “The most tax-conscious assemblyman found it difficult to stand 
up against this overwhelming chorus. One after another, the states approved the necessary 
funds for erecting asylums” (DA, 133). Between 1810 and 1850, public asylums sprang 
up, dandelion-like. Each asylum was governed by a superintendent, and these 
superintendents “became the intermediaries between the state and the insane” (DA, 
xxxvi). Installed in, and granted virtually free reign over, these new public asylums, 
superintendents came close to achieving Rush’s vision of medical-professional 
omnipotence. In sum, Rothman writes, “The physicians’ expertise and power to heal 
legitimized their, but only their, exercise of authority. The doctor in charge, as [Robert] 
Castel puts it, was a kind of philosopher-king, a position that at once sanctioned and 
contained the exercise of unbridled discretion. The doctor’s despotism was confined to 
the mad in the asylum and as such did not contaminate the exercise of power in the civil 
society” (DA, xxxvi).  
Literary Professionalism 
The supernovas of eighteenth-century British criticism – Addison’s Spectator and 
Steele’s Tattler – took an amateur approach predicated on personal mobility, fiscal and 
occupational disinterestedness, promiscuous adventurousness, cultivated taste, and broad 
learning. Such a gentleman-critic was bound neither by the division of labor nor the 
demands of some discipline or other. In this essentially aristocratic conception, writes 
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Terry Eagleton, “The critic, as cultural strategist rather than literary expert, must resist 
specialization… Such amateurism is not ignorance or half-capacity, but the casual 
polymorphous expertise of one to whom no sector of cultural life is alien.”63 In the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, a school of critics – spearheaded by John Wilson in 
Britain and Lewis Gaylord Clark in New York – clung to this increasingly anachronistic 
ideal of belletristic amateurism; but their affectations of shabby gentility had no appeal 
for large swathes of an increasingly massified audience comprising readers from all (or at 
least, significantly more than before) walks of life.  
 As I have tried to show, the rise of modern conceptions of expertise, between 
1840-1860, was shadowed and countervailed by a persistent tendency to resist that 
ideology, inherited from Jacksonian democracy and the longer tradition of republican 
amateurism. But, as Eagleton suggests, this republican mode of fluid and promiscuous 
engagement with all aspects of culture and society “is the mark of a non-specialism 
which is perhaps only in part intelligible to us today, predating as it does that intellectual 
division of labor to which our own amateurisms are inevitably reactive.”64 If our 
understanding of modern professionalism, the new shapes and spaces carved by the 
intellectual division of labor, is impoverished without the background of democratic 
openness and scientific flatness, it is even harder to understand literary studies’ current 
impulse to generalism, openness, and amateurism without the context of intellectual 
specialization, the overwhelming pressure of finding one’s niche in the marketplace of 
ideas. Greg Daniels explains, “as the gentleman amateur had been the prototype of the 
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man of science in the eighteenth century, by the mid-nineteenth century the trained 
specialist – the professional whose sole source of support was his scientific employment 
– had come to be the new type.”65 According to Burton Bledstein, “Americans after 1870, 
but beginning after 1840, committed themselves to a culture of professionalism which 
over the years has established the thoughts, habits, and responses most modern 
Americans have taken for granted.”66  
 Since the 1980s, a welcome wave of scholarship has sought to place U.S. authors 
in the interconnected contexts of the division of labor, the development of mass culture, 
the tensions of social class, and the commodification of literature. Almost unanimously, 
critics who approach this complicated nexus of market forces in the terms of literary 
professionalism trace the genealogy of their own work back to William Charvat. In 
Charvat’s historical narrative, the concept of professional author became possible after 
1820, when infrastructural stagnation gave way to rapid advances in print technology, 
transportation and distribution networks, and the explosive growth of the reading public. 
These transformations were, however, by no means guarantees of professional 
accomplishment; in Charvat’s sense, “The terms of professional writing are these: that it 
provides a living for the author, like any other job; that it is a main and prolonged, rather 
than intermittent or sporadic, resource for the writer; that it is produced with the hope of 
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extended sale in the open market, like any article of commerce; and that it is written with 
reference to buyers’ tastes and reading habits.”67  
So, for Charvat, professional writing means, first and foremost, writing for a 
living: literature must provide the author’s sole (or at least primary) source of income. To 
gain a living by writing, then, the author is forced to craft the kinds of literary 
commodities a wide audience might want to consume. However, for Charvat, the 
professional writer must also write for himself (professional aspirants in Charvat’s sense 
were overwhelmingly male), or for the very sake of writing. Professionalism, then, 
combines both senses of vocation: the writer is called to write, but the writer must also 
get paid. The “mass poet,” who “writes primarily to exploit a market… is on that account 
excluded from history” (PAA, 108). Charvat is concerned, in other words, solely with 
“those writers for whom both art and income were matters of concern, and whose work, 
accordingly, revealed the often conflicting pressures of the will to create and the need of 
the buying public” (PAA, 7-8). Charvat’s definition finally forces him to conclude that 
James Fenimore Cooper was the “only commercially successful writer of belles-lettres up 
to 1850” (PAA, 68). 
 This all-but-unified trend of professional failure has led Leon Jackson to 
“question the validity of a study of the profession of authorship… that finds only one 
professional author in the first fifty of its seventy years of coverage.”68 In The Business of 
Letters, Jackson mounts a sustained and withering assault on Charvat’s idea of 
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professional authorship for “its abstract and anachronistic, if not downright ahistorical, 
nature. When professional authorship is defined in terms as restrictive as Charvat’s, the 
literary history of the early national and antebellum periods will always seem like a 
narrative of repeated failure to attain professional status” (Jackson, BL, 15). Jackson 
argues that “the paradigm of professionalization studies… was fundamentally flawed in 
conception, and… has now outlasted any heuristic or collateral value it might once have 
had… Charvat and others suppose that all authors at all times have sought to maximize 
their utility through professionalization and competitive engagement in the literary 
market, or they have explained failures to behave in this way as a consequence of 
exogenous factors that have stood in the way of such behavior” (Business, 1-2, 38). 
Jackson urges us to abandon the idea that antebellum authors either tried their damnedest 
(and almost always failed) to get rich, or mourned the obstacles that kept them from 
trying to get rich in the first place. Jackson is, I think, spot on in observing that  “the idea 
of professionalism, as Charvat understood it, hardly existed in the 1820s” (Jackson, BL, 
20). According to Charvat’s criteria, literary professionalism existed as a normative ideal 
at best – an aspirational castle in the sky, the object of writerly daydreams. Compounding 
this, Charvat provides only the flimsiest of grounds on which to differentiate a profession 
from any other occupational category. It seems at least ungenerous to claim that no “mass 
poet” made “art” a “matter of concern.” Writing poetry has never been anyone’s best bet 
for accumulating raw capital.  
 Jackson’s basic metacritical gambit is that professionalism should be driven from 
the critical-historical field; he argues “that the economics of authorship in the early 
national and antebellum periods were so complex and tangled, and the concepts of 
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amateur and professional as used by scholars today so crude and lacking in interpretive 
nuance, that [sic] work in this field would be best served by avoiding such terms 
altogether” (Jackson BL, 22). While it is certainly not necessary for critics to apply “the 
concepts of amateur and professional” to the study of literature, acknowledging 
contingency is not the same as conceding futility. Jackson’s interrogation of the at least 
it’s a living! model of professional authorship is welcome and salutary. Despite its 
sophisticated critical-theoretical apparatus, Charvat’s is the only account of the 
professionalism cited in Jackson’s work (with the exception of a brief, and somewhat 
dismissive, treatment of Weber’s writing on vocations.)  
 I see no reason to throw the baby of professionalism out with the Charvatian 
bathwater. Our critical imperative should rather be to bolster the heuristic value of 
professionalism. We will, then, need a new definition. Before embarking in this direction, 
I want to make clear what this study is not. It is not an examination of the ways literary 
texts themselves imagine or “figure” the literary profession. Nor is it an attempt to 
recover or isolate the existence of a profession of letters in history, though the question of 
when professional authorship emerged has been a source of enduring fascination (and not 
a little squabbling) within literary criticism. In his exemplary study of fin de siècle 
realism and journalism, The Labor of Words, Christopher Wilson suggested that the 
development of a “fully professionalized style awaited the emergence of a bona fide mass 
market.”69 It is not easy to see why Wilson traces this consecrating moment to the 1880s 
rather than Cooper’s 1820s or Louis A. Godey’s 1840s. An 1847 article in Fraser’s feted 
Samuel Johnson (dead by 1785) as the “first professional author – the first who, by dint 
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of courage and ability, kept himself free from the slavery of a booksellers’ hack, and free 
from the still worse slavery of attendance on the great. He sought his subsistence in 
public patronage, not in dedications to men of rank” – a sense of professionalism, it bears 
mentioning, that looks very much like Charvat’s.70 Finally, I am not suggesting that 
Melville, Poe, and Delany were or were not professional authors, in any rigorous sense of 
the term; nor, for that matter. I am not even suggesting that they were experts or masters; 
after all, I wasn’t there to watch them work.  
 My focus, instead, is on three related aspects of the texts of Poe, Melville, and 
Delany: first, hostility toward and critique of establishments, institutions, opposed parties, 
and individual enemies; second, the attempt to create what I call expertise effects, textual 
embodiments of special access or competence, markers that provide evidence of special 
knowledge without revealing the contents of that knowledge; and finally, the logic of 
professionalization – or, better still, the felt experience of professionalizing pressures and, 
just as decisively, professional disappointment.  
 For the sake of convenience more than rigor, these three aspects can be glossed in 
Weberian terms as (1) dismantling traditional and rational forms of authority, (2) 
attempting to cultivate authority through charisma, whether personal or 
(representationally) impersonal, and (3) the duties, pleasures, and frustrations inherent in 
vocational calling. The hermeneutic advantage of this relatively inclusive, but also clearly 
bounded, methodological approach is that it allows for close attention to rhetoric, 
aesthetic, and, for lack of a better term, ideology. It is also generically inclusive, allowing 
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for the interplay and counterpoint of pointed critique, personal fantasy, charismatic 
performance, and genuine vocational pursuit.  
 This constellation of critique, charisma, and vocation offers an inclusive, but not 
universalizing, perspective on literature and cultural production, and provides a kind of 
(purely pragmatic) coherence to an otherwise motley collection of authors and texts. (The 
ideal of universal experience, Dana Nelson reminds us, is born afflicted with the 
ideological fantasy of transcendent white manhood.) Such a schema might include those 
writers Mary Kelley designates “literary domestics” without ignoring the ambivalence 
Kelley sees as deeply imbricated in their vocational experience.71 I hope to show, too, 
that the disciplinary boundaries between “American Literature” and “African-American 
Literature” remain much less porous than is necessary (or salutary for either). Many 
(particularly New England) authors are excluded simply for their resolutely anti-
professional understanding of the vocation of authorship. For all his hostility to authority 
and projections of mastery, for instance, Emerson is excluded on the grounds that he 
“preferred to define himself in broad terms, as a scholar, and in his studies he cultivated a 
new amateurism, taking all the arts and sciences as his territory.”72 Indeed, I hope to 
challenge Meredith McGill’s influential argument that studies focused on the category of 
“the author” all-but-inevitably smuggle in a the binocular perspective of literary 
nationalism: “Even when they show how antebellum authors internalize a sense of their 
peripheral cultural status,” author-based studies “are able to discern little place for 
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literature outside of the nationalist frame of reference.”73 But the substance of this 
challenge to the reduction of author and nation is drawn in no small part from McGill’s 
laserlike focus on the particularity of markets, regions, and periods.  
 I am, in other words, entirely persuaded by the great lessons of the cultural-
critical humanities after deconstruction: the non-identity of persons, the fluidity and 
constructedness of gender and race, the performativity of gender and racial roles, the 
inescapable specificity of gendered and racialized experiences, and the artificial and 
totalizing nature of national boundedness and nation-state boundaries. I feel no need to 
prove these points again by adjudicating the conservative, progressive, or radical bona 
fides of texts and authorial personas.  
 Defining the abstract concept of “profession” is notoriously difficult – attempts to 
do so, generally unsatisfying. Here, as in most things, essentialism is as seductive as it is 
distracting. If “the regulation of abstract knowledge, and thus expert labour, is common 
to all societies,” Rosemary Crompton suggested, then “‘professionals’ should not be 
regarded as being in a distinctive category separate from other experts.”74 Laurence 
Veysey found it “best simply to give up the effort abstractly to define the term 
professional,” understanding the professions, instead, “as nothing more than a series of 
rather random occupations that have historically been called that in our own culture” – 
though with the curious caveat that “one should not forget that poets do not seem to 
                                                 
 
73 Meredith McGill, American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 79. 
 
74 Rosemary Crompton, “Professions in the Current Context,” Work, Employment & Society, Special Issue 
(May, 1990): 147-66. 
 39 
require the label professional, even though they have developed a skill with words 
certainly equal to that of lawyers.75 
 It is worth reiterating that the meaning of expertise is not any less historically 
specific; there is no Platonic form of expertise, or at least, not one accessible to merely 
mortal literary critics. The concept is protean, shifty, and relational: “claims concerning 
the essential nature of expertise cannot be sustained,” according to Christopher Winch, 
and the attempt to construct “a general theory of expertise” invites House of Usher-ish 
collapse. Accordingly, Winch advocates a strategy of understanding expertise by 
“appreciating its variety rather than by looking for what is common to all cases.”76  
 With Winch’s caveat in mind, I argue that the writers covered in this study shared 
a number of the felt imperatives broadly characteristic of their era’s professionalizing 
movements, which can be summed up, in broad strokes, by two desires: desire for the 
right, opportunity, and skill necessary to manufacture, market, and profit from specialized 
commodities; the desire for a lay-audience hungry to consume those commodities, and 
willing to subjugate its own instincts to the superior judgment of the author. In her 
foundational study, The Rise of the Professions, Magali Larson identifies modern 
professionalism as the project “by which producers of special services sought to 
constitute and control a market for their expertise.”77 After establishing a market, the 
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profession’s second objective was “to gain special status for their members and give them 
respectability” (TRP, 8). This sought-after professional legitimacy depends on both peer 
acceptance and the indulgence of the public at large. In sum, nineteenth-century 
professionalization was “an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources – special 
knowledge and skills – into another – social and economic rewards” (TRP, xvii).  
 This professional project included both the urges of naked capitalism and a series 
of constitutively ambivalent mechanisms that resisted laissez faire market pressures. 
“Professional entrepreneurs, not unlike their counterparts in industry,” she argues, were 
“bound to solicit state protection and state-enforced penalties against unlicensed 
competitors – that is to say, those producers of services whose training and entry into the 
market they had not controlled” (TRP, 14). Along with the imperatives to market control 
and elevated group status, Larson identifies three “traditional or pre capitalist 
components,” anti-market “residues,” in professional ideology: first, “a work ethic 
derived from ideals of craftsmanship, which finds intrinsic value in work and is 
expressed in the notion of vocation or calling”; second, “the ideal of universal service,” 
most often patterned on the genteel “model of gentlemanly disinterestedness”; and 
finally, “a secularized version of the feudal notion of noblesse oblige” (TRP, 220).  
 This deposits us a long way from Charvat’s relatively straightforward association 
of professionalism and economic self-sufficiency. If there is a logic uniting the texts I 
examine here, it is the insistence on performing negative critique and positive fantasy – 
often in uncomfortably close proximity – out of a (felt or projected) sense of duty. The 
unifying affect, then, is ambivalence: ambivalence toward the market, ambivalence 
toward the audience, and anxiety over the very legitimacy of authorship. This is less a 
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matter of knowledge, or rational persuasion, than on what passes (or fails to pass) for 
knowledge. I find Michael Warner’s explanation of the mechanisms organizing liberal 
print culture helpful, here: 
Success in this game is not a matter of having better arguments or more 
complex positions. It is a matter of uptake, citation, and 
recharacterization. It takes place not in closely argued essays but in an 
informal, intertextual, and multigeneric field. There is no reason why 
intellectuals should be specially positioned for public address in this 
sense, except where they are packaged as experts. And expert 
knowledge is in an important way nonpublic: its authority is external to 
the discussion. It can be challenged only by other experts, not within 
the discourse of the public itself.78  
 
If nothing else, expertise effects come to serve as rhetorical trump cards – uptake hacks, 
you might call them. If the legitimacy of the author’s expertise were recognized by the 
layreader, the non-expert audience member, the author became much more likely to wield 
influence over that reader. Poe, Melville, and Delany developed and deployed arsenals of 
techniques, sometimes to foster their own legitimacy or mastery, and sometimes to 
ironize or obliterate somebody else’s. This is a study of those arsenals.  
 In my first chapter, “The Abduction of Edgar Allan Poe,” I examine a certain 
strain of development in Poe’s prose, in three rough stages. First, I briefly consider Poe’s 
early criticism as an exercise in what Michael Allen calls “expert style.” The components 
of expert style – broad erudition, esoteric penetration, and the exposure of charlatans – 
were intended to foster an avant garde literary community, under the aegis of authority 
(Poe), in opposition to the popular literary “mob” of uncomprehending dupes and 
unregenerate quacks. Poe’s mid-career tales, increasingly taken by critics to be “hoaxes,” 
can better be understood as performances of the relationship between author and audience 
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imagined in Poe’s earlier journalism. The awed narrator of Poe’s detective stories, I 
argue, takes up the position of the expert’s lay-audience. With unwavering credulity, the 
narrator depicts C. Auguste Dupin’s investigative technique, which he calls “analysis,” as 
the preternatural ability to “disentangle” effects into causes – a fully functional mastery 
of the endlessly interconnected natural universe no less than the hopelessly jumbled 
social field. In tales of madness like “The Black Cat” and “The Imp of the Perverse,” on 
the other hand, nameless criminals narrate their confessions, placing us, Poe’s readers, in 
the uncomfortable dual-position of trial juror and judge: even as we adjudicate the 
narrator’s sanity, we are forced to evaluate his insights – presented with all the weight of 
natural science and phrenology – into human nature. The effect is a kind of vertigo, 
produced by an alchemical interaction of irony and esoteric certainty. Finally, I turn to the 
late treatise, Eureka, wherein Poe confronts us with a literally prophetic vision of nature 
and reality. In his own name, Poe combines the roles of expert critic, analytic detective, 
and mad philosopher; again, the reader is confronted with the need to choose – this time, 
between the incompatible roles of juror, judge, and credulous disciple. In Eureka, finally, 
Poe serves both as author and as his own awed audience.  
 My second chapter, “Irony as Expertise: Herman Melville’s Shell Game,” argues 
that the characters populating The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade – most often 
treated, by critics, as avatars of Satan himself – can best be understood as precisely what 
they seem to be: optimistic reformers, opportunistic neo-professionals, and profit-seeking 
speculators. Against the pervasive tendency to read The Confidence-Man as an echo-
chamber of ironic instability and unintelligible myth-syncretism, I want to insist that 
Melville’s difficult last novel constitutes his most sustained engagement with the 
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sociocultural developments of his day: divided labor, intellectual commodification, and 
disembedding. Following Karl Polanyi, Anthony Giddens describes disembedding in 
terms of two “abstract systems.” Where economic exchange becomes mediated through 
“symbolic tokens” (money), interpersonal familiarity is interrupted by increasing reliance 
on “expert systems” (professionals). Melville’s narrative strategy reproduces 
disembedding in textual form. The narrator’s endlessly self-qualifying, often hypothetical 
descriptions force the reader to make tenuous interpretive judgments based on insufficient 
evidence. Placing confidence in any character constitutes a risky investment, and may 
lead to an outright swindle: the herb doctor and the Philosophical Intelligence Officer 
invoke the palliative powers of science in order to exploit their ostensible victims’ 
vulnerabilities; the man with the book solicits speculation in a dubious joint-stock 
company; the Black Guinea may be neither black nor disabled. And yet, for all that, the 
narrative never provides evidence that any character has been diddled or defrauded. As 
the mediating point between the reader and the text’s relentless abstraction, the narrator is 
both the book’s only potentially credible authority, and the sole source of its evidence. We 
are at the mercy of his mastery over the world he describes, but he refuses to describe that 
world straightforwardly. In a strange way, then, The Confidence-Man is Melville’s most 
professionalized work: the addled reader’s inescapable reliance on an aloof, indifferent 
narrator corresponds precisely to the relationship between doctor and patient, sinner and 
cleric, investor and financial advisor. By the end of his career as an aspiring literary 
professional, then, Melville evinces a rigorous skepticism about the possibility of 
professional legitimacy. Fittingly, after The Confidence-Man, Melville retreated to the 
genteel amateurism of privately circulated poetry manuscripts.  
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 Finally, I analyze Martin Delany’s pseudo-apocalyptic picaresque of unrealized 
slave insurrection, Blake: Or, the Huts of America, in terms of its eponymous 
protagonist’s mastery over what he calls the “secret” of black “organization,” which 
implies a plan for the general insurrection of slaves in the south. While critics generally 
see this secret as Delany’s attempt to cultivate moral panic at the possibility of slave 
insurrection, I argue, in my third chapter, “Democracy and Charismatic Authority in 
Blake,” that this secret of organization is, rather, Blake’s managerial acumen, the ends of 
which are ultimately bureaucratic rather than revolutionary. Blake’s access to this secret 
is predicated less on knowledge than on charisma, and less on a facility for rational 
argument than on a preternatural ability to persuade through a kind of mesmeric 
suggestion. Though he has shown Blake meticulously sowing the seeds of revolution, 
Delany’s narrator conspicuously occludes the violent insurrection seemingly demanded 
by the book’s first half. Instead, at the novel’s midpoint, Delany shifts the setting to Cuba, 
where, in the circumscribed bounds of the island community, Blake is able to magnetize 
followers into a centralized black clerisy, a rank-and-file hierarchy of resistance fighters. 
Their resistance, though, is deployed not through violent conflict but through discipline, 
hierarchy, and atomized specialization. In Blake, the creation of a competent class under 
the guidance of a charismatic leader is imagined as finally more revolutionary than any 
single act of revolutionary violence. So, Blake becomes Delany’s harbinger, not of race 
war, but of corporate competition between the authoritarian, ramshackle white monopoly 
and an imminent, better-organized, better-disciplined black administration. Thus, the 
novel reflects Delany’s frustration with the vast scope of the problem of racial 
subjugation in the United States, and his fantasy of solving that problem through the 
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proliferation of a competitive black professional class, which would be evolved from the 






THE ABDUCTION OF EDGAR ALLAN POE: 




Like a good many deft rhetoricians, Edgar Allan Poe’s projection of expertise – 
our sense that he knows what he is talking about – depends less on the dissemination of 
knowledge than on the successful representation of knowledge possessed. More 
persuader than educator, more self-publicist than popularizer, Poe is generally indifferent 
to making the esoteric accessible; his trick – or, at least, his goal – is to make sure we 
think he has access to the esoteric. Of course, this description is itself more argumentative 
than explanatory; it might purport to get to the bottom of things, to lift the curtain and 
reveal the wizard, but it actually produces something new, or at least different. It lives by 
uptake – the extent to which it is accepted, adopted, or even refuted; it dies by being 
dismissed or ignored. In the core of what follows, then, I consider one complex problem 
– how (and why) does Poe project, or at least endeavor to project, the impression of his 
own expertness? – from the perspectives of three sequential, if obviously overlapping, 
phases in his career.  
Schematically and diachronically, the chapter maps onto Poe’s early criticism, his 
mid-period tales of ratiocination, and his late, intergeneric, speculative ruminations on the 
structure of cosmos and mind. In his savage early reviews, Poe attempts to vindicate his 
own poetic productions by allocating nearly all discursive power in a kind of criticism 
that increasingly cloaks the gustatory judgments of the connoisseur in a rhetoric of 
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logical rigor (which isn’t at all synonymous with a logically rigorous method). As he 
finds his footing around 1840, Poe formulates a deceptively simple pseudo-system, a kind 
of universal logic, predicated on an idiosyncratic conception of critical “analysis” and 
imaginative “composition” as the inverse (and readily reversible) operations of a single 
mental faculty. Though this bivalent principle is the crown jewel of his philosophy and 
methodology (to the extent that he truly had either), Poe rarely explores its potential 
limitations in his essays, opting instead to expose the gears and pinwheels in the voices of 
the unreliable, eminently unbelievable narrators of his tales of detection and perversion. 
The mask of fiction freed him up to critique, ironize, and sometimes undermine the 
universalism implied by journalistic claims of hyper-competence. Late Poe rehearses but 
reverses these earlier concerns by investing discursive power in authors by exposing the 
poetic origins of scientific discovery. In his final years, that is, Poe supplemented his 
quasi-rigorous method of analysis with an anti-rational, if not precisely mystical, concept 
of intuition – a kind of revelatory apparatus that produced authoritative knowledge 
without reference to tradition. Intuition, that is, generates thoughts that do not follow 
from what has been thought before, but seem in themselves entirely authoritative. 
Ultimately, Poe argues that all genuine breakthroughs in thought, no matter how 
scientific they seem in retrospect, are poetic in their origins.  
This chapter, then, explores what I take to be Poe’s complex strategies of literary 
expertise, which can, I think, best be understood in terms of a broad project of literary 
professionalization. Less a five-year plan than a fantasy, Poe’s professionalizing project 
was by no means unambiguous, and frequently countervailed by pessimistic, even anti-
professional, sentiments (some adopted deliberately and some anxiously, if not 
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unconsciously). In broad diachronic strokes, my argument is that Poe figures, as well as 
any other antebellum writer, the drive toward legitimacy, prestige, and legal protection 
that could only be achieved through the establishment and ascendancy of a literary 
association (which is tantamount to saying a literary profession) on the basis of shared 
principles, imperatives, and ambitions. Unfortunately for Poe, this ambition would, by the 
turn of the century, be realized in the separate streams of literary scholarship in the 
expanding academy (the professor’s profession) and, less triumphally, in the newly 
“objective” practice of journalism.79 
If the logic of professionalization goes some way toward explaining Poe’s 
conversion from amateurish critical connoisseur into a proto-professional, quasi-scientific 
critic, as well as his status as the pioneer of nearly every conceivable genre of formula 
fiction, I don’t mean to suggest that Poe was a professional in any essential sense, or that 
he had a clear plan for professional literature. Professionalization is, after all, in no small 
part an exercise in wish fulfillment, and Poe is not renowned for the stability of his 
fantasy life. Any amateur can become competent through study and training; only the 
professional has been forged in the baptismal fire of institutional ritual: examination, 
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credentials, and licensure. But what of status-claims that have not (yet) been monopolized 
by a competent community? With typical nimbleness, Erving Goffman observes,  
Claims to be a law graduate can be established as valid or invalid, but 
claims to be a friend, a true believer, or a music-lover can be confirmed 
or disconfirmed only more or less. Where standards of competence are 
not objective, and where bona fide practitioners are not collectively 
organized to protect their mandate, an individual may style himself an 
expert and be penalized by nothing stronger than sniggers.80 
 
While should by no means underestimate the force of contempt, and the avoidance of 
shame, in shaping behavior, it is interesting to reflect that fear of “sniggers” is the 
strongest disincentive against me declaring, for example, that I am a poet of profound 
genius, unconscionably neglected by the world. People who claim to be poets tend to 
seem boorish; people who are poets are cagey or evasive (not to say poetical) about it. 
Poe could be both.  
Even before the untimely and mysterious death of antebellum America’s leading 
purveyor of hypnagogic lyrics and doppelgänger yarns, readers had conjured up enough 
Poeish specters to fill a Whitman catalogue. As Scott Peeples points out, in his invaluable 
study of Poe’s critical “afterlife,” this critical taxonomy tells us less about “who Poe was” 
than it does about “what ‘Poe’ is” (and, we might add, what critics want him to be).81 
Timothy H. Scherman offers a useful heuristic for mapping the relationship between 
Poe’s rhetorical self-projections and his many, variously divergent and overlapping, 
receptions:  
Famous as he is today for the evanescent ‘readerly’ sensations 
generated in his tales of horror and ratio native intrigue, his work would 
be all but forgotten were it not for his expertise in creating – out of, 
                                                 
 
80 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), 60-
61. 
 
81 Scott Peeples, The Afterlife of Edgar Allan Poe (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004), ix. 
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effectively, ‘nothing’ – an ‘authority effect’ in the cultural field… Once 
Poe had established through various stylistic and rhetorical manoeuvers 
the quasi-holographic projection of himself… he could do little to 
control the progress of that projection, or what I have called here his 
‘authority effect.’82  
 
The “authority effect” neatly suggests both Poe’s specific contribution to the enterprise of 
his reception – the impression of his virtually ex nihilo “expertise” – and the swiftness 
with which this specificity was buried in the avalanche of praise and blame, imitation and 
recrimination.83 
Two hundred years of Poe’s cultural centrality have conspired to ensure that even 
a study dead-set on delegitimizing individual centrality as an organizing principle of 
literary history will have little choice but to use Poe himself to illustrate the point. As 
Wimsatt and Brooks put it, “It is possible to rate Poe up or down. It is difficult to avoid 
him.”84 Poe had a “seductive influence on great writers,” as exhaustively demonstrated 
by Burton R. Pollin; but, then again, Pollin’s judgment begs the question of which writers 
count as “great.” In a sense, the begging of the question is more critically interesting than 
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the judgment itself, since canon-formation is, we might say, a series of variously 
indelicate attempts to answer the question, which authors belong in the canon? while 
studiously evading or polemically bulldozing the question, on what grounds? In 1994, 
Joyce Carol Oates asked, “Who has not been influenced by Poe?”85 A half-century 
earlier, T.S. Eliot, cautious as a prairie dog, had answered: “one cannot be sure that one's 
own writing has not been influenced by Poe.”86 Taking a measure of Poe’s influence on 
literary history, popular culture, and the elite profession of criticism is like accounting for 
the influence of nitrogen on everyday life: it is as omnipresent as it is easy to disavow, 
everywhere and nowhere, holding the air itself together or doing precisely nothing; at 
certain depths, it becomes narcotic; too deep, it is toxic.87  
There are perhaps as many Poes as there are critical accounts of Poe, but it is 
instructive, if reductive, to group the portraits into the two camps captured in the title of 
Stuart Levine’s 1972 study, Edgar Poe: Seer and Craftsman.88 As a seer/visionary, Poe 
can readily be credited with the demi-divine faculty of origination – of being first, 
marking the break, inaugurating the new in history. Poe’s work and thought has been 
diagnosed as the originary fount for a dizzying variety of technical innovations, literary 
genres, and even schools of thought; such diagnoses have been countered by less 
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88 Stuart Levine, Edgar Poe: Seer and Craftsman (Deland, Fla.: Everett/Edwards 1972). 
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enthusiastic, and often less sympathetic, critics who see Poe as a derivative or relatively 
minor footnote in the history of thought and art.89 This pattern – fervent affirmations of 
Poe’s originality crashing against the rocks of equally fervent, if unimpressed, 
protestations of Poe’s uninspired, derivative artifice – holds for virtually every notable 
aspect of Poe’s career. For the Poe-positive W.H. Auden, “His portraits of abnormal or 
self-destructive states contributed much to Dostoevski, his ratiocinating hero is the 
ancestor of Sherlock Holmes and his many successors, his tales of the future lead to H.G. 
Wells, his adventure stories to Jules Verne and Stevenson.”90 If he did not steal it from 
Sophocles, Voltaire, Henry Fielding, Eugéne François Vidocq, or Honoré de Balzac, then 
Poe almost certainly created the detective story.91 If he did not invent Anglophone Gothic 
fiction, he was at least the first to “excel in” and to “formulate a thorough and convincing 
theory of the Gothic,” or so argues George E. Haggerty.92 Seminal SF historian Hugo 
                                                 
 
89 At the extreme end of this oppositional limb, Harold Bloom sits almost alone: “Emerson fathered 
pragmatism; Poe fathered precisely nothing, which is the way he would have wanted it.” “Inescapable 
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90 W.H. Auden, “Introduction to Edgar Allan Poe: Selected Prose and Poetry,” in The Recognition of Edgar 
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Gernsback early on affirmed Poe’s status as “the father of ‘scientifiction.’ It was he who 
really originated the romance, cleverly weaving into and around the story, a scientific 
thread.”93  
Critical enthusiasm for Poe-the-originator can sometimes obscure the vital 
countertradition of craftsmanship: the critical habit of casting Poe as the self-directed star 
of a whiz-bang variety show, a theater of the effect, cobbled together from prefab sets, 
chintzy props, Foley thunder, and (above all) smoke and mirrors. “Some critics,” as 
Richard Wilbur notes, “have refused to see any substance… in Poe’s fiction, and have 
regarded his tales as nothing more than complicated machines for saying ‘boo.’”94 D.H. 
Lawrence saw Poe’s robotic style as a transparent symptom of his robotic soul: “The 
absence of real central or impulsive being in him leaves him inordinately, mechanically 
sensitive to sounds and effects, associations of sounds, associations of rhyme, for 
example – mechanical, facile, having no root in any passion.”95 Harry Levin emphasizes 
the monological quality of Poe’s cross-genre narrative persona, which evokes for him 
“the patter of a stage magician, adept at undermining our incredulity with a display of 
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sham erudition, scientific pretensions, quotations from occult authorities, and 
misquotations from foreign languages.” 96 
When twentieth-century critics described Poe as mechanical, mathematical, or 
overly technical, they typically meant to address his psychological peculiarity. Indeed, 
the same can be said for Poe’s contemporaries and immediate followers, but in the 
nineteenth century, the issue was less settled. For many of his early champions, Poe’s 
formal mastery and technical sophistication was precisely what made him powerful. As 
one obituary notice put it, “The characteristic of his mind was its wonderful analytical 
power. This was the great secret of his literary success. He would take a great poem 
mentally to pieces, just as a mechanician would take to pieces a watch, and thus learn, 
like the artisan, how to construct a similar one.”97 In the 1845 essay that popularized Poe 
to the literary nationalists of New York, James Russell Lowell hails Poe for his potent 
admixture of “two of the prime qualities of genius, a faculty of vigorous yet minute 
analysis, and a wonderful fecundity of imagination” (CH, 163). Even when his tales seem 
to leap from “the probable into the weird confines of superstition and unreality” – when 
reason has, to all appearance, ceded the field to chaos – this impression is as concertedly 
composed as a minuet: “Even his mystery is mathematical to his own mind. To him x is a 
known quantity all along. In any picture that he paints, he understands the chemical 
properties of all his colors” (CH, 164).  
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Three years of miscommunication, frustrated ambitions, and distinctly Poe-ish 
misbehavior later, Lowell had no further interest in the volunteer position of image 
consultant to Mr. Poe. Where his essay had rendered Poe’s “genius” as the homogenous, 
fluid solution of “analysis” and “imagination,” a jaunty stanza in A Fable for Critics 
(1848), sketches Poe himself as the chemical suspension of two rigidly proportioned 
elements:  
There comes Poe, with his Raven, like Barnaby Rudge,  
Three fifths of him genius and two fifths sheer fudge, 
Who talks like a book of iambs and pentameters, 
In a way to make people of common sense damn meters, 
Who has written some things quite the best of their kind, 
But the heart somehow seems all squeezed out by the mind.98 
 
Even as it travesties Poe’s fondness for measurable metrics and literary machines, 
Lowell’s quasi-statistical distillation of genius and obscurantist bullshit encapsulates 
Poe’s growing reputation for indifference to (or incomprehension of) exoteric clarity and 
emotional accessibility. The qualities that had typified Poe’s greatest virtues – 
observational detachment, mathematical precision, analytically-enhanced imagination – 
are made to look ridiculous, and to make Poe look ridiculous: a gifted, stunted, robotic 
oddity.99  
In his infamous obituary, Poe’s literary executor Rufus Griswold memorialized 
Poe as a “dreamer – dwelling in ideal realms – in heaven or hell”; Griswold’s Poe, 
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trapped in his own mind, “walked the streets, in madness or melancholy,” oblivious to 
and contemptuous of his surroundings (CH, 387, 299). And yet, for all the animus aimed 
at Poe personally, Griswold is actually quite complimentary of the tales and lyrics (he 
even professes admiration for Eureka). But, for Griswold, “as a critic, he was more 
remarkable as a dissector of sentences than as a commentator upon ideas. He was little 
better than a carping grammarian” (CH, 301, italics in original).100 After Griswold’s 
opening salvo, a fusillade of obituaries and exposés aimed to lay bare Poe’s seemingly 
unworldly nature. Even critics who saw Griswold’s portrait as a character-assassinating 
caricature tended to share the premise of Poe’s inability to penetrate the real world, or to 
commune with normal people. Evert Duyckinck – the figurehead of literary Young 
America, and Poe’s occasional ally in literary battles – is most often, and not 
unreasonably, seen as a debunker of Griswold’s scurrilous attacks. That said, in his two 
reviews of Griswold’s edition of Poe’s works, only the second disputes the mad-dreamer 
myth. The first – a bracing, single-paragraph enumeration of Poe’s deficiencies – rather 
amplifies than contravenes Griswold’s appraisal of Poe’s atrophied emotional equipment. 
But rather than a hot-blooded, Byronic vates, Duyckinck’s Poe is an arid formalist, a 
metronomic meter-beater, a kind of soulless abacus:  
His genius was mathematical, rather than pictorial or poetic… His 
indifference to living, flesh and blood subjects, explains his fondness 
for the mechanism and music of verse, without reference to the thought 
or feeling… His instrument is neither an organ nor a harp; he is… a 
Swiss bell-ringer, who from little contrivances of his own, with an 
ingeniously devised hammer, strikes a sharp melody, which has all that 
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is delightful and affecting, that is attainable without a soul. (CH, 337-
38) 
 
When Duyckinck concludes the review by thanking the editors and publishers volume for 
“wheel[ing] into public view this excellent machine,” it’s impossible to tell if the 
machine he means is the book, the text, or the author (CH, 338).  
Toward a Rigorous Connoisseurship 
Poe was no more a gentleman of leisure and letters than his audience was a cross-
section of upper-crust gentility; he often complained of the “gentlemen of elegant leisure” 
who, ensconced in their provincial “cliques,” controlled the American publishing industry 
(ER, 1003). Vulnerable, and acutely aware of his vulnerability, to the caprices of the 
market, Poe’s relationship with capital was never more than that of an aspirant to an 
obstacle. Poe’s endless quest for a living wage depended, in Terence Whalen’s terms, on 
his ability to “adapt his talents to the unstable and perhaps unfathomable tastes of a 
distant mass audience.”101 Poe found himself forced to fashion new tools and techniques 
for relating to – for, literally, establishing relationships between himself and – an abstract 
readership he could only imagine. But Poe did not simply abandon the ideal of an elite 
audience; rather, as Whalen argues, “he viewed his texts as split or divided objects – one 
part containing literary value for the critical taste, the other part containing such matter as 
would render them profitable to the mass market.”102 
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A new form of literary authority, based on criteria other than class identification, 
was sorely needed; so critics began to recast the conventions of classicism – wide 
learning, principled judgment, comfort with any experience or idea – in the crucible of 
European Romanticism and scientific formalism. What emerged, in the form of critics 
like Coleridge and Carlyle, was the “tone of the sober intellectual expert, or the 
philosopher” – a tone that enabled its wielders “to play the role of the philosopher expert 
rather than that of the gentleman connoisseur of good writing.”103 Taking a cue from the 
“great magazine exponent of the expert role,” Thomas De Quincey, Poe accented his 
wide-ranging investigations with “a tone of expert knowledge which could hardly be 
supported by research in the time at the disposal of the journalist” (PBMT, 85-6). 
Occasionally, Poe also (again like de Quincey) drops “the merest jocular hint to his more 
educated readers… that his authority is not so absolute as he pretends, but the tenor of his 
exposition is fundamentally serious and has all the rhetorical appeal of expertise” 
(PBMT, 86).104  
Poe did not emerge from his cocoon as a full-fledged “intellectual expert.” In his 
early years as a wage-earning writer, Poe cultivated a critical style I call “rigorous 
connoisseurship,” a taste-based (which is to say, essentially unprincipled) approach to 
reading texts. His protestations of fairness, his conspicuous displays of erudition, his 
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theatrically indubitable discriminations, and (especially) his ritualistic unmasking of 
quacks work in conjunction to delimit legitimate and illegitimate practices of literary 
production. In this section, then, I trace the contours of Poe’s critical techniques of 
authority – a rhetorical quiver of tactical tricks and tropes, each chosen for its potential to 
engender the impression of a three-tiered literary hierarchy: author-critic, elite reader, and 
philistine (which is to say, anyone who disagreed with Poe).  
There is something uncanny in the fact that Poe’s first important contribution to 
criticism was written and published by a twenty-two year old man, a military veteran who 
had already washed out of one center of higher learning and was even then courting a 
fresh wave of academic and military disappointment. After serving for two years in the 
U.S. Army, Poe resigned from his position as a noncommissioned officer to enroll in 
West Point Academy in 1830, though, as it would turn out, his eyes for a military career 
had been bigger than his stomach; in less than a year, Poe launched a campaign of 
insubordination that eventually saw him court marshaled and expelled. In the midst of 
this misadventure in soldiery, Poe wrote the epistolary essay (datelined “West Point, 
1831”) that would become the preface to Poems by Edgar A. Poe, Second Edition (1831).  
“Letter to Mr. –––” offers a kind of literary-critical sonogram, a prefiguration of 
the themes and fixations Poe would flesh out over the next two decades. Stylistically, the 
essay runs the gamut of rhetorical tricks, moods, and postures that would eventually 
distinguish Poe’s critical voice: urbane persiflage, unimpeachable tastefulness, corrosive 
disgust, naked hypocrisy, and the profound-sounding vagueness of quasi-occult insight. It 
is also possible to trace the inchoate outlines of Poe’s later aesthetic theory. In the 
“Letter,” Poe first decries British literature’s despotic hold on America’s taste (and 
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market); he first sneers at the absurd idea of a long poem; he first guarantees qualified 
judgment’s superiority to popular opinion; he first insists that truth should be sought in 
surfaces, not in depths; he even offers half-formed versions of what would become his 
critical signatures: the autonomy of poetry, and the primacy of effect. In sum, the preface 
is a surprisingly comprehensive entree into the public sphere – particularly the subspheres 
of critical judgment and self-promotion – that would thenceforth serve as his critical 
stomping ground.  
But the essay is most notable for its fast-and-loose approach to polemics. As a 
many-limbed, schoolyard-rules pummeling of Wordsworth and Coleridge, the “Letter” is 
a minor masterpiece of juvenilia. While the epistolary essay’s titular addressee has never 
been positively identified, Poe did dedicate the edition of Poems it prefaced to his fellow 
cadets at West Point. In this light, it makes good sense to read the preface as a 
conspiratorial missive from a rebellious collegian to his peers. The piece is as serious as it 
is silly, as feral as it is conspiratorial. In roughly equal measure, “Letter to Mr. –––” 
investigates the nature of critical authority and judgment, and lashes out at the Lake poets 
(and, with especial ferocity, Wordsworth). Poe proves remarkably game in the little acts 
of sophomoric literary vandalism that seem somehow bracing, even brave. The essay 
frames its critique of the Lake Poets in the pragmatic-sophistic terms of literary 
nationalism Poe would slip into and out of like a pair of toy handcuffs over the course of 
his career: “You are aware of the great barrier in the path of an American writer. He is 
read, if at all, in preference to the combined and established wit of the world. I say 
established; for it is with literature as with law or empire – an established name is an 
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estate in tenure, or a throne in possession.”105 Positioning himself a particularly savvy 
specimen of the Aspiring American Author type, Poe acknowledges his quest for 
recognition and profit artificially constrained by a transatlantic literary market rigged in 
favor of the European establishment.  
Against the backdrop of this moral tableau, Poe launches his madcap assault on 
“the most singular heresy in [poetry’s] modern history – the heresy of what is called very 
foolishly, the Lake School” (CT, 6). Wordsworth catches the brunt of the broadside for 
what Poe sees as his intellectualized abstraction, jargon-laced obscurity, and versified 
sermonizing – the enduring cardinal sins in Poe’s poetic economy. But again, Poe’s 
values are clumsily cloaked in the rhetoric of quasi-deductive reasoning and appeals to 
authority, as in his effort to show up Wordsworth’s presumed belief that instruction, not 
pleasure, is a poem’s proper end:  
Aristotle, with singular assurance, has declared poetry the most 
philosophical of all writing – but it required a Wordsworth to 
pronounce it the most metaphysical. He seems to think that the end of 
poetry is, or should be, instruction – yet it is a truism that the end of our 
existence is happiness; if so, the end of every separate part of our 
existence – every thing connected with our existence should still be 
happiness. Therefore the end of instruction should be happiness; and 
happiness is another name for pleasure; – therefore the end of 
instruction should be pleasure: yet we see the above mentioned opinion 
implies precisely the reverse. (CT, 6-7).106 
 
The letter’s opening paragraphs lays bare two “vulgar error[s]” infecting the prevailing 
view of criticism: first, the belief “that a good critique on a poem may be written by one 
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who is no poet himself”; second, “the notion that no poet can form a correct estimate of 
his own writings” (CT, 6, 7). Poe rather posits a strict correspondence between the 
concepts of “poetical talent” and critical judiciousness: “in proportion of the poetical 
talent, would be the justice of a critique upon poetry. Therefore, a bad poet would, I 
grant, make a false critique, and his self-love would infallibly bias his little judgment in 
his favor; but a poet, who is indeed a poet, could not, I think, fail of making a just 
critique” (CT, 5, 6).  
Though it is not explicitly marked, Poe’s poet-critic equation repurposes one of 
Coleridge’s famous claims: “No man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same 
time a profound philosopher.”107 But Poe’s more explicit target is Wordsworth’s 
insistence that, in order to judge with “absolute value,” a critic must have “a mind at once 
poetical and philosophical,” and must cultivate that mind by making “poetry a study.”108 
Beyond didacticism and obtuseness, then, the British poets’ “heresy,” is a willing, even 
eager, subordination of poetry to knowledge. Poe will have none of this. His poet is 
emphatically not a philosopher; indeed, poetry is inimical to philosophy, just as 
philosophy is incompatible with criticism: “Against the subtleties which would make 
poetry a study – not a passion – it becomes the metaphysician to reason – but the poet to 
protest” (CT, 7). Poe’s invocation of the fidelity between poetry and protest might 
account, to some extent, for the seeming absence of either justice or critique in the essay. 
If the “Letter” is critically just, it is so precisely to the extent that it expresses the full 
                                                 
 
107 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, in The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
vol. 3 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1884), 381. 
 
108 William Wordsworth, “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface” in The Complete Poetical Works of 
William Wordsworth, vol. 10, Prefatory Essays and Notes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 75. 
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weight of poetic protest, which Poe further figures as a battle between authorities, for the 
prize of authority: “The diffidence… with which I venture to dispute their authority, 
would be overwhelming, did I not feel, from the bottom of my heart, that learning has 
little to do with the imagination – intellect with the passions – or age with poetry” (CT, 
7).  
The most remarkable moment in the “Letter” is, strangely, an act of retribution 
against Wordsworth’s bad taste, his injudicious judgment of James Macpherson’s Ossian 
poems: “that he may bear down every argument in favor of these poems, he triumphantly 
drags forward a passage, in his abomination of which he expects the reader to 
sympathize.” That he seems particularly fond of the Ossian passage in question only 
heightens his contempt for Wordsworth’s contempt. Poe does not sympathize. Instead, as 
if to ask Wordsworth how he likes it, Poe “triumphantly drags forth” a pair of passages 
from Wordsworth’s pastorals (though not before treating them to a generous dose of 
editorial tweaking): 
 Imprimis:  
“And now she’s at the pony’s head, 
And now she’s at the pony’s tail, 
On that side now, and now on this, 
And almost stifled her with bliss –  
A few sad tears does Betty shed, 
She pats the pony where or when 
She knows not: happy Betty Foy! 
O Johnny! never mind the Doctor!” 
 
 Secondly: 
“The dew was falling fast, the–stars began to blink, 
I heard a voice, it said–drink, pretty creature, drink, 
And looking o’er the hedge, be–fore me I espied 
A snow-white mountain lamb with a – maiden at its side, 
No other sheep were near, the lamb was all alone, 
And by a slender cord was – tether’d to a stone.”  
 
Now we have no doubt this is all true; we will believe it, 
indeed we will, Mr. W. Is it sympathy for the sheep you wish to excite? 
I love a sheep from the bottom of my heart (CT, 9) 
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Poe’s misquotations transform Wordsworth’s bucolic portraits of ecstatic communion 
with nature, which happen to involve livestock, into travesties of themselves – viz., 
bucolic portraits of ecstatic communion with livestock, which happen to take place in 
nature.109 If this performance – a kind of ventriloquist act whose dummies are the 
exquisite corpses of Wordsworth’s verse – can’t quite be described as a just critique in 
the conventional sense, perhaps this mode of grotesque burlesque is what Poe had in 
mind when claimed that “protest” “becomes” the poet-critic. If this is so, the poet’s 
license of protest turns out to legitimize virtually every gesture of opposition: intentional 
misreading, caustic sarcasm, naked expressions of contempt. On the other hand, it is 
entirely possible that this hair-splitting rationalization misses the point, or invents a point 
where none exists. If Poe engages in precious little of the “judicious criticism” he seems 
to have promised, it may be because he was lying, or didn’t want to, or didn’t care one 
way or the other. Perhaps he forgot. The absence might mean precisely nothing, 
irrespective of our incomprehension of the idea that anything in Poe – even an absence – 
means nothing. But if we take seriously the proposition that a judicious critic is 
necessarily a good poet, the “Letter” suggests that Poe is not a very good poet. 
Above all else, “Letter to Mr. –––” inaugurates a problem that would occupy Poe 
for the length of his career: how to make the roles of “poet” and “critic” two sides of the 
same coin, without the whole coin being swallowed by philosophy, or science, or some 
                                                 
109 As Stuart and Susan Levine observe in their introduction to the essay, “Misquoting Wordsworth is 
unforgivably unfair, but it is funny, and it sets up one of the best belly laughs in Poe, his laconic line about 
the love of sheep” (CT, 2). Jonathan H. Hartmann provides a useful account of Poe’s distortions of 
Wordsworth’s language. In its original form, Hartmann notes, “The Idiot Boy” is “an extended rural 
melodrama focusing… on the frightened parent of a mentally retarded youth. By contrast, Poe’s 
manipulation of the text produces a mother who appears to be thoroughly consumed by her passionate 
sharing of loving embraces with the family horse.” Hartmann, The Marketing of Edgar Allan Poe (New 
York: Routledge 2008), 50.   
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other way of knowing truth rather than feeling beauty. Richard Jacobs sees the “Letter” 
as Poe’s “indirect attempt to qualify himself as an expert in judging poetry,” and this is 
surely fair, with two caveats.110 First, the attempt is indirect precisely because the essay 
treats expert judgment only as a generic abstraction: Poe does not claim to be a good 
critic; he rather explains what a good critic can do (write good poetry, and judge poetry 
well). Second, if we accept the idea that Poe is speaking of himself as a brilliant judge of 
poetry through the gauze of rhetorical deflection (and of course he is), the expertise he 
displays is essentially gustatory – he is attempting to qualify himself as an expert, but 
only in the sense that he has very good taste, indeed. And, since the only condition of 
“judicious criticism” the “Letter” offers is discrimination, the only condition for 
compositional competency as a poet is the post hoc ability to render a “correct estimate” 
of what has already been made. Poe distributes literary power evenly between authors 
and critics by revealing, in an Oliver Twist-like reversal, that poets have been critics (and 
critics poets) all along. But while the bravura equation (P=C) is pyrotechnic, it is only 
slightly more persuasive than the analogous claim that every person with a sophisticated 
palate is, necessarily, a gourmet chef.  
Poe’s poet-critic comports himself as an amateur (his theatrical abhorrence of 
philosophy is a reaction against its encroachment onto poetry’s sacred ground, but it is 
also a measure of Poe’s resistance to specialization) and as a connoisseur.111 For 
                                                 
110 Robert D. Jacobs, Poe: Journalist & Critic (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1969), 51. 
 
111 In fact, virtually the only passage deleted from the essay’s 1836 reprint, in the Southern Literary 
Messenger, qualifies the effective critic precisely as a connoisseur: “Poetry, above all things, is a beautiful 
painting whose tints, to minute inspection, are confusion worse confounded, but start boldly out to the 
cursory glance of the connoisseur” (CT, 12). You can see why Poe decided to get rid of it.  
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eighteenth-century Anglo-aesthetes like Shaftesbury and John Richardson, 
connoisseurship meant evaluating art on rational, but eminently non-specialized, 
grounds.112 Poe was, in 1831, still several years away from taking up his career as a 
“Magazinist,” beginning with his tumultuous editorship of the Southern Literary 
Messenger, and his letters of the period reveal him as a passionate, eminently amateur 
aspirant after the laurels of poetic immortality.  
But connoisseurship also has, in Michael Polanyi’s luminous critique of 
positivism, Personal Knowledge, a supplemental relationship with scientific objectivity: 
since “[t]he avowed purpose of the exact sciences is to establish complete intellectual 
control over the experience in terms of precise rules which can be formally set out and 
empirically tested,” Polanyi writes, investigators are left in the lurch of personal 
judgment whenever precise rules and perfect calibrations are lacking.113 An exercise of 
personal judgment is not, however, an opportunity for the id to explode into some purely 
private caprice; it rather depends on inherited and cultivated forms of what Polanyi 
famously calls “tacit knowledge.” Between perfect objectivism and total subjectivism lies 
connoisseurship, which, “like skill, can be communicated only by example, not by 
precept. To become an expert wine-taster… you must go through a long course of 
                                                 
 
112 For the remaking of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English “men of taste” on the model of 
Continental connoisseurs and virtuosi, see Brian Cowan, “An Open Elite: The Peculiarities of 
Connoisseurship in Early Modern England,” Modern Intellectual History 1.2 (2004): 151-83; for Jonathan 
Richardson’s elevation of connoisseurship to the level of art and philosophy, and his attempt to fortify its 
reputation as a “science,” see Carol Gibson-Wood, “Jonathan Richardson and the Rationalization of 
Connoisseurship,” Art History 7.1 (1984): 38-56. 
 
113 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2005 
[1958]), 18. 
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experience under the guidance of a master.”114 In the world of technical rationality, 
though, such guild-like, mysterious forms of mastery are mere orthopedics, placeholders 
for new rules and new methods that make the implied principles explicit and formal:  
Wherever connoisseurship is found operating within science or 
technology we may assume that it persists only because it has not been 
possible to replace it by a measurable grading. For a measurement has 
the advantage of greater objectivity, as shown by the fact that 
measurements give consistent results in the hands of different observers 
all over the world, while such objectivity is rarely achieved in the case 
of physiognomic appreciations.115  
 
Whether Poe brought literary criticism any closer to the fantasy of transparent 
“objectivity,” and whether it would be good if he had, are questions above my pay grade; 
but it does seem clear that many of Poe’s contributions to aesthetics and poetic theory 
consisted in formalizing “precise rules” for the practices of poetry and criticism.  
The rules of art Poe developed over the course of the 1830s are perhaps all too 
familiar to Americanists: poetry is a vessel for beauty, not truth (the heresy of the 
didactic; the autonomy of art); the reader experiences beauty as a kind of pleasure that is 
not antithetical to exquisite agony (the poetic principle; supernal ideality); this experience 
is an undifferentiated impression (the unity or totality of effect); to achieve this singular 
purpose, the art object must be governed at all times by an overarching authorial design 
(methodical composition); because this experience is a kind of intense emotional event, 
its expression must be compressed (a long poem is impossible). Taken together, this 
bundle of rules constitutes Poe’s poetic “theory,” but it also constitutes his practice.  
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In his puzzled study of Poe’s influence on the French symbolists, T.S. Eliot lays 
out his own belief that “the poet’s theories should arise out of his practice rather than his 
practice out of his theories.”116 (342). Poe did not recognize the theory/practice 
distinction, as evinced already in his 1836 review of Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge: “theory 
and practice are in so much one, that the former implies or includes the latter. A theory is 
only good as such, in proportion to its reducibility to practice. If the practice fail, it is 
because the theory is imperfect” (ER, 225). Though he has fiction in mind, this passage 
reads like “The Philosophy of Composition” compressed into a kōan: if an author only 
understands the principles of composition, all fickle choice, random chance, and 
inspiration from who knows where is struck from the equation; all that’s left is inevitable 
necessity. Poe’s theory of creativity is “inventorial or recombinative,” as Robert 
Macfarlane describes the classical photonegative of Romanticism’s notion of radical 
origination; for Poe, as for the classicists who preceded and the formalists who followed 
him, “the writer is merely a rearranger of bits and pieces: an administrator rather than a 
producer.”117 Inspired romantics, daemon-driven transcendentalists, have no need of 
principle or theory; they write down whatever God says. The success of Poe’s self-
administrating writer boils down to crafty skill, high standards, and informed judgment – 
but above all, to his fluent knowledge of the rules.  
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Modular Literature: Poe’s Fundamental Theorem 
If composition and criticism are the same skill in reverse, Poe needs a way to 
describe that reversibility. The centerpiece of Poe’s aesthetic theory – the logical schema 
of “analysis” and “composition” – reimagines cognition as unified-but-reversible process: 
the composer composes his composition by combining monadic fragments of language 
into amalgams that, in their mottled complexity, give off the impression of genuine 
originality; the critic analyzes such compositions by breaking them back down into their 
component parts, and thereby demystifies the artificial aura of originality. In this way, 
Poe makes poetic ability strictly proportional to critical acumen.  
Poe treated analysis as a crucial discovery of the emergent science of phrenology 
– and, indeed, phrenologists were enchanted by the idea of a faculty dedicated to 
unraveling the world’s endless chains of causality. But, as Paul Hurh has recently shown, 
Poe’s two-party system was “inherited from debates over science in Renaissance 
history,” particularly the seventheenth-century Port-Royal Logic, wherein “analysis” is 
“comprised of two significant processes – the process of resolution and the process of 
composition” (Hurh, 469). Resolution or analysis (which Poe uses interchangeably) 
involves breaking a corporate whole into its component parts; composition is the creative 
faculty of combining parts into new conglomerates. This reversible process, Hurh writes, 
allows for “a conceptualization of scientific discourse and poetic imagination as two 
expressions of a single method” (Hurh, 471). Where critical work is analytic, creative 
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work is synthetic, for which Poe uses the Coleridgean term “imagination,” the 
phrenological term “combination,” and the logical term “composition” synonymously.118  
Because genuine analysis is not a subjective process, any genuine analyst’s 
beliefs, opinions, and presuppositions are elided from the process: “the interest of an 
analysis, or reconstruction… is quite independent of any real or fancied interest in the 
thing analyzed” (ER, 14). Though analysis is, in a sense, a personal capacity – only 
accessible to a few – its enactment bypasses the parts of the personality that count as 
personal. By 1842, with his creation of a principled criticism, Poe had also self-
consciously formulated a concept of “literary” writing. He called one writer’s farcical 
novels “practical-joke publications” and “not ‘literature’… Being in no respect works of 
art, they neither deserve, nor are amenable to criticism” (ER, 179). Yet, though he 
provides us with a qualitative distinction between “literature” and tripe, Poe provides no 
criteria for adjudicating the difference between the two categories other than taste and the 
critic’s own good word. Poe echoes the claim of unified theory-practice in his “Marginal 
                                                 
118 Poe’s use of analysis and composition is structurally quite similar to the fundamental theorem of 
calculus which holds that differentiation and integration are inverse processes. I won’t pretend to be fluent 
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apparent: everything that can be broken down can be built back up, and anything that can be put together 
can be taken apart. See David M. Bressoud, “Historical Reflections on Teaching the Fundamental Theorem 
of Integral Calculus.” The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 118, No. 2 (February 2011), pp. 99-115. 
It is also worth comparing to Victor Shklovksy’s notion of defamiliarization, the literary device of making 
a stone stoney: “The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase 
the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and 
must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important.” 
Comparatively easy to forget is the fact that Shklovsky presents ostranenie in the context of a theoretical 
inversion of ordinary prose speech and poetic speech. Ordinary speech involves habituation, the “process, 
ideally realized in algebra,” through which “things are replaced with symbols… By this ‘algebraic’ method 
of thought we apprehend objects only as shapes with imprecise extensions; we do not see them in their 
entirety but rather recognize them by their main characteristics.” Algebraic reduction, “the over-
automatization of an object, permits the greatest economy of perceptive effort” (11). The “artistic 
trademark,” on the other hand, is employed by the conscious, deliberate artist in order to maximize the 
observer’s “length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be 
prolonged” (19, 16). Victor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, 
ed. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1965).  
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Notes” of 1845: “In all cases, if the practice fail, it is because the theory is imperfect.” 
Here, he concisely lays out his belief that artistic ability and critical perspicacity are 
strictly proportional:  
One who has some artistical ability may know how to do a thing, and 
even show how to do it, and yet fail in doing it after all; but the artist 
and the man of some artistical ability must not be confounded. He only 
is the former who can carry the most shadowy precepts into successful 
application. To say that a critic could not have written the work which 
he criticizes, is to put forth a contradiction in terms. (ER, 1365).  
 
Critical and artistic ability seem less like two well-balanced quantities than one capacity 
named twice. In such declarations of method, Poe tries to imagine a mode of aesthetic 
judgments whose conclusions seem as certain and inevitable as Euclidian deductions. 
“Originality” is a central tenet of Poe’s aesthetic axiology. Yet originality is never 
absolute, and its recipe can always be reverse-engineered by the skilled analyst: “All 
novel conceptions are merely unusual combinations… [A]ll which seems to be new–
which appears to be a creation of intellect… is resoluble into the old. The wildest and 
most vigorous effort of mind cannot stand the test of this analysis” (ER, 334). The more 
valuable originality becomes in determining literary value, the more powerful “analysis” 
– with its built-in ability to undermine any representation of novelty by dissolving it into 
the merely conventional – becomes as a tool to vindicate or eviscerate works and their 
authors. The critic’s “legitimate task is,” Poe wrote, consists “in pointing out and 
analyzing defects and showing how the work might have been improved, to aid the 
general cause of Letters, without undue heed of the individual literary man” (ER, 1040).  
Analysis, in the form Poe imagined it, never requires a hypothesis because it is 
not open to doubt; nor is a form of “interpretation,” because it does not generate any new 
meaning of its own. The critic simply moves from the given whole to finer subsets of 
parts, unpacking each part into smaller segments. So, Poe cultivates in his criticism a 
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sense of principled certainty, a sense that his judgments and prescriptions are justified on 
the grounds of some internally coherent philosophical system, even as the contents of that 
system continuously shift, substitute, and redefine one another. Poe’s critic, then, can 
engage in captious faultfinding while claiming to subordinate his will and wishes to the 
higher entity of literature. If the crucial effect of poetry, for Poe, is the reader’s 
experience of beauty, the crucial effect of criticism is the reader’s experience of the 
critic’s right judgment – his impeccable ability to discriminate. Poe paints this as an 
ethical imperative, and a matter of forthrightness: “It is… the duty of all whom 
circumstances have led into criticism… to uphold the true dignity of genius, to combat its 
degradation, to plead for the exercise of its powers” (ER, 314).  
In an 1842 review, Poe approvingly quotes a lengthy passage from Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton’s essay “Upon the Spirit of True Criticism,” in which Bulwer writes, 
“There is no criticism in this country [England]–considering that word as the name of a 
science… In fact no science requires such elaborate study as criticism. It is the most 
analytical of our mental operations.” Yet he invokes the name of science for a number of 
dubious ends; the critic uses his science “to say why that passage is a sin against nature, 
or that plot a violation of art – to bring deep knowledge of life in all its guises” (ER, 162). 
Bulwer’s conception of “science” allows him to make aesthetic judgments on ethical 
grounds.119 In the “Exordium to Critical Notices” (1842), Poe frames his pretensions to 
science more tentatively, but claims to be gaining ground in the war on bad taste: “That 
                                                 
119 Thomas Babington Macaulay was operating in a similarly triumphalist register in his 1852 “On the 
Royal Society of Literature”: “the principles of literary criticism, though equally fixed with those on which 
the chemist and the surgeon proceed, are by no means equally recognised… It is more difficult to ascertain 
and establish the merits of a poem than the powers of a machine or the benefits of a new remedy. Hence it 
is literature, that quackery is most easily puffed, and excellence most easily decried” (Macaulay, On the 
Royal Society of Literature). The Works of Lord Macaualay, vol. 7 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1871) 575. 
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the public attention, in America, has, of late days, been more than usually directed to the 
matter of literary criticism, is plainly apparent. Our periodicals are beginning to 
acknowledge the importance of the science (shall we so term it?) and to disdain the 
flippant opinion which so long has been made its substitute” (ER, 1027). The appeal to 
science is an appeal to the critic’s specialization; not merely one voice in the throng, he is 
a student of the deeper truths manifest in the object of study – in this case, poetry. 
Criticism is a study of natural laws, and therefore, in principle, transhistorical: “That a 
criticism ‘now’ should be different in spirit… from a criticism at any previous period, is 
to insinuate a charge of variability in laws that cannot vary–the laws of man’s heart and 
intellect–for these are the sole basis upon which the true critical art is established” (ER, 
1031). “Following the highest authority, we would wish… to limit literary criticism to 
criticism upon Art.” Criticism is “the test or analysis of Art, (not of opinion)” and, 
consequently, the critical test is “only properly employed upon productions which have 
their basis in art itself” (ER, 1032). 
As a blueprint for good writing, Poe’s “Philosophy of Composition” offers 
aspiring poets about what Japanese-language VCR manuals gave middlebrow American 
comedians in the 1980s: plenty of fodder for abstract reflection, but little in the way of 
practical instruction. Poe offers a reconstruction of the writing process of “The Raven,” 
in which the composition – as the opposite trajectory of analysis – is strictly based on 
principle. Composition, in fact, precedes writing – it is an act of mental conception. Poe 
claims that “every plot, worth the name, must be elaborated to its denouement before any 
thing be attempted with the pen” (ER, 13). Only with the preconceived end “constantly in 
view” can the writer “give a plot its indispensable air of consequence, or causation, by 
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making the incidents, and especially the tone at all points, tend to the development of the 
intention” (ER, 13). So the paper’s “design,” he writes, is “to render it manifest that no 
one point in its composition is referable either to accident or intuition–that the work 
proceeded, step by step, to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a 
mathematical problem” (ER, 14-15).  
The essay’s intended effect is the impression of Poe’s total and rigorous mastery 
over the writing process, which he juxtaposes with the broad majority of scribblers: 
“Most writers – poets in especial – prefer having it understood that they compose by a 
species of fine frenzy–an ecstatic intuition – and would positively shudder at letting the 
public take a peep behind the curtain.” Revealing the process of composition means 
displaying “the painful erasures and interpolations – in a word, the wheels and pinions – 
the tackle for scene-shifting – the step-ladders and demon-traps… which, in ninety-nine 
cases out of the hundred, constitute the literary histrio.” Indeed, most authors are in no 
“condition to retrace the steps by which his conclusions have been attained. In general, 
suggestions, having arisen pell-mell, are pursued and forgotten in a similar manner.” If 
this makes composition seem haphazard and unscientific, it is only due to a deficiency in 
the reasoning powers or memories of other poets; as against the rabble, Poe has not “the 
least difficulty in recalling to mind the progressive steps of any of my compositions” 
(ER, 14). His total recall is not here limited to certain texts – he remembers the 
“progressive steps” of “any,” which is to say, all of his “compositions” – the rigorous, 
principled movements from a chaotic field of elements to a plot-ruled, intentionally 
designed art object.  
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Of course, since “Beauty is the sole legitimate province of the poem,” the poem is 
designed with the end of beauty constantly in the poet’s view. Poe claims that the breed 
of “pleasure which is at once the most intense, the most elevating, and the most pure, is, I 
believe, found in the contemplation of the beautiful. When, indeed, men speak of Beauty, 
they mean, precisely, not a quality, as is supposed, but an effect – they refer, in short, just 
to that intense and pure elevation of the soul – not of intellect, or of heart.” This 
pleasurable elevation “is experienced in consequence of contemplating ‘the beautiful’” 
(ER, 16). Poe’s definition of beauty as the experience of the beautiful is curiously circular 
– beauty is the effect of contemplating the beautiful – but the emphasis on effect rather 
than essence enables Poe to conceive of the poem in the quasi-scientific context of cause 
and effect – a problematic that Thomas Haskell identifies squarely with professionalism: 
“Esoteric questions of causal attribution had always been the métier of the professional,” 
whose role was and is “to provide answers to esoteric questions that defied common 
sense and custom.”120 The question of how to make good art certain defies common 
sense and custom, but rather than appealing the “fine frenzy” pretended to by other poets, 
Poe appeals to principle, even as he gives a suppositious catalogue of his process of 
crafting “The Raven.”  
Mid-career Poe’s overwhelming focus on effect – both in his aesthetic theory and, 
if we can trust his aesthetic theory, his imaginative writing – comes with risks. First, there 
is no way for Poe to guarantee that the author’s desired effect will be successfully 
manufactured in the reader; all Poe can do is legislate over the potentially limitless array 
                                                 
120 Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science 




of causes that, with luck, harmonize or transmogrify into the effect. The effect only 
comes it to being, it only happens, when the finished composition is consumed by some 
individual, some audience of one.121 By privileging “effect” – something that necessarily 
post-dates the process of composition – Poe built his “Philosophy of Composition” on a 
kind of rhetorical quicksand. For the artist at work, that is, “effect” can only be a 
normative ideal – a goal or a target – never a procedure. Second, the elevation of unified 
effect is something of a pyrrhic victory, insofar as the locus of this “effect” is, by 
necessity, the subjective experience of the reader; relocating literary value to the site of 
affective transfer between work and audience all but relinquishes whatever authority the 
author might have or want. The effect, that is, happens in or to or on the reader; there can 
be no unity if the reader does not experience the effect of unity. So long as the poem is a 
good poem, and its reader a good reader, there would seem to be no short-circuiting the 
system of literary value. This would seem to shift the balance of power entirely from the 
creator, and even the critic, to the private consumer. Insofar as the “beautiful” is only 
given its existence by the experience of beauty, it opens the door for an aesthetic 
relativism in which a doggerel limerick would have to be accepted as genuine if it 
elevates the soul of the reader by giving an experience of beauty. (I confess to being one 
such reader.) Since “originality” and “beauty” are both effects rather than ontological 
states of affairs, they become merely heuristic indicators. That is, a poem is “original” or 
“beautiful” if its audience feels those effects. Only the status of “critic,” as opposed to 
                                                 
121 Perhaps the best illustration of the limitations of Poe’s emphasis on effect comes from another card-
carrying aesthete, Vladimir Nabokov, whose echo of Poe is surely no accident: “the study of the 
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Jovanovich, 1980), 64. This again obscures more about the process of literary production than it enlightens. 
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“general reader,” provides cover for the legitimating ability to use these heuristics 
authoritatively.  
In a pair of 1844 letters to James Lowell, Poe ceded ground on his demands for 
personal autonomy and proposed a kind of clerisy, a proto-profession, of competent 
critics: “Suppose… that the élite of our men of letters should combine secretly” into a 
“coalition,” producing a magazine with “articles to be supplied by the members solely, 
upon a concerted plan of action. A nominal editor to be elected from among the number. 
How could such a journal fail?”122 coalition – a kind of joint-stock company owned and 
operated by the contributors – and its magazine, was to offer “a scheme for protecting 
ourselves from the imposition of publishers.” Ultimately, and perhaps most importantly, 
such a project would “afford (in the circulation & profit of the journal) a remuneration to 
ourselves for whatever we should write” (Letters, 1:265). Poe’s mutual aid society blends 
elements of a Junto-like elitist sect with the collective bargaining and protective aspects 
of a trade union. It also offers exclusivity, both to its producers and its consumers: the 
magazine would “address the aristocracy of talent” rather than the common reader 
(Letters, 1:266). Yet Poe’s attempt to create an intellectual aristocracy is precisely his 
attempt to create a profession of literature. An aristocracy of taste or talent – a “natural 
aristocracy” – is (rhetorically, if not actually) a meritocracy, not a heritable nobility. 
Tellingly, Poe has little to say about the scientifical or analytical credentials of the “élite” 
he has in mind. 
                                                 
122 Edgar Allan Poe, The Letters of Edgar Allan Poe, 2 volumes, ed. John Ward Ostrom (New York: 
Gordian, 1966), 1:247. Further citations from these volumes will be given parenthetically in the  text as 
Letters. 
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Detection and Perversion: Tales Against Analysis 
Poe’s fiction, far more than his nonfiction, explores the depths and reveals the 
limits of the essentially impractical practice of analysis. His tales of criminal detection 
take this fantasy of aesthetic infallibility to the superheroic extreme of perceptual 
infallibility tout court. The visionary-analytical detective, C. Auguste Dupin, seems able 
to draw from some primordial pool of truth, to describe the world’s messiest problems 
with the precision of formal logic. In his tales of criminal confession, on the other hand, 
Poe develops the countervailing concept of perverseness – an illustration, if only by 
indirection, of those depths of mind impregnable to analysis. Poe’s detective fiction 
offers what can profitably be seen as ironic commentary on his depiction of the role of 
the critic. Perhaps Poe’s most famous treatment of analysis comes in “The Murders in the 
Rue Morgue,” the tale of ratiocination that introduced readers to the remarkable 
investigative capacities of Dupin, a gadfly, flaneur, and amateur investigator. The plot 
turns on an unusual event: an escaped orangutan attempts to mimic the practice of 
straight-razor shaving on the pattern it has observed in its human warden. Needless to 
say, the ape’s unorthodox technique culminates in an effect not typical of shaving, viz., 
the decapitation of an old woman. We might hazard to draw a kind of moral from this 
catastrophic failure of intent and technique: design has no necessary, determinant 
influence on the experience of a unified effect. However acute in conception or carefully 
planned, a shave can become a beheading.  
The city’s policemen, forensic investigators, and journalists alike are baffled by 
the murder – “if indeed a murder has been committed at all,” as one newspaper report 
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helplessly notes – which seems to have been committed in a securely locked room.123 
Contemptuous of the police’s “shell of an investigation,” Dupin enlists a nameless 
sidekick (who also serves, avant John Watson, as the story’s narrator) for an unofficial 
inquiry of their own (T, 544-45). With evidence pieced together from a thorough 
examination of the crime scene, Dupin uses his remarkable powers of observation and 
analysis to surmise not only the true identity of the killer, but also to infer the existence of 
the hapless sailor who let the ape escape.  
The first thing to note about the Dupin stories is that their subject of interest – 
Dupin himself – is walled off from the reader, who can only access the detective through 
the narrator’s mediation.124 He is, in a sense, the general reader to Dupin’s analytical 
critic. The opening pages of “Rue Morgue” consist of the narrator’s essayistic exploration 
of what he calls “[t]he mental features discoursed of as the analytical.” These “features,” 
though, cannot be explained simply or directly, since the cognitive capacities that 
together make up the analytical “faculty of re-solution” are, “in themselves, but little 
susceptible of analysis. We appreciate them only in their effects” (T, 527-28). The 
observer is forced to approach the abstract concept of “analysis” indirectly, observing its 
effects without understanding its essence. The first such effect enumerated by the narrator 
is the pleasure analytical exercise offers to individuals whose faculties are highly 
developed: “We know,” he writes, “that they are always to their possessor, when 
inordinately possessed, a source of the liveliest enjoyment.” It seems, in other words, that 
                                                 
123 Edgar Allan Poe, Tales & Sketches volume 2, ed. Thomas Ollive Mabbott (Urbana: Illinois UP), 544. 
Further citations from this volume will be given parenthetically in the text as T.  
 
124 As Charles Rzepka notes, the narrator of Poe’s detectives stories serves the dual functions of keeping 
readers “at a distance from the immediate observations and conclusions of his detective hero and 
unobtrusively controlling, through delay and proper sequencing, access to information crucial to solving the 
crime” (Rzepka, Detective Fiction, 77). 
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average people, those endowed only with average analytical talents, cannot experience 
this profound delight for themselves; they can, however, see for themselves that more 
highly developed individuals draw “the liveliest enjoyment” from exercising their 
“talent” for analysis. As an “analyst,” Dupin “glories… in that moral activity which 
disentangles. He derives pleasure from even the most trivial occupations bringing his 
talent into play. He is fond of enigmas, of conundrums, of hieroglyphics; exhibiting in his 
solutions to each a degree of acumen which appears to the ordinary apprehension 
praeternatural. His results, brought about by the very soul and essence of method, have, 
in truth, the whole air of intuition” (T, 528). That the “air” is only an “air” is evidenced, 
for instance, by the narrator’s insistence that “There was not a particle of charlatanerie 
about Dupin” (T, 535). Dupin does not merely, or even partially, put on a show; he is all 
substance, or the pure confluence of substance and style. 
The narrator of “The Murders of Rue Morgue” is initially enchanted by “the wild 
fervor, and the vivid freshness of [Dupin’s] imagination” (T, 532). Indeed, it is because 
of Dupin’s imagination – his “rich ideality”  – that the narrator is “prepared to expect” his 
“peculiar analytical ability” (T, 533). Again, analysis and imagination are convertible 
terms, two trajectories of the same phenomenon: “the ingenious are always fanciful, and 
the truly imaginative never otherwise than analytic” (T, 531). So analysis seems to be a 
formal, rigorously logical process: confronted with some riddle or rebus, the analyst 
endeavors to unravel the aura of mystery, to decipher the solution to the problem. From 
this angle, analysis resembles cryptography, the two-way process of, first, disguising 
intelligible information by converting it into unintelligible gibberish and, second, 
breaking this code back down by applying a secret key – some set of symbols or equation 
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that enables the reader to translate encrypted information and plain meaning back and 
forth, into and out of one another. The narrator observes, with no little equivocation, “The 
faculty of re-solution is possibly much invigorated by mathematical study.” But even the 
“highest branch” of math has “unjustly, and merely on account of its retrograde 
operations… been called, as if par excellence, analysis. Yet to calculate is not in itself to 
analyze. A chess-player, for example, does the one without effort at the other” (T, 528).  
The narrator illustrates this idea by outlining a rough hierarchy of leisure games, 
ranked by the analytical rigor required to master them. The more complex game of chess 
is trumped, counterintuitively, by checkers, because “the higher powers of the reflective 
intellect are more decidedly and more usefully tasked by the unostentatious game of 
draughts [checkers] than by all the elaborate frivolity of chess.” Complexity introduces 
randomness, and randomness. Admirers of chess are overawed by the variety and 
irregularity of the game’s menagerie of pieces, each characterized “different and bizarre 
motions… The possible moves being not only manifold but involute, the chances of… 
oversights are multiplied; and in nine cases out of ten, it is the more concentrative rather 
than the more acute player who conquers.” In checkers, on the other hand, “the 
probabilities of inadvertence are diminished,” so any “advantages” gained by a player 
must be referable to that player’s “superior acumen” (T, 528). The narrator invokes a 
hypothetical game of checkers,  
where the pieces are reduced to four kings, and where, of course, no 
oversight is to be expected. It is obvious that here the victory can be 
decided (the players being at all equal) only by some recherché 
movement, the result of some strong exertion of the intellect. Deprived 
of ordinary resources, the analyst throws himself into the spirit of his 
opponent, identifies himself therewith, and not unfrequently sees thus, 
at a glance, the sole methods (sometimes indeed absurdly simple ones) 




The skill of the analyst has nothing to do, here, with finding the truth, or getting to the 
bottom of some complex system of elements and contingencies; it is, instead, a matter of 
diagnosing weakness in an opponent. Complex problems can be solved by calculation; 
profundity, on the contrary, is the sole province of analysis.  
The narrator illustrates his meaning by drawing an analogical equivalence 
between “the skill of the analyst” and the skills characteristic of a successful player of 
whist – or, in modern terms, a card shark. In chess, says the narrator, “what is only 
complex is mistaken (a not unusual error) for what is profound.” Poker requires the 
“higher powers of the reflective intellect” that can find no purchase in the chaotic 
ditherings of a chess board: “Beyond doubt there is nothing of a similar nature so greatly 
tasking the faculty of analysis… proficiency in whist implies capacity for success in all 
those more important undertakings where mind struggles with mind.” Here, the narrator 
offers a surprising definition: “When I say proficiency, I mean that perfection in the game 
which includes a comprehension of all the sources whence legitimate advantage may be 
derived. These are not only manifold but multiform, and lie frequently among recesses of 
thought altogether inaccessible to the ordinary understanding” (T, 529).  
So, from the hermeneutic perspective of Poe’s essays, analysis is a powerful way 
to get at the truth; but from the rhetorical perspective of “Rue Morgue,” it implies a 
facility with manipulation. But again, the narrator reaffirms the capacity of analysis to get 
to the truth, but this time on the grounds of evading or outmaneuvering mere calculation. 
The skilled card player “notes every variation of face as the play progresses, gathering a 
fund of thought from the differences in the expression of certainty, of surprise, of 
triumph, or of chagrin… embarrassment, hesitation, eagerness, or trepidation – all afford, 
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to his apparently intuitive perception, indications of the true state of affairs” (T, 529). The 
similarity between analysis and poker is, then, not merely metaphorical; indeed, the 
narrator’s treatment of poker starts to get terminologically slippery:  
But it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the 
analyst is evinced. He makes, in silence, a host of observations and 
inferences. So, perhaps, do his companions; and the difference in the 
extent of the information obtained, lies not so much in the validity of 
the inference as in the quality of the observation. The necessary 
knowledge is of what to observe. Our player confines himself not at all; 
nor, because the game is the object, does he reject deductions from 
things external to the game. (T, 529-30) 
 
Thanks in part to the unacknowledged substitution of “the analyst” and “[o]ur player,” it 
is not altogether clear whether we are talking literally about gambling, or using gambling 
as a metaphor for analysis in general.  
Because the critic’s job is to analyze, he is impotent in the face of that which 
cannot be analyzed – and this is the reason Poe places his critique of phrenology on the 
grounds of the perverse in his fiction rather than in his criticism. So, another of Poe’s 
strategies for cultivating expertise is more problematic: in his tales of the perverse 
employ the terms of (pseudo)scientific discourse even as they burlesque the conventions 
and critique the credibility of that discourse. These tales narrate the limits of knowledge, 
and so hold forth a kind of negative knowing – they delineate an empty place, something 
outside of the known (perhaps even the knowable). Poe was fond of the concept of and 
term “perverse,” and both have become common tools in the criticism of his literary 
productions. Perversion in the sense Poe would have understood it had little to do with 
contemporary notions of sexual deviation from procreative sexuality. It is not a question, 
here, of misplaced desire, impotence, frustration, or sexual confusion; it is a question, 
rather, of whose testimony is trustworthy (less missionary position, more position of the 
missionary). Perverseness is, in Pauline terms, a post-lapsarian condition against which 
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only true faith can act as an orthopedic, recovering the supplicant’s position on the true 
path. Salvation is contingent on a proper posture of supplication on the part of the sinner. 
Therefore, of course, it’s not so straightforward as having faith – one must have faith in 
the correct thing, and have the proper information or doctrine to have faith about, in order 
not to worship false idols.  
In an 1836 review of a popular handbook, Mrs. L. Miles’s Phrenology and the 
Moral Influence of Phrenology, Poe celebrates phrenology’s graduation in public 
standing from cultish humbug to genuine disciplinary practice. Phrenology is “no longer 
to be laughed at,” Poe writes; it has “assumed the majesty of a science.”125  Some of the 
practice’s “earliest and most violent opposers have been converted to its doctrines,” and, 
at a single lecture in Scotland, Spurzheim “is said to have gained five hundred converts to 
Phrenology, and the Northern Athens [Edinburgh] is now the strong hold of the faith.” It 
had become, he writes, “very extensively accredited in Germany, in France, in Scotland, 
and in both Americas… Phrenology is no longer to be laughed at. It is no longer laughed 
at by men of common understanding. It has assumed the majesty of a science; and, as a 
science, ranks among the most important which can engage the attention of thinking 
beings.” Some of the practice’s “earliest and most violent opposers have been converted 
                                                 
 
125 In his essay “Poe and Phrenology,” Edward Hungerford finds in the author “no definite indication of any 
concern with the subject before 1836” (Hungerford, 212). Yet perverseness is alive in Poe since his earliest 
writing. In “Metzengerstein,” the first tale attributed with certainty to Poe, the narrator describes the 
manner in which the protagonist’s “perverse attachment to his lately-acquired charger — an attachment 
which seemed to attain new strength from every fresh example of the animal’s ferocious and demon-like 
propensities — at length became, in the eyes of all reasonable men, a hideous and unnatural fervor” (Tales, 
26). The narrator of “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839) recalls Roderick Usher’s “long improvised 
dirges” that “will ring forever in my ears. Among other things, I hold painfully in mind a certain singular 
perversion and amplification of the wild air of the last waltz of Von Weber” (Tales, 405). Legrand of “The 
Gold Bug” (1843) is “well educated, with unusual powers of mind, but infected with misanthropy, and 
subject to perverse moods of alternate enthusiasm and melancholy” (Tales, 807).  
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to its doctrines,” and, at a single lecture in Scotland, Spurzheim “is said to have gained 
five hundred converts to Phrenology, and the Northern Athens [Edinburgh] is now the 
strong hold of the faith” (ER, 329). Here, even as Poe affords phrenology the lofty perch 
of a hard science, it also takes on the structure of a religious sect, gaining “converts” 
through preaching of the word by apostles versed in its “doctrines.” 
Poe praises Miles’s discussion of “Combativeness” – the faculty of self-defense – 
for including the “very sensible and necessary observation” that the “possession of 
particular and instinctive propensities” does not acquit us of “responsibility in the 
indulgences of culpable actions. On the contrary it is the perversion of our faculties 
which causes the greatest misery we endure, and for which (having the free exercise of 
reason) we are accountable to God.”126 In a move characteristic of midcentury natural 
theology, Poe follows Miles in making science subordinate to, and evidence for, an 
intelligent design that forecasts judgment in the hereafter. If we let our faculties be 
perverted, without counteracting this maleficent influence through the proper use of 
“reason” and “moral sentiments,” we might, simply stated, end up in hell.127 
While combativeness is an inherent faculty of human nature, in its proper state 
this faculty will lead to right action. In this form, phrenology treats natural law as 
juridical law. Rational agents can break natural laws. Here, the design of nature is less a 
precise Newtonian mechanism than a jurisprudential monarchy of universal scope. There 
is no phrenological faculty of abnormality; when the normal faculties are perverted, we 
                                                 
126 Edgar Allan Poe, Essays and Reviews, ed. G.R. Thompson (New York: Library of America, 1984), 329. 
Further citations from this volume will be given parenthetically in the text as ER.  
 
127 As Miles explains, “it is held to be the obvious design of the Author of Nature, that the merely animal 
propensities should be in subjection to the intellectual faculties, and these again regulated and governed by 
the moral sentiments” (Miles, 21). 
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must normalize those perversions through a “free exercise of reason.” It is because of this 
ostensible power to regulate the faculties through observation and self-control that Poe 
posits phrenology’s “most direct, and, perhaps, most salutary” use “is that of self-
examination and self-knowledge. It is contended that, with proper caution, and well-
directed inquiry, individuals may obtain, through the science, a perfectly accurate 
estimate of their own moral capabilities–and, thus instructed, will be the better fitted for 
decisions in regard to a choice of offices and duties in life” (ER, 329).  
In “The Black Cat” (1843) and “The Imp of the Perverse” (1845), Poe subjects 
this hopeful phrenological futurity to a grim reversal. Rather exposing “their own moral 
capacities” and utilizing that knowledge to practical advantage, in these tales Poe’s 
narrators peer inward at an abyssal gap in the structure of the psyche and the universe. 
Instead of self-development or moral awakening, these tales narrate the mingling of their 
narrators’ insatiable gaze with their inscrutable objects of inquiry.  
Poe first explicitly theorizes the perverse in “The Black Cat,” where the narrator 
defines it as an “unfathomable longing of the soul to vex itself – to offer violence to its 
own nature – to do wrong for the wrong’s sake only” (T, 852, Poe’s italics). It is marked 
by an elemental yet fundamentally inexplicable status: “Of this spirit philosophy takes no 
account. Yet I am not more sure that my soul lives, than I am that perverseness is one of 
the primitive impulses of the human heart – one of the indivisible primary faculties, or 
sentiments, which gives direction to the character of Man” (T, 852). Here, it is not that a 
faculty is perverted – instead, perverseness is a faculty unto itself.
 
It is, not, however, a 
faculty that operates in the positive furtherance of a goal, or towards the attainment of 
any object, since it is manifest as “a perpetual inclination, in the teeth of our best 
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judgment, to violate that which is Law, merely because we understand it to be such” (T, 
852). Perverseness is, in other words, a faculty of negation – a faculty of violation, not a 
violated faculty.  
And yet, it’s important to be precise about what the narrator of “The Black Cat” 
takes to be the act precipitated by perverseness. The narrator grows dependent on alcohol, 
and, through the “instrumentality of the Fiend Intemperance,” offers “personal violence” 
to his wife, and begins “maltreating the rabbits, the monkey, or even the dog” (T, 851). 
Finally, the narrator turns his aggression against Pluto: returning from a debauch, “I 
fancied that the cat avoided my presence. I seized him; when, in his fright at my violence, 
he inflicted a slight wound upon my hand with his teeth. The fury of a demon instantly 
possessed me. I knew myself no longer. My original soul seemed, at once, to take flight 
from my body; and a more than fiendish malevolence, gin-nurtured, thrilled every fibre 
of my frame” (T, 851). It would be easy and sensible to conflate the impetus imparted by 
this “demon” with the imp of this and the later tale, and yet the two monsters operate on 
different logics. Alcohol is directly ascribed as motivating his attacks on his wife, his 
domestic menagerie, and Pluto – but, in this last case, only after he has been provoked 
into a rage. The narrator’s initial “violence,” on the other hand – his seizure of Pluto – 
takes place when he perceives that the cat shrinks from his presence.  
This becomes clearer in the next episode: after he gouges Pluto’s eye out, the cat, 
“as might be expected, fled in extreme terror at my approach.” The narrator has enough 
of his “old heart left, as to be at first grieved by this evident dislike on the part of a 
creature which had once so loved me. But this feeling soon gave place to irritation. And 
then came, as if to my final and irrevocable overthrow, the spirit of Perverseness.” This 
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impulse “urged me to continue and finally to consummate the injury I had inflicted on the 
unoffending brute.” In sharp contrast to the “fiendish malevolence” that “thrilled” him 
while maiming the cat, he hangs it “in cool blood.”128 And all this “because I knew it had 
loved me, and because I felt it had given me no reason of offence; – hung it because I 
knew that in so doing I was committing a sin – a deadly sin that would so jeopardize my 
immortal soul as to place it – if such a thing were possible – even beyond the reach of the 
infinite mercy of the Most Merciful and Most Terrible God.” As in the “Phrenology” 
article, the narrator is both “responsible” and “accountable” to God for his transgression. 
The difference is that, in this case, he lacks the “free exercise of reason.” Here, the 
perverse figures as an agent of self-reproach – the narrator, already feeling himself 
already unworthy of divine mercy, commits a crime so egregious that it, in his own eyes, 
renders him unredeemably damned. By cutting out Pluto’s eye, he’s punishing the cat for 
its betrayal; by hanging Pluto, he’s punishing himself for punishing the cat. Yet this is not 
a free or rational or autonomous choice. After all, “Have we not,” the narrator asks, “a 
perpetual inclination, in the teeth of our best judgment, to violate that which is Law, 
merely because we understand it to be such?” (T, 852).  
In “The Imp of the Perverse,” Poe again invokes “Combativeness” as the impulse 
to “self-defence. It is our safeguard against injury. Its principle regards our well-being.” 
                                                 
128 The narrator further externalizes his alcoholism into a force that acts upon him by asserting that “my 
disease grew upon me – for what disease is like alcohol!” (Tales, 851). If alcohol does not precisely conjure 
the “imp of the perverse,” perhaps this is because Poe identifies it with the imp’s jocular doppelganger, 
“The Angel of the Odd,” who in the story of that name is “the genius who presided over the contretemps of 
mankind, and whose business it was to bring about the odd accidents which are continually astonishing the 
skeptic” (Tales, 1104). If the imp of the perverse is an internal principle, the angel of the odd visits from 
without. In this sense we might see the two figures in the same light Paul de Man casts on allegory (the 
angel) and irony (the imp) – the first places a stable subject in an unstable situation; the second reveals the 
internal division of the subject by unveiling the inhuman double inside of him, as part of the constitution of 
his “self.” 
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Against this conception, the narrator claims, “in the case of that something which I term 
perverseness, the desire to be well is not only not aroused, but a strongly antagonistical 
sentiment exists” (T, 1221, Poe’s italics). The “phrenologists,” and “all the moralists who 
have preceded them,” have neglected the faculty due to its seeming “supererogation. We 
saw no need of the impulse – for the propensity. We could not perceive its necessity” 
since it fails to further “the objects of humanity, either temporal or eternal” (T, 1219, 
Poe’s italics). These thinkers are guilty of “deducing and establishing every thing from 
the preconceived destiny of man.” In attempting to decode the divine design of nature 
from a readymade key, phrenology has broken its own rules: “Induction, à posteriori, 
would have brought phrenology to admit, as an innate and primitive principle of human 
action, a paradoxical something” (T, 1220). Though the perverse remains always in 
excess of explanation, its existence can be verified inductively – it can be observed in its 
effects – even though its origin remains unreachable: Poe writes, “No one who trustingly 
consults and thoroughly questions his own soul, will be disposed to deny the entire 
radicalness of the propensity in question. It is not more incomprehensible than 
distinctive” (T, 1221, my italics). The perverse will not “admit of analysis, or resolution 
into ulterior elements” (T, 1221). Poe asks us to mark its incomprehensibility – in other 
words, perverseness becomes legible only insofar as its illegibility is made stark. What 
fails is, precisely, analysis. The perverse seems to be made up of nothing, to be 
irreducible. It cannot be broken into its component parts. The perverse, like analysis 
itself, is a faculty that refuses to be analyzed.  
The year before “The Imp of the Perverse” was published, Poe decried “the 
assumption that we, being men, will, in general, be deliberately true. The greater amount 
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of truth is impulsively uttered… But, in examining the historic material, we leave these 
considerations out of sight. We dote upon records which, in the main, lie; while we 
discard the Kabbala, which, properly interpreted, do not” (ER, 1322, Poe’s italics). 
Interestingly, though Poe asserts that the Kabala does not lie, he does not imbue it with 
the positive quality of truth-telling. If it is “properly interpreted,” scripture will not 
necessarily provide easy answers or foundations we can rest on; indeed, the implication 
seems to be that an interpretation that gives the last word to “historical material” and 
“records” will yield a harvest of falsity. In another entry of the same “Marginalia,” Poe 
laments that the defenders of an unspecified work “uphold it on the ground of its 
truthfulness” (ER, 1330). For Poe, “this truthfulness is the one overwhelming defect… In 
my view, if an artist must paint decayed cheeses, is [sic] merit will lie in their looking as 
little like decayed cheeses as possible” (ER, 1330). The uglier the “truth” is, the less good 
art will be responsible to represent it. What Poe describes as proper interpretation might 
not render unalloyed truthfulness – since truthfulness can be an “overwhelming defect” – 
but it will not render deception. The question, then, is what kind of truth is being told. Or, 
if the scriptures don’t tell the truth, what do they tell, if they don’t lie? For Poe, their 
truth, such as it is, comes through the expression of supernal beauty, which he figures as 
“that elastic Hope which is the Harbinger and Eos of all. Man’s real life is happy, chiefly 
because he is ever expecting that it soon will be so” (ER, 1335, Poe’s italics).  
Eureka: Sisyphus and Tantalus Paraphrase the Universe 
After 1845, Poe struggles to formulate a method of knowing irreducible to 
scientific experiment. In “The Colloquy of Monos & Una,” he describes a kind of “poetic 
intellect – that intellect which we now feel to have been the most exalted of all,” a style 
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of thought that facilitates revelations alien to “unaided reason.” Even Dupin – the analyst 
whose seemingly intuitive leaps are actually sound method – anticipates the shadowy 
irrationality Poe would finally champion: Speaking of Epicurus’s theory of atomism, he 
says, “how singularly, yet with how little notice, the vague guesses of that noble Greek 
had met with confirmation in the late nebular cosmogony” (T, 536).  
One of the key arguments of Eureka is that Enlightenment science owes its origin, 
not to logic or reason, but to an act of poetic imagination. Kepler was, at his most 
groundbreaking, not a scientist at all; he did not reason his way toward his laws. “Newton 
deduced [the theory of gravity] from the laws of Kepler. Kepler admitted that these laws 
he guessed… [T]hese laws whose investigation disclosed to the greatest of British 
astronomers that principle, the basis of all (existing) physical principle, in going behind 
which we enter at once the nebulous kingdom of Metaphysics. Yes! – these vital laws 
Kepler guessed – that is to say, he imagined them.””129 Eureka’s “general proposition” is 
that, “In the Original Unity of the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, 
with the Germ of their Inevitable Annihilation” (Eu, 7, Poe’s italics). Its “legitimate 
thesis,” somewhat puzzlingly, is “The Universe” (Eu, 16, Poe’s italics). Yet neither of 
these, for Poe, the book’s epistemological gambit. Rather, Poe writes, “an intuition 
altogether irresistible, although inexpressible, forces me to the conclusion that what God 
originally created–that that Matter which, by dint of his Volition, he first made from his 
Spirit, or from Nihility, could have been nothing but Matter in its utmost conceivable 
state of – what? – of Simplicity” (Eu, 22). God first created a perfect simplicity, and then 
splintered it into plurality – which is the universe of relation we recognize. Simplicity, 
                                                 
129 Edgar Allen Poe, Eureka ed. Stuart Levine and Susan F. Levine (Urbana: Illinois UP, 2004). Further 
citations will be given in parenthetically in the text as Eu. 
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Poe says, is the sole assumption in the book. Yet, he claims, it follows a “train of 
ratiocination as rigorously logical as that which establishes any demonstration in Euclid.” 
“Nothing was every more certainly–no human conclusion was ever, in fact, more 
regularly – more rigorously deduced: – but, alas! the processes lie out of the human 
analysis–at all events are beyond the utterance of the human tongue” (Eu, 22). Like the 
perverse, simplicity is not susceptible to analysis. But in Eureka, Poe holds up simplicity 
precisely as his own Keplerian guess – or, put another way, as a hypothesis. Poe hedges 
his bets about the content of intuition, describing it as, perhaps, “the conviction arising 
from those inductions or deductions of which the processes are so shadowy as to escape 
our consciousness, elude our reason, or defy our capacity of expression” (Eu, 22, Poe’s 
italics).  
The central themes and gambits of Poe’s cosmology seem simple enough, but the 
work as a whole proves relentlessly resistant to paraphrase. Poe frames his ostentatious 
lay-scientific demonstrations as an alternative to, and a correction of, the cosmological 
musing of Alexander von Humboldt’s Cosmos. The book’s “legitimate thesis,” Poe says, 
simply but puzzlingly, is “The Universe” (Eu, 16, Poe’s italics). The “general 
proposition” of the prose-poem is that, “In the Original Unity of the First Thing lies the 
Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their Inevitable Annihilation” (Eu, 7, 
Poe’s italics). The book offers a creation myth in which an originally unified, 
undifferentiated godhead disperses itself throughout the cosmos in the form of 
differentiated matter. This matter – which is the whole of creation as we are capable of 
understanding it – yearns to be recombined into this primordial state that preexisted 
creation, “the absolute and final Union of all” (Eu, 44). This unimaginable state is outside 
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space and time – in it, neither relation nor matter exists. This entails the destruction of the 
physical universe of space, and the end of times. Thus, Eureka essays the alpha of 
Genesis and Revelation’s omega in the span of a hundred pages.  
The atomic desire to return is figured as attraction, or, equivalently, as the 
Newtonian principle of gravitation. Gravity, Poe writes, is “the expression of a desire on 
the part of matter” (Eu, 43-44, my italics). After the initial moment of creation, in which 
matter is dispersed to the ends of the universe, atoms feel an intractable pull from every 
other atom in existence. Left to their own devices, these atoms – the individual units that 
together make up the universe of relation – would agglomerate, merge, and rejoin one 
another in the unity that preceded creation. This Poe refers to as the “state of progressive 
collapse,” since, as he says, the “tendency to collapse’ and ‘the attraction of gravitation’ 
are convertible phrases” (Eu, 95). The completion of the work of attraction, then, is the 
demobilization of all attraction.  
However, since the “ultimate design” of the divine creation is the “utmost 
possible relation” – “Multiplicity is the object” – this atomic desire must be thwarted. To 
this end, Poe proposes the “necessity for a repulsion of limited capacity – a separative 
something” to keep atoms apart (Eu, 26). Repulsion is the force “which we have been in 
the practice of designating now as heat, now as magnetism, now as electricity; displaying 
our ignorance of its awful character in the vacillation of the phraseology with which we 
endeavor to circumscribe it” (Eu, 27, Poe’s italics). This force exists to keep all atoms, no 
matter how close in proximity they come, from establishing any positive contact with one 
another: “Man neither employs, nor knows, a force sufficient to bring two atoms into 
contact. This is but the well-established proposition of the impenetrability of matter” (Eu, 
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26-27). This impenetrability is both evident to observation and an irreducible property of 
all material existence. 
Attraction and repulsion are not mere intensive properties or forces that act on 
matter from without. On the contrary, for Poe, “Matter exists only as Attraction and 
Repulsion… Attraction and Repulsion are Matter” (Eu, 28). All positive, material 
creation, then, is constituted of a desire (to unite) and a prohibition forbidding the 
consummation of that desire (repulsion). In this scheme, “each atom attracts – 
sympathizes with the most delicate movements of every other atom, and with each and 
with all at the same time, and forever,” and forever frustrated by the “separative 
something” of electricity (Eu, 32). And yet, positioned at the end of this infinite 
“forever,” it remains the case that “absolute consolidation is to come” (Eu, 72). The idea 
of this consolidation, the consummation of matter’s collapse, carries with it “the startling 
thought” of creation’s “instantaneous disappearance” (Eu, 101). The “majestic remnants 
of the tribe of Stars flash, at length, into a common embrace,” at which point the 
“inevitable catastrophe is at hand” (Eu, 100).  
“But this catastrophe,” Poe asks, “ – what is it?” (Eu, 101). Poe’s use of 
“catastrophe,” as opposed to the more conventional or orthodox “revelation” or 
“apocalypse,” is fitting in a couple of senses. First, catastrophe is, in dramaturgical terms, 
the “change or revolution, which produces the conclusion or final event of a dramatic 
piece” (Johnson on Shakespeare, 259). This reflects what Aristotle writes of the 
“ending,” which is “whatever itself is naturally after something else… but has nothing 
else after itself” (Poetics, 547). Second, at the end of Poe’s universe, nothing is revealed. 
There is no “apocalypse” in the sense that nothing is brought to light, nothing revealed to 
 95 
human eyes for the first time. Instead, creation regresses into “Material Nihility,” “that 
Nothingness which, to all finite perception, Unity must be” (Eu, 103). At this point, “God 
will remain all in all” (Eu, 103). So, instead of a veil being lifted, with the theatrical 
“catastrophe,” a curtain falls. Ultimately Eureka suggests that unity, the cosmic godhead 
that stands as the alpha and omega of Poe’s cosmology, can be invoked glancingly, 
suggested by art, but only realized by the end of days, without a last trump or a final 
judgment, but only a winking out of light, and a closing of all temporally- and spatially-
bound eyes. In this vision of ending, unity entirely subsumes particularity, and with it, 
particularity’s particular instantiations – for instance, humanity. It is not to the end of the 
world or the extinction of man alone – cataclysms already inconceivable in scope – but 
the end of the created universe in its entirety, from one edge of space to the other. 
And yet here, where the work is at its bleakest, and seemingly at its most 
indifferent to human concerns, Poe backdoors in a kind of a concept of immortality 
through rebirth: “we can readily conceive that a new and perhaps totally different series 
of conditions may ensue – another creation… another action and reaction of the Divine 
Will” (Eu, 103). This new creation is temporary, but the tendency is renewable and, 
ultimately, endless: “are we not, indeed, more than justified in entertaining a belief – let 
us say, rather, in indulging a hope – that the process we have here ventured to 
contemplate will be renewed forever, and forever, and forever; a novel Universe swelling 
into existence, and then subsiding into nothingness, at every throb of the Heart Divine?” 
(Eu, 103). The rhetorical register has shifted from scientific ratiocination to a faith-based 
whimsicality, “indulging a hope” rather than proving a point.  
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Here, the pattern of God’s recurrent creations and destructions is analogous to the 
structure of conscious suffering and unconscious oblivion articulated in Poe’s letter to 
Eveleth. Poe’s own tribulations can be viewed as occupying a synecdochial relationship 
with God’s. Individual difference, even individuality itself, is leveled by its inclusion in a 
“family” that transcends phylum and genus. Matthew Taylor has noted a potentially 
troubling anti-humanism of Poe’s cosmology: Eureka denies any special character, 
specificity, or privilege to the “human.” Poe writes, “All these creatures – all – those 
whom you term animate, as well as those to which you deny life for no better reason that 
that you do not behold it in operation,” are “more or less, and more or less obviously 
conscious Intelligences; conscious, first, of a proper identity; conscious, secondly and by 
faint indeterminate glimpses, of an identity with the Divine Being of whom we speak – of 
an identity with God” (Eu, 106). Startlingly, rocks, dust, and ash are “conscious” of a 
“proper identity,” and if they differ in this respect from humans, they do so only in degree 
– “more or less.” (Poe does not specify whether only agglomerated masses of atoms have 
this identity, or whether, and more bafflingly, each individual atom is self-conscious.) 
However, the nature of this leveling is significant: in the case of each atom or cluster of 
matter, “Difference is their character – their essentiality – just as no-difference was the 
essentiality of their source” (Eu, 27). In other words, all “creatures,” all atoms, have an 
“identity with God” in a meaningful sense only insofar as God has crumbled himself into 
the macadam of creation. Pre-creation and post-cataclysm, God could not be said to be 
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“aware of identity,” since God is singular, and there is no possibility of reflexivity in an 
undifferentiated oneness.130  
So, this sameness-in-difference cuts both ways: man shares with all things a 
fundamental and un-transcendable inability to come into positive contact with anything, 
to eradicate the boundary between itself and its other; yet, in sharing the same situation of 
alienated differentiation, each atom is in a kind of harmony with every other. So, if each 
atom is a part of the “cosmical family,” it is also the case that each atom constitutes a sui 
generis race unto itself. This dispersal of intelligence, from “Mankind” to the 
suprahuman, “cosmical” order of familial relativity, is especially significant in light of 
the way Poe later describes repulsion: “To electricity – so, for the present, continuing to 
call it – we may not be wrong in referring the various physical appearances of light, heat 
and magnetism; but far less shall we be liable to err in attributing to this strictly spiritual 
principle the more important phenomena of vitality, consciousness and Thought” (Eu, 
28). Poe has equated attraction with desire – the yearning to return – and here equates 
repulsion with consciousness. In other words, the very force that stifles the desire towards 
unity is awareness, cognition, “consciousness” itself. Further, the “creatures” Poe spoke 
of are “conscious Intelligences” insofar as they enact repulsion. Thought itself, in other 
words, is the frustration of desire; attraction, as the desire to reunite, is necessarily the 
desire to annihilate thought. Poe has purged the phrenological taxonomy of faculties into 
a bare, minimalist shell of itself. There are only two faculties – attraction and repulsion, 
or (synonymously) desire and thought – and each entails stifling the other. So relation – 
                                                 
130 John Irwin has discussed splitting and doubling, and especially the necessity of doubleness for 
reflection, in some detail in American Hieroglyphics: The Symbol of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics in the 
American Renaissance (New Haven: Yale UP, 1980). 
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creation itself – becomes, and is a product of, the “longing of the soul to vex itself.” 
Creation is coterminous with alienation, frustration, and pain.  
To further this point, Poe maintains that there can be no more happiness extant 
than the happiness God feels in his primordial Unity – the “absolute amount of happiness 
remain[s] always the same” (Eu, 105). Whether in its original unity or in the created state 
of diffusion, it is not in the “power of this Being – any more than it is in your own – to 
extend, by actual increase, the joy of his Existence; but just as it is in your power to 
expand or to concentrate your pleasures (the absolute amount of happiness remaining 
always the same) so did and does a similar capability appertain to this Divine Being,” 
(Eu, 105). No matter how he manifests himself, god cannot make himself happier. And 
yet, from this it follows that the creation is both the diffusion of divine pleasure and the 
creation of divine pain. God, finding his primordial unity and presumably perfect 
happiness unfulfilling, fractures his happiness into “expansive existence” out of, perhaps, 
a craving for novelty – perhaps a craving for suffering (Eu, 106). Poe does not presume to 
psychoanalyze God on this score, and indeed, it is difficult to fathom just how 
unreasonable the motive of creation seems – at least in human terms – from this 
perspective. 
Eureka’s creation-myth involves the enactment of a masochistic compulsion – a 
compulsion that is already embedded in the godhead even when recumbent in its 
perfectly happy consolidation.131 In the state of things as we experience them, in their 
utmost relation, god “feels his life through an infinity of imperfect pleasures – the partial 
                                                 
131 See Jonathan Elmer, Reading at the Social Limit: Affect, Mass Culture, and Edgar Allan Poe (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1995). 
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and pain-intertangled pleasures of those inconceivably numerous things which you 
designate as his creatures, but which are really but infinite individualizations of Himself” 
(Eu, 106). This creation of pain, which is equivalent to the introduction of relation and 
non-identity into the fabric of existence, is also the creation of a desire for the alleviation 
of that pain. So while it is the case that each individual atom is an “individualization” of 
god, it’s also true that the source of each individual atom “lies in the principle, Unity” 
(Eu, 34). Though there is a certain pantheistic flavor to the assertion that each creature is 
a particle of god, this is complicated by the fact that god, insofar as he is each creature, is 
trying to become something he’s not – the unity that is each atom’s “lost parent. This they 
seek always – immediately – in all directions – wherever it is even partially to be found; 
thus appeasing, in some measure, the ineradicable tendency, while on the way to its 
absolute satisfaction in the end” (Eu, 34). In this notion of gravitation, all particles are 
attracted to all other particles, and desire nothing other than an ultimate merger into one 
being – the divine unity that preceded creation. Yet the desire for contact – the 
“ineradicable tendency” – can only be appeased “in some measure,” palliated but not 
cured. The “absolute satisfaction” only comes in the end, after the catastrophe (after the 
ending after which there can be nothing), with the destruction of the universe and the 
abolition of creation – and with it, the abolition of the desire that is erased the moment it 
is satisfied.  
This divine peccadillo – the desire to experience pain – isn’t, in Poe’s cosmology, 
morally neutral, since the “absolute, irrelative particle primarily created by the Volition 
of God, must have been in a condition of positive normality, or rightfulness – for 
wrongfulness implies relation. Right is positive; wrong is negative – is merely the 
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negation of right; as cold is the negation of head – darkness of light” (Eu, 44). In other 
words, before the act of diffusion – the moment of creation that has been compared to the 
Big Bang – things do not exist, but what does exist, irrelationality itself, is ethically 
perfect. This view of the godhead also implies violence, insofar as creation involves 
“forcing the originally and therefore normally One into the abnormal condition of Many,” 
which is also to say, “forcing the normal into the abnormal – of impelling that whose 
originality, and therefore whose rightful condition, was One, to take upon itself the 
wrongful condition of Many” (Eu, 23, 68). Poe’s schematic view of morality entails a 
syllogism the implications of which he doesn’t fully flesh out in his treatise: If unity is 
(equivalent to) right and relation is (equivalent to) wrong, and if the divine creation is the 
creation of relation, then the divine creation is also the creation of wrong. In positing “the 
idea of the utmost possible Relation as the Omnipotent design,” Poe is also positing the 
creation of the utmost possible wrongness as the Omnipotent design (Eu, 71).  
However, this isn’t precisely to say that the creation of the universe is wrong – 
rather, it is the creation of the very condition that makes wrongfulness itself possible. 
“That a thing may be wrong, it is necessary that there be some other thing in relation to 
which it is wrong – some condition which it fails to satisfy; some law which it violates; 
some being whom it aggrieves” (Eu, 44-45). Relation, and with it creation, are the 
constitutive conditions for a violation of the law, and a grief to the “being” that preceded 
them. The very principle of creation negates the possibility of the consummation of this 
desire. Every atom’s desire is frustrated – vexed – by its countervailing urge, repulsion, 
and this frustration “aggrieves” the being that suffers it. The Fall, for Poe, is not due to 
the willful rebellion of man or seraph, and does not result in the estrangement of 
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subjective beings from a former state of closeness or fidelity with the godhead. Rather, 
the fall is coterminous with creation itself. To speak of the post-lapsarian universe is, 
simply, to speak of the universe, as it exists and has always existed, since the literal 
beginning of time. Yet this is not to suggest that Poe’s vision of the cosmos is anti-
humanist, nihilistic, or malevolent; evil for Poe is not an end in itself, but a product of 
what can only be described as a divine compulsion – in fact, a divine perversion. The 
structure of Poe’s creation, as narrated in Eureka, ultimately offers mankind universal 
absolution. There is no primordial sin for man to repent, and so no punishment for him to 
dread beyond the pale. In Poe’s universe, by merit of the fact that every man is among the 
fallen, he bears no responsibility for the fall. 
The mere fact of material existence – of being imbued with the gravitational 
desire and the repulsive frustration of that desire – is, insofar as repulsion is equivalent to 
consciousness, already to have the knowledge of good and evil. Since consciousness, for 
Poe, is equivalent to repulsion, and repulsion is responsible for preserving relation, 
consciousness itself involves a divinely ordained injunction to participate in a state of 
absolute wrongness that last precisely as long as creation itself. Knowledge of good and 
evil isn’t a byproduct of an action – rather, insofar as “wrongness” and “evil” are 
equivalent, knowledge itself is coterminous with evil.  
It is well established that in Eureka Poe elides the boundary between science and 
philosophy, but more radical is his collapsing of orthodoxy and atheism. In endowing his 
God with the compulsive tendencies we now associate with obsessional neurosis, Poe 
imagines a fallen universe; and yet, for Poe, the fall isn’t the transition from Edenic 
utopia to post-lapsarian guilt, but is instead concurrent with the creation of the universe. 
 102 
When God created the world, it was a sinless place – thence the Fall. But in Poe’s schema 
of the universe, humans are absolved of original sin by the same gesture that it is 
bestowed upon them, without requiring the intervention of a benevolent savior. For Poe, 
all humanity is perverse, because all creation is perverse – the soul has a tendency to vex 
itself because the spiritual unity of the godhead has already vexed itself. Ultimately, in 
his deterministic, scientifically Calvinistic cosmos, creation is the founding perversity 
and the ultimate perversion. In engendering the universe, God causes an ineluctable chain 
of self-vexing, self-defeating, and self-negating that continues unabated until the 
catastrophe – a cataclysmic, eschatological pseudo-revelation, an end of the universe that 
reveals nothing. There is no heaven or hell – there is only (bad) relation and (good, but 
effectively non-existence) irrelation. 
So, in “The Imp of the Perverse” and “The Black Cat,” the perverse is theorized 
as an essential and omnipresent faculty of the soul. Finally, in Eureka, it becomes a 
characteristic of divinity itself, and a predicate of creation; perverseness becomes 
embedded in the very structure of the universe. Yet perhaps more intriguingly, the 
perverse tendency also becomes more pronounced as the universe’s conscious 
“creatures,” human or not, become more highly evolved. We catch earlier glimpses of a 
kind of man-beyond-man earlier in the book. In a vatic, speculative voice Poe muses, “we 
should not be unwarranted in the fancy that the discharge of yet a new planet… may give 
rise to yet a new modification of the terrestrial surface – a modification from which may 
spring a race both materially and spiritually superior to Man” (Eu, 65). Again, Poe has it 
both ways – this race would be “superior” to humanity only by merit of suffering more 
attraction and being stifled, correspondingly, by more repulsion. So Eureka’s theory of 
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“progressive collapse” – itself a phrase rich in paradox – is also a theory of evolution 
with an ambivalent stance towards teleology. Poe writes, 
The human brain has obviously a leaning to the ‘Infinite,’ and fondles 
the phantom of the idea. It seems to long with a passionate fervor for 
this impossible conception, with the hope of intellectually believing it 
when conceived. What is general among the whole race of Man, of 
course no individual of that race can be warranted in considering 
abnormal; nevertheless, there may be a class of superior intelligences, 
to whom the human bias alluded to may wear all the character of 
monomania (Eu, 77, Poe’s italics). 
 
This is the (speculative) perverted superman, whose monomaniacal fixation with the 
infinite is nothing but an indication of the concentrated density spirit. The more 
repulsion, the more perversion, the more evolution – the more consciousness. In this way, 
Poe gives us a strange revision of the theory of teleological evolution, or evolution with 
an ultimate end in mind. Poe's teleology hinges on the idea of collapse and annihilation. 
Attraction is the tendency to collapse; repulsion is the corresponding inability to do so. 
Larger bodies, larger agglomerations of matter, will have a corresponding largeness of 
the repulsive (perverse) impulse.  
Repulsion, we recall, is the “strictly spiritual principle” of “vitality, consciousness 
and Thought” (Eu, 28). Poe writes, “let us understand the systems – let us understand 
each star, with its attendant planets – as but a Titanic atom existing in space with 
precisely the same inclination for Unity which characterized, in the beginning, the actual 
atoms” (Eu, 100). These “system-atoms,” at least heuristically, take on the properties of 
an individual atom – therefore an individual consciousness (Eu, 100). Yet they retain the 
repulsive force of the swirl of atoms comprising them, and are charged with “a million-
fold electric velocity, commensurate only with their material grandeur and with their 
spiritual passion for oneness” (Eu, 100). Here are massive, blazing stars, radiating with a 
passionate and erotic longing for consummation. The image is “laughable” and “pathetic” 
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only to the extent that it attempts to sustain an experience of sublimity beyond the 
capacities of the reader.  
As repulsion increases, so consciousness increases with it, since consciousness “is 
merely in the development of this Ether [the repulsive force], through heterogeneity, that 
particular masses of Matter become animate – sensitive – and in the ratio of their 
heterogeneity; – some reaching a degree of sensitiveness involving what we call Thought 
and thus attaining obviously Conscious Intelligence” (Eu, 101). As matter clusters 
together and is frenzied by the desire to merge into oneness, a corresponding amount of 
repulsion is there to stifle that desire, to make consummation impossible. As desire – 
attraction – strengthens, and as the object of fulfillment is approached, it slips further and 
further away, asymptotically, like Zeno’s tortoise eternally outpacing Achilles. The 
“development of the terrestrial vitality proceeds as the terrestrial condensation” (Eu, 65). 
The more matter is assembled, the more “vitality” is produced: “these phenomena, 
whether observed generally or in detail, seem to proceed at least in the ratio of the 
heterogeneous” (Eu, 28). And since each atom is different – “no two bodies are 
absolutely alike” – increasing aggregation of atoms leads directly to higher, or at least 
more, consciousness (Eu, 28). As particles are brought into close proximity, electricity, 
and therefore “consciousness and Thought,” is concentrated (Eu, 28).  
How does Poe know any of this? In a sense, he doesn’t – not if “knowledge” 
means anything rigorous or even conventional. He has replaced the rigorous fantasy of 
“analysis” and “composition” with a new, poetic mode of cognition that, instead of 
supporting itself with scientific rhetoric, actually competes with that rhetoric. The turning 
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point late in Poe’s career is nothing more or less than a new comfort with theoretical 
speculation. In a letter, published in 1848, Poe writes,  
the objections of merely scientific men – men, I mean, who cultivate 
the physical sciences to the exclusion, in a greater or less degree, of the 
mathematics, of metaphysics and of logic – are generally invalid except 
in respect to scientific details. Of all persons in the world, they are at 
the same time the most bigoted and the least capable of using, 
generalizing, or deciding upon the facts which they bring to light in the 
course of their experiments. And these are the men who chiefly write 
the criticisms against all efforts at generalization – denouncing these 
efforts as ‘speculative’ and ‘theoretical’ (Letters, 2:363).  
 
Poe invokes science in order to give his criticism the sheen of validity, but he also 
critiques scientific discourse in order to subordinate it to art. Perhaps more importantly, 
he gradually comes to see hypothesis formation – in the loose sense of telling a plausible 
story about a set of facts, offering an explanation for a range of data – as the lynchpin 
between poetry and science. Intuitive mastery and expertise are legitimated through 
similar processes: each appeals to some extra-personal font of authority that vouchsafes 
the specialness of the knower’s knowledge. In a sense, the difference springs from their 
divergent sources of abstract authority. The expert aims to synthesize that which is 
already known to a certainty, to cobble together the bits of truth that have been deemed 
useful by the curators of the discursive domain. The expert’s role is to solve a problem by 
applying the tools, tricks, and techniques developed by and shared between her clique’s 
credentialed operators. The cliqueless genius, on the other hand, creates a new problem, 
often shattering our complacent acceptance of conventions, dismantling ossified 
hierarchies, and unmasking specialized education as a baroque form of self-deception 
along the way.  
In this, Poe anticipates Charles S. Peirce’s concept of “abduction” – a type of 
thought irreducible to induction and deduction, but no less fundamental to “knowing.” 
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“Abduction” is, Peirce’s sense, intuitive, improvisatory thinking – or, as Peirce was fond 
of putting it, “guessing.” Through the successful application of abduction, he writes, 
“those problems that at first blush appear utterly insoluble receive, in that very 
circumstance, as Edgar Poe remarked in his ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue,’ their 









IRONY AS EXPERTISE: 
SHELL-GAME NARRATION IN HERMAN MELVILLE’S THE CONFIDENCE-MAN 
 
“A society which believes it has dispensed with masks can only be a 
society in which masks, more powerful than ever before, the better to 
deceive men, will themselves be masked.” 
-Claude Lévi-Strauss 
 
“Let us treat the men and women well: treat them as if they were real: 
perhaps they are. Men live in their fancy, like drunkards whose hands 
are too soft and tremulous for successful labor.” 
-Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
“You do not know, you cannot determine scientifically, that I will not 
steal your money or your spoons.” 
-William I. Thomas 
 
 In the 1850s, Gustave Flaubert invented the modern novel, and with it, the 
modern novelist; or, at any rate, he has been consecrated in criticism as a Promethean 
figure whose theft of fire was Madame Bovary. Critics and theorists habitually take that 
novel to mark a historical break between the novel’s past and present, and to inaugurate 
the tradition that is our Western cultural inheritance.132 For Mario Vargas Llosa, 
“Flaubert was the first modern novelist,” and for Julian Barnes, “Madame Bovary is the 
first truly modern novel.”133 More colorfully, James Wood argues, “Novelists should 
thank Flaubert the way poets thank spring: it all begins again with him. There really is a 
                                                 
132 In a famous essay on Flaubert’s style, Proust accounts for his predecessor’s innovativeness in terms of 
grammar and syntax: Flaubert, “through the entirely new and personal use he made of the definite and 
indefinite past tenses, of the present participle, of certain pronouns and prepositions, has renewed our 
vision of things almost as much as Kant, with his Categories, renewed theories of Knowledge and of the 
Reality of the external world” (CC, 148).  
 
133 Mario Vargas Llosa, “Flaubert, Our Contemporary,” trans. John King, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Flaubert, ed. Timothy Unwin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 15; Julian Barnes, “The 
Art of Fiction No. 165,” interview by Shusha Guppy, available at 
http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/562/the-art-of-fiction-no-165-julian-barnes 
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time before Flaubert and after him.”134 These accounts suggest that, in a crucial sense, 
Flaubert inaugurated novel writing as a distinctive kind of labor; he was the prototype, 
the novelist who set the pattern and articulated the techniques and values by which 
aspiring novelists could achieve legitimacy in a field that was no longer legitimized by 
classical conventions or aristocratic values.  
Flaubert, then, occupies a central but uneasy position in the history of literary 
autonomy: one foot in professionalization, the other in the lyric obscurity of modernism, 
his novels (and his correspondence’s ingenious aesthetic theories) helped set the 
conventions of realism and naturalism even as they provided an impetus for symbolists 
and aesthetes who laid siege to those same conventions. Emile Zola saw in Madame 
Bovary the blueprint for a scientific literature that might master reality, as it were, 
objectively; other readers, like Vladimir Nabokov, championed the book as an 
authoritative satire of the bourgeois culture that produced it, but which it transcended.  
Paradoxically, though, claims for Flaubert’s import as an originator and ancestor 
of later literary specialists, whether modernist poets or realist novelists, are predicated on 
his problematization of authority, legitimacy, and transparency. André Brink sees, 
throughout Madame Bovary, the distinctively “modernist approach with which Flaubert, 
together with Mallarmé and Rimbaud, so radically shifted our appreciation of literature 
and its implication in language” – an approach characterized by “despair of language and 
its incapability of communicating adequately the private perception and experience.” 
Flaubert’s novel understands language to be “primarily unreliable and defective,” and the 
                                                 
 
134 James Wood, How Fiction Works (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), p. 32. 
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narrative’s “claims to authority are subverted in every fibre of its own narration.”135  
Similarly, Flaubert’s artistic achievement is, as far as Lawrence R. Schehr can tell, 
indistinguishable from his utter transvaluation of abject artistic failure, or rather, his 
thematization of artistic failure: 
The success of Flaubert’s writing is in the fact that it attains total 
failure: there can be no hermeneutic code, there can be no 
interpretation, nor can there be any successful evocation of an object in 
time and space. The more precise the descriptions seem to become, the 
more they are accidental and contingent. Values and meaning collapse 
at the level of the writing, as it begins to reproduce the collapse of 
meaning and values for the characters. In the end, there is no solution 
but to go on, endlessly, working at doing nothing.136  
 
Flaubert’s style, and the style of Madame Bovary specifically, might then be described in 
R.W.B. Lewis’s terms as “self-cancelling prose”; its sentences “modify, hesitantly 
contradict, and then utterly cancel one another out, leaving not a rack of positive 
statement behind.”137 Lewis is writing, here, not of Flaubert’s first novel, but of Herman 
Melville’s last: The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, published the same year Madame 
Bovary was serialized (1856).  
 The Confidence-Man has been recruited into the ranks of high-modernist 
indirection, fragmentation, and elusiveness. Virtually everyone who cares about such 
things agrees that it is a very difficult book indeed; but, even if it is a truism of 
contemporary criticism that no literary text can, will, or should furnish a finished 
                                                 
135 André Brink, The Novel: Language and Narrative from Cervantes to Calvino (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998), 129, 139, 146. 
 
136 Lawrence R. Schehr, “Flaubert’s Failure,” in The Cambridge Companion to Flaubert, p. 218. 
 
137 R.W.B. Lewis, Trials of the Word: Essays in American Literature and the Humanistic Tradition (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 65. From the perspective of this discordant tradition “the key 
American figure of the past [nineteenth] century was Herman Melville, and the key book was The 
Confidence-Man” (209).  
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interpretation or transcendental signified, critics have still taken pains to point out that 
The Confidence-Man’s ambiguity is unusually – perhaps even uniquely – pervasive, 
perplexing, and thematically central. For some, the book is not about anything other than 
its own falsehood or artifice.138 John G. Cawelti argues that, for Melville’s reader, 
“reality remains unattainable; the moment of seeming truth may be only another mask.... 
We are left with ambiguity at the heart of things.”139 According to Peter Bellis, the book 
“cannot finally be said to provide an authoritative textual center upon which to build a 
reading,” since each scene or dialogue “is either undercut by the circumstances or 
language of its presentation or revealed as the start of a seemingly infinite interpretive 
regress.”140 Finally, in Lawrence Buell’s estimation, “the main problems of the novel are 
insoluble” – those problems being “the extent to which it is possible to determine 
‘meaning’ in the novel,” and “the precise tone or spirit in which the novel should be 
read.”141  
 Taken together, two commonalities of these accounts are striking: first, they share 
an anxiety that The Confidence-Man may be no more valuable or edifying than a grim 
                                                 
 
138 Differently valenced versions of this tendency can also be seen in Malcolm Magaw’s “The Confidence-
Man and Christian Deity: Melville’s Imagery of Ambiguity,” in Explorations of Literature ed. Rima Drell 
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Reality in Melville's The Confidence-Man," ELH. 31.4 (1964): 418-442: Merlin R. Bowen’s “Tactics of 
Indirection in Melville's The Confidence-Man,” Studies in the Novel. 1.4 (1969): 401-420; and John G. 
Blair’s "Puns and Equivocations in Melville's The Confidence Man," American Transcendental Quarterly, 
22 (1974). 
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141 Lawrence Buell, “The Last Word on The Confidence-Man?” Illinois Quarterly, 35 (Nov. 1972): 15-29, 
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joke on its reader, whose sustained efforts to understand the book must inevitably be 
fruitless. Second, they position The Confidence-Man as a work of proto-modernism, a 
kind of self-enclosed symbolist poem made up of unaccountably complex, metaleptic, 
areferential tropes. The book, then, seems at once a howl of despair and a Dionysian 
excursion into pure play. If it is valuable in these accounts, its value springs from the 
painstaking minuteness of Melville’s authorial labor, which demands a correspondingly 
heightened level of attention and effort from the reader who wants even basic 
comprehension of the text.  
The evident lesson of these searchers for deep meaning in The Confidence-Man – 
the key-shaped meaning that might mirror the novel’s lock – is that the search cannot but 
lead into this trou de loup of affirming unmeaning as the book’s ultimate meaning.  But 
Melville is not Mallarmé, and The Confidence-Man was not, or not only, an attempt to 
create an object of pure art without reference. The literary-historical argument entailed 
here is not that literary modernism actually begins with American antebellum fiction, but 
rather that the styles of writing and thinking characteristic of literary modernism did not 
erupt, fully formed, out of the failed Revolution of 1848; nor was literary modernism ever 
simply or completely opposed to the other poles – whether populist or simply 
straightforward or non-experimental – of literary production.  
The question of what the book means – what kinds of truths it tells – can easily 
overshadow the more mundane question of what it is about. Certainly the novel’s 
referential dimension is obscured by its literary tricksterism. Nina Baym – as erudite and 
well-traveled a scholar of antebellum literature as any – asserts that the book is “self-
reflexive… to a greater degree (so far as I know) than any other American work of its 
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period.”142 At this point in his career, Baym argues, fiction is only useful as a vehicle of 
its author’s increasingly excruciating alienation from the craft of fiction: in it, Melville 
“bitterly expresses the sort of truth that can be asserted in a mendacious medium and 
illustrates the convulsed ways in which it can be expressed. But the truths he speaks are 
only about fiction and language” (921). Though her account of Melville’s “quarrel with 
fiction” is largely persuasive, Baym’s case obscures the extent to which The Confidence-
Man is an urgent confrontation of the social conditions and marketplace exigencies of 
Melville’s day.143 I want to insist that self-reflexivity is not the be-all, end-all of The 
Confidence-Man, and that a crucial representational level of the book has gone largely 
overlooked: its ongoing, dialogic, and vexed debate with professionalization, particularly 
in terms of intellectual specialization.  
The argumentative content of The Confidence-Man is not of merely sociological 
interest, since the book’s argument – what we might call its quarrel with specialization – 
is embedded in its form. Melville’s and the book’s position is by no means unequivocal; 
The Confidence-Man is not a straightforward critique or repudiation of specialization. 
                                                 
142 Nina Baym, “Melville's Quarrel with Fiction,” PMLA 94.5 (1979): 909-923, p. 921. 
 
143 In spite of its reflexivity and ambiguity, The Confidence-Man has often been taken as an urgent 
investigation of Melville’s social climate and political milieu. It is, R.W.B. Lewis writes, Melville’s “most 
searching statement about the fatal direction in which America was heading.” Lewis, Trials of the Word: 
Essays in American Literature and the Humanistic Tradition (New Haven: London, 1966) 209. It is not 
unprecedented, in other words, to see social significance in Melville’s seemingly recherché works. As 
Michael Paul Rogin puts it, “Melville’s revolutionary, expansive fiction-writing project went smash in the 
course of Pierre. His tales register thereafter the claustrophobic gloom and the portents of explosion which 
infiltrate the politics of the decade.” Rogin, Subversive Genealogy: The Politics and Art of Herman 
Melville (New York: Knopf, 1983). Here, I am concerned less with the political than the cultural and 
institutional forces registered by Melville in The Confidence-Man, but I am indebted to Rogin’s account. 
Michael Davitt Bell argues that Melville, like Hawthorne, “used the dissociated world of romance, its 
‘world of words,’ to scrutinize the world of their contemporary American culture.” Both writers, in their 
fiction, “exploited the connection between questions of meaning in romance and questions of meaning in 
the world of which romance was not only a part but perhaps the most adequate emblem.” Bell, The 
Development of American Romance (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1981), 155.  
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Even as he attempts to find a posture capable of navigating the choppy waves of 
emerging vocations and disciplines, Melville stakes a claim for a certain kind of 
legitimacy as a literary artist, a species of success and prestige at odds with the popularity 
of sentimental and psychological novels of the day. The book’s difficulty – which is to 
say, its specifically literary quality – is a function of Melville’s own intellectual 
specialization, his specific understanding of the function of art, and his attempt to 
legitimize and to fulfill that function. The artist’s role, though, is characterized by 
evasiveness, indirection, and the ability to resist or defuse propositional logic. Like 
Flaubert, the great puncturer of bourgeois competency, Melville understands technical 
expertise and artistic production as twin – but irreconcilable – species of intellectual 
commodification. Where the technician races to capitalize on his domain by bolstering it 
with claims to scientific precision and objective, progressive potential (a boon for the 
customer!), the artist resists allowing the aesthetic work to become a saleable object; he 
encrusts his production with the very difficulty that short-circuits unselfconscious 
consumption.  
Like the belletristic men of letters who preceded him, Flaubert was, or at least 
seemed, socially and politically disinterested; he aspired to occupy what Pierre Bourdieu 
calls a “neutral place… above the class struggles and material conflicts of the dominant 
class.”144 He strove likewise to be independent from and unaffected by the pressures, 
demands, and even rewards of the literary marketplace, and he demanded that his 
literature be read without respect to his biography, a convention that has held strong on 
criticism until only lately. Each of these desires, to the degree it is satisfied, serves to 
                                                 
144 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Invention of the Artist's Life.” Yale French Studies (1987): 75-103, p. 97. 
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heighten the fantasy of aesthetic autonomy, of “pure art.” In the Francophone and 
Francophile traditions, Flaubert – alongside Baudelaire, whose Fleurs du Mal was 
published in 1857, and who had translated Poe’s essays on aesthetic theory as early as 
1852 – is poised on the threshold of literary modernity. Flaubert signals, for Roland 
Barthes, the twilight of the classical tradition.145 Through his self-conscious literariness, 
Flaubert “finally established Literature as an object, through promoting literary labour to 
the status of a value; form became the end-product of craftsmanship, like a piece of 
pottery or a jewel” (4). The great novelist’s craftsmanship, in other words, helped 
legitimize both the commodity he produced and the vocation of his craft itself. Flaubert, 
in other words, did not lay the groundwork for just any old writer of novels for money. 
Built into his example is a species of “high” literariness, an element that confounds 
convention and inaugurates its own tradition. But it does so by attaining a special kind of 
authoritative heft that can only be understood with reference to writing as a kind of labor 
due recognition and remuneration.  
Like Flaubert, Melville foregrounds his own resistance to being understood – his 
uninterpretability – because that resistance is the marker of his own artistic specialization. 
In The Confidence-Man, Melville both delivers his most sweeping and most scathing 
critique of intellectual specialization even as he offers his most difficult, most specialized 
work of Literature. 
  
                                                 
 
145 “[W]e know that where writing is concerned classicism lasts until Flaubert.” Roland Barthes, Writing 
Degree Zero (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968) p. 37.  
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Forensics: Inventing the Confidence Man 
“A confidence man knows he’s lying; that limits his scope. But a 
successful shaman believes what he says – and belief is contagious; 
there is no limit to his scope.” 
-Robert Heinlein, Strangers in a Strange Land 
 
“A hustler has to get out of town as quick as he can. But a good con 
man? He doesn't have to leave until he wants to.” 
-Diggstown (1992) 
 
As increasingly autonomous disciplines adopted increasingly idiosyncratic 
vocabularies, they became increasingly difficult to understand, much less evaluate, from 
the external position of laypersons or professionals in other disciplines. The great threat 
posed by technocratic social organization is that the “expertise” on which it is grounded 
might be empty obscurantism, and the hierarchy it founds might be counterfeit, organized 
not on the honest, holistic evaluation of individual merit but on the mastery of some skill 
or dogma that might be worthless, if not pernicious. The Confidence-Man lays out a 
vivisected anatomy of the antebellum market and the atomized subjects who constitute, 
and are swallowed by, it. Rather than starting with an individual working towards social 
legitimacy – a theme Melville’s earlier novels shared with developing trends of social 
realism – the book begins with the social totality of midcentury America itself, and works 
backwards and downwards, to the amazingly multifarious splay of dubious postures and 
outright impostures that constitute that totality. In sum, the Fidèle’s passengers evince a 
“Tartar-like picturesqueness, a sort of pagan abandonment and assurance. Here reigned 
the dashing and all-fusing spirit of the West, whose type is the Mississippi itself, which, 
uniting the streams of the most distant and opposite zones, pours them along, helter-
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skelter, in one cosmopolitan and confident tide.”146 The image of society as an 
undifferentiated current is attractive, but its emphasis on becoming evades the question of 
the individual’s vulnerability. The laissez-faire atmosphere of confluence and intercourse 
leaves self-defense to selves.  
Melville’s concealment of inwardness under layers of artifice, disciplined 
mannerism, and (im)posture dramatizes the experience of the market revolution on the 
ground, wherein habitual suspicion – so necessary in a society of strangers – could easily 
become a paralyzing paranoia. Moby-Dick, Redburn, and White Jacket illustrate a tight-
knit community of expert sailors with delegated responsibilities, under the thrall of 
tyrannical oversight and the threat of draconian punishment. The Confidence-Man’s 
milieu, on the other hand, is a vacuum of authority and responsibility. It is a resolutely 
urban novel, depicting a floating city of dangerous strangers. On the Fidèle, as in the 
city, mystery is “raised to the level of spectacle,” as Alan Trachtenberg writes, and “the 
daily performances of city life” seem “parades of obscurity, of enigma, of silent sphinxes 
challenging the puzzles citizens.”147 The book dramatizes that form of “modernity” 
Sacvan Bercovitch describes as “a world where the self was cut loose in a marketplace of 
other independent selves; where no theory of government could offer a ready way to 
impose community.”148 
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For all its cosmopolitanism, community is just what the Fidèle lacks. Its deck is a 
honeycomb attracting a continually shifting, never quite self-identical, swarm of 
strangers, all “involuntarily submitting to that natural law which ordains dissolution 
equally to the mass, as in time to the member” (CM, 16). Here, that is, the surface tension 
lending consistency to the liberal subject bursts in the “helter-skelter” flow; the tide 
might be “cosmopolitan and confident,” but it seems that its subjects and citizens have 
grounds for concern over the matter of their own survival, much less protection. The 
riverboat’s passengers are confined, thrust together in a frontier facsimile of the public 
sphere. For the most part, they are alone; few have friends, colleagues, or families, and 
fewer still have brought them aboard. The Confidence-Man locks its characters (and its 
reader) away from any and all institutions – police, officials, even the ship’s crew – that 
might protect the individual from the impersonal forces of capital and the personal 
encroachment of soliciting entrepreneurs.   
Thomas Bender has called Melville’s historical moment “the Age of Barnum,” a 
period marked by “an intellectual free-for-all, as all manner of men sought an audience in 
the city’s public culture.” Bender vividly describes the predicament: 
Lacking a solid impersonal basis for establishing a relationship with 
their audience, urban intellectuals relied on their personalities and the 
appearance of intimate disclosure to establish the trust and authority 
essential for intellectual community. But personality was a poor 
substitute for the shared intellectual framework and clear social 
categories that had earlier given shape to local intellectual life. In such 
a situation, the eighteenth-century penchant for argument gave way to 
the quest for ‘influence.’ 149 
 
                                                 
 
149 Thomas Bender, Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic Intellectuals in the 
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Awash in the democratic spirit of exposure, people felt newly empowered to solve 
problems for themselves by exposing the submerged connections of a world that seemed 
endlessly interconnected. At midcentury, knowledge was, or seemed to be, socialized, 
redistributed to the people as a natural consequence of America’s democratic principles. 
Jacksonian populism and Barnumesque skepticism created a climate of suspicion of and 
hostile towards the elitist implications of vocational expertise, especially as it became 
increasingly clear that professions stood transparently in conflict with the economic 
interests of their clients. Professionals, everyone noticed, are useful only when laypersons 
are faced with crises that outstrip their resources; so, P.T. Barnum quipped, “the learned 
professions depend solely for support upon the misfortunes, miseries, or foibles of 
mankind.”150 
Indeed, institutionally legitimate professionals were often less effectual than their 
upstart competitors: “the expert turned out frequently to be a pedantic ignoramus, easily 
fooled himself; the learned doctor was often a victim of scientific nonsense and deserved 
to be overruled by intelligent laymen.”151 Esotericism, in that case, could only be an 
obscurantist cover-up, a needless complexification of problems that could be solved by 
common sense. This mistrust of differential access, both to information and to the ability 
to use that information, implied that each individual was her own best judge; unless it 
was transparent and legible to the layperson, the consensual and conventional wisdom of 
professionals – whether clergymen, lawyers, or doctors – was practically irrelevant.  
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The problem with this brand of epistemological populism was that special skills, 
and the dedicated education to teach them, were necessary in order for anyone to do 
anything – particularly any complex thing – other than what anyone else could do. For 
anti-institutional thinkers like Thoreau (and sometimes Emerson), this was not a problem 
but a virtue of self-reliance. But as scientific paradigms, technological developments, 
communication media, and modes of transportation grew denser and more forbidding, 
expertise was again a commodity.152 All manner of men stepped up to fill this void of 
good advice. Some of these seekers were sincere philanthropists and lovers of 
knowledge, but with them swarmed a horde of charlatans and false prophets. It was not 
always possible to tell the difference; in some cases there did not seem to be a difference. 
There was no longer a reliable system for distinguishing legitimate experts from 
pretenders (or incompetents). In Wood’s terms, the “democratization of truth” was 
coextensive with an “epistemological crisis”: “Most ordinary people were no longer 
willing to defer to the knowledge and judgments of those who had once been their 
superiors.” This requisitioning of personal agency carried responsibility along with it. If 
no one knew better than anyone else, that also meant every individual fell with full force 
on the sword of his mistakes. Without expert advisors, those overconfident in their ability 
to decide for themselves were easy “prey for all the hoaxers, confidence men, and 
tricksters like Edgar Allan Poe and P.T. Barnum who soon popped up everywhere.153 
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The confidence man’s historical emergence, then, is part of the broader trend of 
the fetishization, commodification, and intense suspicion of expertise. The term 
“confidence man” was introduced in the press in 1849 to describe Thomas Wilson, who 
stole pocket watches from well-heeled gentlemen simply by asking to borrow them. The 
forensic category he inspired was an uneasy attempt to synthesize a complex web of 
social forces, in sometimes-contradictory ways. The figure’s conceptual crystallization 
was the product of the mid-nineteenth century’s mania for isolating and cataloguing 
perceived threats, most famously analyzed by Foucault’s History of Sexuality. Like the 
homosexual or the pervert, once he was fixed and taxonomized, the confidence man 
became an identifiable subspecies, a criminal underclass that could be understood by 
experts, discovered by forensics, and punished by law. The confidence man is, in a sense, 
in the closet: by passing for honest, he poses a threat that is more dangerous for its 
surreptitiousness.154  
Wilson’s career, like Bartleby’s, ended in the Tombs. Basically a petty crook, 
Wilson nevertheless captured the attention and imagination of the commentariat, 
particularly in New York, where artists, journalists, and editors saw him as a symptom of 
a society that was sickening, in one sense or another. A month after Wilson’s arrest, the 
Literary World – Melville benefactor Evert Duyckinck’s magazine – ran a piece on “The 
Confidence Man, the new species of Jeremy Diddler recently a subject of police 
fingering.”155 Its author argued, “It is a good thing, and speaks well for human nature, 
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that, at this late day, in spite of all the hardening of civilization, and all the warning of 
newspapers, men can be swindled.” The man who is “always on his guard, always proof 
against appeal… is far gone, in our opinion, toward being himself a hardened villain… 
and when he dies, may Heaven have that confidence in him which he had not in his 
fellow mortals” (CM, 311). Here, Wilson serves as a kind of satanic tester, who gives 
ordinary people the opportunity to prove their goodness, even if that goodness is naïve.156  
Not everyone, though, was reassured by what Wilson said about the culture that 
fostered him. An anonymous writer for the New York Herald argued that there is no 
substantive difference between petty swindling and financial speculation; the speculative 
financier is merely the “Confidence Man on a large scale.” Where the solitary operator’s 
“genius has been employed on a small scale in Broadway,” the genius of banks and 
bankers “has been employed in Wall street [sic]. That’s all the difference. He has 
obtained half a dozen watches. They have pocketed millions of dollars. He is a swindler. 
They are exemplars of honesty. He is a rogue. They are financiers” (CM, 308). The 
editorial ends with a perverse sort of toast: “Long life to the real ‘Confidence Man!’ – the 
‘Confidence Man’ of Wall street… As for the ‘Confidence Man’ of the Tombs,’ he is a 
cheat, a humbug, a delusion, a sham, a mockery! Let him rot!” (CM, 309). Unlike 
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Wilson, the banks do nothing illegal; and unlike Wilson, they don’t get caught.157 In 
either case, though, the weapons of fraud and finance are the same: the ability to cultivate 
consent in the skeptical, and suasion, whether moral or not.  
These editorial responses reflect the ambivalence this figure engendered in the 
commentariat, and in each case, the writer takes the confidence man to be a symptom of a 
broader social phenomenon. The first editorial uses the confidence man to celebrate the 
Christian charitableness of American character and American democracy, despite the 
obstacles presented to brotherly democracy by greed and crime; this 
optimistic/progressive view places him in the taxonomy of criminals and deviants, those 
misfits who are essentially other than the “typical,” good-natured individual.158 This 
forensic impulse is comforting, insofar as it implies that confidence men can be mastered, 
outmaneuvered, and policed. On the other hand, it induces anxiety, since it demands the 
kind of constant vigilance that can verge into paranoia. If anyone could be a confidence 
man, everyone might be a confidence man, and it is up to each individual not to be taken 
in, duped, or tricked. The second editorial uses the confidence man as leverage to indict 
the excesses and systemic corruption of American capital in the early days of the robber 
barons; this pessimistic/skeptical view sees all men as, at least potentially, members of 
the same fallen species. Some urban intellectuals, like the Herald writer, felt that the 
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machine of capital was itself all but indistinguishable from a confidence game, a worry 
that would only intensify with the omnipresent political and economic corruption that 
marked the Gilded Age.  
Worse, these writers worried that the system’s “aristocrats” were not, strictly 
speaking, criminals; they were instead reformers, financiers, peddlers, partisans, and 
grandstanders. All were in the business of selling themselves, and of advocating their 
own interests, and all took pains to look altruistic and disinterested.159 When a confidence 
trick becomes legible as a confidence trick, something has gone wrong: the obvious 
hustler’s mistake is not victimizing his victims, but allowing his victims to realize that 
they have been victimized. The best con men go undiscovered, and earn the faith of an 
unsuspecting community for however long they want it. The goal of refined con men is to 
transubstantiate illegitimacy into legitimacy, so that they might be recognized as an 
institutional rather than a criminal element. If they seem antiestablishmentarian, it is only 
to clear space for themselves at the establishment’s table. Lacking what Magali Larson 
calls “socially recognized expertise,” any specialist was prima facie indistinguishable 
from a charlatan.160 The antebellum impulse to form associations and societies was an 
unambiguous attempt to overcome this obstacle.  
                                                 
 
159 William Worthington Fowler’s contemporary description of Wall Street both resembles The Confidence-
Man’s exotic, if debauched, menagerie, and illustrates what many saw as the essential false dichotomy 
between capitalists and confidence men: “All classes and grades are represented here – rich and poor, 
gentle and simple, learned and illiterate… The broken operator takes whiskey ‘straight’ with the wealthy 
capitalist, and the puritan and blackleg exchange a sympathetic smile when they see the stocks advancing in 
which they are interested.” Quoted in H.W. Brand, American Colossus: The Triumph of Capitalism, 1865-
1900 (New York: Anchor Books, 2010), 16. 
 
160 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: Monopolies of Competence and Sheltered Markets 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2013 [1977]). Larson argues, the “task of professional organizers 
was twofold: to open the ranks of traditional professional elites by direct or indirect attack upon their 
gatekeeping institutions; and to organize the expanded markets opened by urbanization and by the relative 
enrichment of certain publics” (Rise, 10). 
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The characters conventionally labeled confidence men by The Confidence-Man’s 
criticism attempt to fill the antebellum era’s void of institutional legitimacy by offering 
other characters investment opportunities (that may or may not be legitimate, and are 
hence highly speculative). Each claims his own proprietary economy of faith, based on 
the promise of future fulfillment rather than immediate gratification. In aggregate, they 
cover the explosion of specialized speculative economies that subtended the market 
revolution: charity, religion, medicine, labor, and finance. As it unfurls, The Confidence-
Man offers a procession of targeted marketers who employ increasingly sophisticated 
techniques to disable suspicion in their potential customers. These ostensibly conning 
characters present themselves as experts whose authority is founded on special 
knowledge of “nature” or “reality.” They claim a special ability to see the truth of nature 
or reality, and then to offer that ability for sale.  
However, these claims to knowledge indelicately balance the progressive claims 
of science with the authority of special revelation. Ambitious to quicken reform “with the 
Wall street spirit,” the Seminole charity agent’s pet project is a World’s Charity whose 
“one object” is “the methodization of the world’s benevolence” (CM, 49, 47). The 
president and transfer agent of the Black Rapids Coal Company holds that dour topics 
should only be “philosophized upon, as not to afford handles to those unblessed with the 
true light,” so as to keep rhetorical ammunition out of the hands of those cynical folk who 
might adversely affect the stock market. The herb doctor castigates science as passing 
fad; herbalists, he says, “go about in nature, humbly seeking her cures,” unlike those 
hubristic researchers who see themselves as discoverers. The Philosophical Intelligence 
Officer bases his business on “strictly philosophical principles,” culled from “a careful 
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analytical study of man,” and so can deliver maximally efficient (and therefore 
maximally exploitable) laborers 
The real skill of these characters, though, lies less in methodization than in 
finding likely customers, which is to say, promising to satisfy deep-seated desires, or 
threatening the realization of deep-seated fears. Proto-professions, in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, were speculative ventures (gambles): potential but certainly not 
guaranteed vehicles of legitimacy for their pioneering practitioners and developers, who, 
it never stops being surprising to reflect, were improvising. In a spiritedly anti-
professional account of nineteenth century professionalization, Burton J. Bledstein 
describes professionals as fear-mongers and predators.  
Professionals not only lived in an irrational world, they cultivated that 
irrationality by uncovering abnormality and perversity everywhere: in 
diseased bodies, criminal minds, political conspiracies, threats to the 
national security. An irrational world, an amoral one in a state of 
constant crisis, made the professional person who possessed his special 
knowledge indispensable to the victimized client, who was reduced to a 
condition of desperate trust. The culture of professionalism exploited 
the weaknesses of Americans – their fears of violent, sudden, 
catastrophic, and meaningless forces that erupted unpredictably in both 
individual and mass behavior.161 
 
By this account, professionals’ primary agent of persuasion is fear, and their primary 
products are prevention and cure. They flourish in an atmosphere of paranoia, and that 
atmosphere flourishes with them.  
In his dealings with a consumptive, the herb doctor – himself shilling an 
alternative therapy – is locked in rhetorical battle with other alternative therapies; indeed, 
his central sales strategy is to persuade the miser that other treatments are, despite the 
best intentions of their sellers, harmful and illegitimate. He paints mineral doctors, “not 
                                                 
161 Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher 
Education in America (New York: Norton, 1976), 102. 
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as willful wrongdoers, but good Samaritans erring” (CM, 82). The water-cure, likewise, 
is a “fatal delusion of the well-meaning Preisnitz,” its inventor (CM, 85). In contrast, herb 
doctors, “claim nothing, invent nothing,” but merely “go about in nature, humbly seeking 
her cures” (CM, 84). Unlike those who promise miracle cures, the herb doctor is “neither 
prophet nor charlatan” (CM, 88). He mocks the “conceit – that science is now-a-days so 
expert that, in consumptive cases… it can, by prescription of the inhalation of certain 
vapors, achieve the sublimest act of omnipotence, breathing into all but lifeless dust the 
breath of life” (CM, 84). Scientific doctors are hubristic, even “atheistical,” evincing that 
“pride in human skill, which seems scarce compatible with reverential dependence upon 
the power above” (CM, 84).  
Against the astringent snake oils of artifice and science, the herb doctor reasons, 
“nature is health; for health is good, and nature cannot work ill. As little can she work 
error. Get thee nature, and you get well. Now, I repeat, this medicine is nature’s own” 
(CM, 87). Daniel Walker Howe reflects the conventional historical view of the period in 
claiming that medicine was “possibly the least well developed” of the “major branches of 
science,” which fostered the proliferation of alternative therapies and fringe treatments: 
“Though unorthodox practitioners could be unscrupulous charlatans, some of them had 
sounder ideas and did less harm than the M.D.s.”162 Of course, the herb doctor is the 
agent of nature, and in preaching submission to its curative powers, he also preaches 
unconditional submission to his own expertise, for an indefinite duration: he advises the 
sick man that if he takes “my medicine steadily, without assigning an especial day, near 
                                                 
162 David Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2007), p. 470. 
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or remote, to discontinue it, then you may calmly look for some eventual result of good” 
(CM, 88). The sick man, then, is the herb doctor’s customer unto death.  
But even in Melville’s bleak anatomy, confidence men are not a necessarily 
destructive or parasitic force: preying on emotion is not necessarily diabolical, nor is 
taking advantage necessarily a zero-sum game. Though these are surely aspects of 
capital’s exploitative nature, exploitation is not without pleasures and payoffs, however 
attenuated.163 Curiously, as Lawrence Buell observes, the book offers “no tangible proof 
of actual cheating, not even in the case of the herb-doctor” (Buell, 16). The B.R.C.C. 
president is selling either worthless or legitimately tantalizing stock, but in either case he 
is selling financial speculation (and with it, the promise of profit to the daring, like the 
collegian, and future security to the cautious, like the merchant, Henry Roberts). The herb 
doctor is selling either a miracle cure or medicinally worthless snake oil – or if you 
prefer, a placebo – but in either case, he is marketing the promise of health to persons 
sick or in pain (and so, if his cures don’t work, exploiting their fear-fostered credulity).164 
The Philosophical Intelligence Officer is contracting labor to employers, but more 
importantly, he is selling the promise that ideal laborers can be bought (though they may 
never be delivered). Their putative products may be dubious, or even nonexistent, but we 
                                                 
 
163 Capitalism, Michele Foucault suggests, “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no”; it also 
“traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body much more than as a 
negative instance whose function is repression” (Truth and Power 1). 
 
164 Rachel Cole usefully views the book’s titular figure in terms of structural function rather than intent or 
personality. If “confidence-man has an identity,” she writes, “it is defined by winning, rather than 
deception… To be an embodiment of this character… is not to be just a player but the winner of a 
confidence game” (388). The confidence man, in short, “never loses.” The problem is that winning and 
losing, in The Confidence-Man, are no more self-evident than honesty and dishonesty. Instead, I see the 
novel’s confidence men as those characters who try to win assent through the promise of moral or monetary 
incentives; they need not even actually achieve it. Cole, “At the Limits of Identity: Realism and American 
Personhood in Melville's Confidence-Man.” Novel: a Forum on Fiction. 39.3 (2006): 384-401. 
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have no grounds on which to judge them as individual characters or transactions. We do 
not know if the victims have been tricked or duped – that is to say, if they are in fact 
victims of anything more egregious than buyer’s remorse. In other words, there may not 
be a single confidence man in The Confidence-Man.  
For all that, though, the threat of deception and ruination looms everywhere. In 
The Confidence-Man’s telling, capitalism is always susceptible to abuse, and so, in the 
capitalist context, suspicion is never entirely unwarranted. On the other hand, suspicion, 
when generalized into a habitual posture, leads to misery, terror, and a strange kind of 
resentful smugness (as in the gimlet-eyed man or Pitch, the Missouri bachelor). The 
characters in The Confidence-Man, then, are self-elected specialists of dubious standing 
who want, or seem to want, to be recognized as socially legitimate. Part of the reason the 
book’s self-professed specialists seem so dubious is that they exist in isolation; they refer 
to affiliates, but they never appear with those affiliates, or display any verifiable 
endorsement from any socially recognized association. In The Confidence-Man, as David 
Reynolds argues, “Melville had reached the same conclusion about American society that 
many humorists of the 1850s had: in the Barnumesque carnival of popular culture, all is 
reduced to theater and entrepreneurial manipulation.”165 Perhaps because of this 
omnipresence of manipulation, The Confidence-Man has suspiciously little to say about 
what constitutes confidence men, and is conspicuously unhelpful in identifying them, or 
differentiating them from anyone else.  
                                                 
 
165 David S. Reynolds, Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in the Age of 
Emerson and Melville (New York: Knopf, 1988) p. 552. 
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There is, on the Fidèle’s deck, a “placard nigh the captain’s office, offering a 
reward for the capture of a mysterious impostor, supposed to have recently arrived from 
the East; quite an original genius in his vocation, as would appear, though wherein his 
originality consisted was not clearly given; but what purported to be a careful description 
of his person followed” (CM, 9-10). The placard doubles as a kind of advertisement: 
“crowds” gather around it “[a]s if it had been a theatre-bill” (CM, 10). The book all but 
demands that we infer that this wanted poster is meant to warn passengers of the 
confidence man himself. Though the narrator emphasizes that the consistency or content 
of his “original genius” is obscure, he elides the fact that we readers can only guess at 
what his “vocation” comprises. After all, is imposture a job, or the mimicking of a job 
one doesn’t have? The narrator assures us that the poster provides a “what purported to 
be a careful description of his person,” but he does not transcribe that description; 
instead, he describes the description, if in an aggressively vague way. By withholding it 
from the reader, the novel ostensibly provides clues to its characters that it refuses its 
audience. If, however, the confidence man can look and act in the manner of a menagerie 
of different men, this information is worse than useless for those who have it. Indeed, if 
the confidence man is characterized by a chameleonic aptitude for disguise, the 
description can only divert attention and suspicion from his disguises. 
So the placard offers a warning, and prescribes caution, but it gives no clues to 
identifying or defining the nature of the threat. In the midst of a description of the ship’s 
carnival throng, the narrator observes that bandits and pirates, overt members of 
America’s criminal class, have been “exterminated… for the most part, like the hunted 
generations of wolves in the same regions, leaving comparatively few successors; which 
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would seem cause for unalloyed gratulation, and is such to all except those who think that 
in new countries, where the wolves are killed off, the foxes increase” (CM, 10). Here, the 
narrator suggests, without affirming, that violent and overt criminality has been forced 
underground, as it were, in Young America. In this “new country,” criminals are no 
longer immediately recognizable in their otherness. This anxiety begets paranoia, fear 
that “foxes” walk among us undetected – not only the petty criminals and merchants who 
pepper the deck of the Fidèle, but also subtler predators whose otherness harrowingly 
disguised by familiarity. The wolf is what he is, but the fox is something other than what 
he seems to be.  
The novel’s titular phrase appears only once, in the final chapter, when a “dreamy 
man” overhears the cosmopolitan’s reading aloud from the apocryphal book of 
Ecclesiasticus, and calls out, “Who’s that describing the confidence-man?” (CM, 241). 
The description he keys on is this: “With much communication will he tempt thee; he 
will smile upon thee, and speak thee fair, and say What wantest thou? If thou be for his 
profit he will use thee; he will make thee bare, and will not be sorry for it. Observe and 
take good heed. When thou hearest these things, awake in thy sleep” (CM, 241). The 
cosmopolitan understands this to mean that “not the truest friend in the world is to be 
implicitly trusted. Can Rochefoucault equal that? I should not wonder if his view of 
human nature, like Machiavelli’s, was taken from the Son of Sirach” (CM, 242). Frank 
Goodman takes the book’s author, in other words, to endorse a bleak view of human 
nature, one that forces individuals into positions of desperate suspicion at their constant 
vulnerability.  
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Interestingly, though, the cosmopolitan’s quotation elides essential context: the 
Son of Sirach is, at this point, advising his reader against social climbing, against 
affiliating with the rich:  
Burden not thyself above thy power while thou livest; and 
have no fellowship with one that is mightier and richer than thyself: for 
how agree the kettle and the earthen pot together? for if the one be 
smitten against the other, it shall be broken. 
The rich man hath done wrong, and yet he threateneth withal: 
the poor is wronged, and he must intreat also. 
If thou be for his profit, he will use thee: but if thou have 
nothing, he will forsake thee. 
If thou have any thing, he will live with thee: yea, he will 
make thee bare, and will not be sorry for it. 
If he have need of thee, he will deceive thee, and smile upon 
thee, and put thee in hope; he will speak thee fair, and say, What 
wantest thou? 
 
The rich man, he says, is motivated by profit, and willing to exploit the poor man for his 
own benefit. Even when he “hath done wrong,” and has “wronged” the poor, he is in a 
position of power – “he threateneth withal,” and unjustly reduces the poor to the 
necessity of entreaty. Insofar as the poor have “fellowship” with the rich, they are 
susceptible to the volatile, and potentially catastrophic, whims of the market; so, the 
author advises, the poor should keep to themselves, for, “As the proud hate humility: so 
doth the rich abhor the poor.” 
So what is, in Ecclesiasticus, a description of the rich and powerful man is 
presented, in The Confidence-Man, as a description of “the confidence-man.” The threat, 
then, is that the confidence man operates on the same motives ascribed to the rich man in 
Ecclesiasticus: profit, power, status, dominance, cruelty, self-righteousness, and an 
unfeeling willingness to exploit the other and the lesser.  
Specialization in The Confidence-Man 




“I'm not conceited, I'm just convinced. I'm so modest I can admit my 
own faults, and my only fault is, I don't realize how great I really am!”  
-Muhammad Ali 
 
It is not often noticed that the first half of The Confidence-Man actually 
dramatizes, in its deployment of characters, the evolution of occupational specialization. 
Though a full investigation of this is beyond my scope, here, a schematic list offers an 
intriguing alternative to reading the avatars of the confidence man as, for instance, so 
many disguises of the devil:  
1. The man in cream, a renegade preacher, offers doctrine gratis to a flock he sees as lost, 
fallen 
2. The Black Guinea sells entertainment and the opportunity to perform social superiority 
publically, through alms-giving 
3. John Ringman sells equality and fraternity, by leveraging the pathos of social a peer in 
dire straits (there but for the grace of God) 
4. The Seminole charity agent sells the exorcism of national guilt, or personal exculpation 
for social ills through the penance of charity 
5. The Black Rapids Coal Company president sells financial speculation, the promise of 
personal enrichment 
6. The herb doctor sells personal health, mastery over one’s body 
7. The Philosophical Intelligence Officer sells the subjugation of others in the form of 
perfectly routinized labor – a workforce with no unpredictable human element 
 
None of these role-players, in 1856, was a professional in the conventional sense, but 
each offers a basically intellectual service to a community of laypersons helpless to 
perform that service for themselves. By the end of the century, fringe religions would be 
solidified into institutional structures; artists and singers would be established as 
professionals in their crafts; professional confidence men would be listed in police 
manuals; charity would be big business; Wall Street rivaled Washington as an epicenter 
of power; healthcare became the single most important market segment; and the 
acquisition and exploitation of labor became perhaps the dominant social problem. 
It is fitting, then, that the first in the book’s procession is a burlesque of one of the 
classical professions (with law and medicine): the clergy. The Confidence-Man begins 
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with the “advent” of a “lamb-like figure,” the man in cream, an ineffectual oracle with 
“the air of one neither courting nor shunning regard, but evenly pursuing the path of 
duty” (CM, 9). This duty, it seems, is to preach to the flock of Fidèle passengers; so, 
“gaining his place” at the head of the crowd, he holds up flash-sermons, scrawled on slate 
(“Charity thinketh no evil,” “Charity endureth all things”). But the annexation of “his 
place” proves fleeting, since the crowd perceives “no badge of authority about him, but 
rather something quite the contrary – he being of an aspect so singularly innocent; an 
aspect, too, which they took to be somehow inappropriate to the time and place, and 
inclining to the notion that his writing was of much the same sort” (CM, 11). The point, 
here, is that preacherly authority is predicated upon badges, outward signs, which 
connote that authority based on accepted custom. Later in the novel, for instance, a 
Methodist minister’s vocation will go unquestioned because of his white collar, even as 
he doubts the legitimacy of a black beggar’s blackness.  
The man in cream is, “in the extremest sense of the word, a stranger.” Though the 
Fidèle is “always full of strangers,” with the man in cream’s disappearance, “she 
continually, in some degree, adds to, or replaces them with strangers still more strange” 
(CM, 15). Though the passengers recognize the man in cream as a stranger, this only 
obscures the fact that they are strangers to one another. After being jeered, pushed, 
punched, and knocked over, he retreats from his abusers – “as if not wholly unaffected by 
his reception” – to a “retired spot on the forecastle” (CM, 13). Finally out of the public 
eye, and out of the public’s way, the narrator observes that, “as a deck-passenger, the 
stranger, simple though he seemed, was not entirely ignorant of his place” (CM, 13, my 
italics). This shift in the narrator’s identification of the man in cream’s “place” suggests 
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that he has been disciplined through punishment to identify himself as an exile in this 
“humble quarter.” He cannot earn social acceptance through sheer force of will, even 
when his message is drawn directly from scripture.  
In his grab for public attention, the man in cream “had by no means passed 
unobserved, yet by stealing into retirement… he seemed to have courted oblivion, a boon 
not often withheld from so humble an applicant as he” (CM, 15). His vanishing, in fact, 
marks a beginning: “like some enchanted man in his grave, happily oblivious of all 
gossip, whether chiseled or chatted, the deaf and dumb stranger still tranquilly slept, 
while now the boat started on her voyage” (CM, 14, my italics). Finally, after “two or 
three random stoppages… the last transient memory of the slumberer vanished, and he 
himself, not unlikely, waked up and landed ere now” (CM, 15). And so the man in cream 
colors disappears from the novel, into narratorial speculation and reputational 
nonexistence – into the unconscious of the book and the world alike. The man in cream is 
the most obtrusive character for the book’s first two chapters, and he seems to transform 
into the character that follows him, the Black Guinea; but Will Kaufman proposes that 
"one reason for the critical disagreement" over the man in cream's status as an avatar of 
the title character is that, as a confidence man, "he is a singular failure." 166 He offers the 
timeless truths of scripture, but because he confers no impression of personal authority, 
the crowd rejects his message out of hand. Indeed, he fails as a preacher because he fails 
as a con man: he enjoins faith but receives none; he offers religious instruction, but 
provides no incentive for its adoption. Disembarrassed of his intrepid ambition for an 
audience, he seeks belonging in solitude and, eventually, oblivion.  
                                                 
166 Will Kaufman. The Comedian as Confidence Man: Studies in Irony Fatigue (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1997), p. 61. 
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After the man in cream, each focal character has something to sell. He is replaced, 
in the narrative’s attention, by a busker – a “grotesque negro cripple” – who makes 
“music, such as it was,” with an “old coal-sifter of a tamborine.” In contrast to the 
seemingly innocent but socially intractable man in cream, the self-described “Black 
Guinea” does not challenge the crowd, or try to influence its beliefs or desires; instead, he 
attempts to read its beliefs and desires, and to alter his own behavior accordingly. 
(Perhaps because of this, Kaufman reflects the consensus that the Guinea is 
"unquestionably an avatar.") This marginal minstrel’s adaptability is underlined by the 
narrator’s depiction of him in terms of a notoriously trainable, and stereotypically 
friendly, breed of dog: he is, “owing to something wrong about his legs… in effect, cut 
down to the stature of a Newfoundland dog; his knotted black fleece rubbing against the 
upper part of people’s thighs as he made shift to shuffle about” (CM, 17). Due to his 
novel appearance, the Guinea is “not the least attractive object, for a time” (CM, 17). But 
the Guinea is able to inspire little generosity until he “more than revived their first 
interest” in him as a “curious object” by offering himself as the object of a “game of 
charity,” in which benefactors throw pennies (and buttons) into the Guinea’s open mouth 
(CM, 18). With nothing to sell but hard luck and songs, the Guinea transforms himself 
into the site of recreation, for which the players must pay in order to participate. The 
game, “whether by chance or design, was a singular temptation at once to diversion and 
charity, though, even more than his crippled limbs, it put him on a canine footing. In 
short, as in his appearance he seemed a dog, so now, in a merry way, like a dog he began 
to be treated” (CM, 18). 
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At the height of the charity game, a “gimlet-eyed” man with a wooden leg 
declares the Guinea’s “deformity” to be “a sham, got up for financial purposes... He’s 
some white operator, betwisted and painted up for a decoy” (CM, 19, 21). With this 
confrontation, writes Eric Lott, “we realize with a jolt that this is probably a blackface 
performance”; the scene’s dramatic irony consists in the fact that “Melville lifts the mask 
for the reader only,” and not for the Fidèle’s passengers (Lott, 61). As a literary critic 
writing a (brilliant) book on blackface minstrelsy, Lott has a vested interest in supposing 
that The Confidence-Man supports his view that the Guinea’s “’secret emotions’ are 
probably those of a white man pretending to be black,” and that blackface “is just one 
more con game” (Lott, 62).167 It is, though, by no means clear that the Guinea is “really” 
white. Our only reason to think so is the gimlet-eyed man’s misanthropic paranoia.  
Susan M. Ryan argues that “the era’s voluminous writings on charity functioned 
most often as an anatomy of suspicion, promoting elaborate rituals of authentication and 
constructing the ideal donor as a rational, well-trained investigator.”168 Further, Ryan 
writes,  
The professional beggars whom these strategies were meant to 
circumvent engaged in a variety of passing. They faked destitution or 
illness, pretended to be blind, or borrowed hungry-looking children to 
make their appeals seem more urgent, all because they preferred such 
deceptions to working for a living, or so the story goes… From the 
donor’s perspective, then, the professionalization of beggars – a parody 
of Americans’ investment in occupational expertise – had to be 
matched by the professionalization of donors (692-93) 
 
The gimlet-eyed man is ironized embodiment of this urge to forensic scrupulousness, but 
his motive may be, not benevolent watchdoggery, but resentment. The narrator surmises 
                                                 
167 Though Lott is by no means alone in making this critical turn: “Guinea is in all probability a fake Negro 
impersonated by a ‘white operator’ (he may even be the devil himself)” (Cook, 35) 
 
168 Susan M. Ryan, “Misgivings: Melville, Race, and the Ambiguities of Benevolence.” American Literary 
History. 12.4 (2000): 685-712, p. 686. 
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that he “may be a discharged custom-house officer,” and that, having lost his job and 
income, he has “concluded to be avenged on government and humanity by making 
himself miserable for life, either by hating or suspecting everything and everybody” (CM, 
21, my italics). The narrator, in other words, is – or represents himself to be – suspicious 
of the gimlet-eyed man’s suspicion, and the description he provides of the gimlet-eyed 
man’s attempt to prove the Guinea’s deceit is ridiculous indeed: In an attempt to “prove 
his [the Guinea’s] alleged imposture on the spot,” the “wooden-legged man hobbled up to 
the negro,” and would “have stripped him and then driven him away, but he was 
prevented by the crowd’s clamor” (CM, 20). This description, leading with its wooden 
leg, invites us to see Melville’s late Captain reflected in the gimlet-eyed man: The defiant 
Ahab – the tragic hero who threatened to punch through the prison-wall of reality to hurt 
God, to strike through the mask, to reach the truth – is reduced to forcibly removing the 
clothes of a black-looking man who he suspects to be white.  
 The literary critic, in attempting to prove imposture or treachery, is reduced to a 
similar position of punching through a veil that yields no substance; indeed, there are 
compelling reasons to read the Guinea as “actually” black. Aside from the crassly 
depicted physical likeness, the Guinea’s Newfoundland dog-ness is characterized not 
only by friendly forthrightness and eagerness to please, but also by submissiveness, or 
better, resignation to yield to the power of the (white) mob. Confronted with the gimlet-
eyed man’s suspicion, the Guinea’s countenance “drooped into a heavy-hearted 
expression, full of the most painful distress. So far abased beneath its proper physical 
level, that Newfoundland-dog face turned in passively hopeless appeal, as if instinct told 
it that the right or the wrong might not have overmuch to do with whatever wayward 
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mood superior intelligences might yield to” (CM, 19). The Guinea’s reaction is not to 
attack his attacker, but rather to submit to the crowd’s verdict, whatever it might be, 
offering in his defense only this “passively hopeless appeal.”  
It is useful to remember that, in consequence of the nation’s Fugitive Slave Acts 
(1793, 1850), those blacks suspected and accused of being fugitive slaves were legally 
forbidden from testifying in their own defense in trials held almost entirely before 
entirely white juries.169 In describing the crowd – “suddenly come to be all justiciaries in 
the case themselves” – the narrator tells the story of an Arkansas lynch mob that breaks a 
condemned man out of prison, tries him again in an ad-hoc court, and, finding him “even 
guiltier than the court had done… forthwith proceeded to execution; so that the gallows 
presented the truly warning spectacle of a man hanged by his friends” (CM, 20). The 
same year blacks legally lost all standing as citizens, in the Dred Scott vs. Sanford case, 
Melville invokes racial violence, vigilante “justice,” and the volatility of mob psychology 
to color our understanding of the danger posed by an all-white, extralegal jury, and the 
fear this elicits in a solitary, accused black man.  
Where the Guinea can only hope the white mob is a sympathetic one, a “soldier-
like” Methodist minister, who initially defends the Guinea against the accusations, is 
under no such threat (CM, 22). Under the gimlet-eyed man’s needling, the minister 
speaks “with exterior calmness tremulous with inkept emotion… conscientiously holding 
back the old Adam in him, as if it were a mastiff he had by the neck” (CM, 22, 23). He 
finally loses control, “suddenly catching this exasperating opponent by his shabby coat-
collar, and shaking him till his timber-toe clattered on the deck like a nine-pin” (CM, 23). 
                                                 
169 See James Forman’s “Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century,” The Yale Law Journal. 113.4 (2004): 
895-938. 
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Unregenerate human nature (“old Adam”) is here described less as in terms of grace than 
of manners; the outburst is a failure of self-restraint and decorum. As Jenny Davidson 
points out, “Manners – the social constraints that check the dictates of individual desire – 
represent a subtle but pervasive hypocrisy, a form of discipline that exacts certain 
penalties but also promises social and moral rewards” (Davidson, 8). The minister’s 
social position allows him to break character, so to speak, when provoked, with no 
repercussions but the reproaches of his own conscience.  
So, in this scene, the narrator confronts us with a series of suspicious behaviors, 
potential hypocrisies, and latent disjunctions between action and feeling. When, on the 
other hand, we read the characters as equivalent to the roles they play – when we take 
their self-representations for granted – we can read the novel as a poignant and 
devastating portrait of the “labor” of black beggars who lack even labor-power to sell. 
The Guinea is a freeman only because, as he says, “What ge’mman want to own dese 
here legs?” (CM, 18). But this “freedom” is purchased by an absolute dependence on the 
altruism of a culture deeply ungenerous to persons in his position. During the “game of 
charity,” it is irrelevant whether the Guinea is “really” black, or a white man in blackface; 
in either case, he provides the crowd with a service it wants, and is willing to pay for: the 
debasement of a man in need, under the guise of benevolence.170 In this respect, the novel 
dramatizes Nietzsche’s assertions of the pernicious motives of charity: 
                                                 
170 Suspicion that the Guinea is actually white, in other words, breaks up the crowd’s charitable enthusiasm; 
and while surely this is in part meant to suggest that the crowd is not well pleased by imposture, it also 
implies that they are not comfortable with dehumanizing a white man. Though we may not share in the 
enthusiasm with which the crowd objectifies and humiliates the man in cream and the Black Guinea, still 
we join them in the aesthetic appreciation of the scene, as mediated to us by the narrator’s endlessly-
faceted, crystalline prose. We are removed from the immediacy of the spectacle, which allows us to enjoy it 
voyeuristically, without feeling guilt for our participation in the debasement. If we are horrified, that too 
can provide a species of satisfaction—we feel contempt for the crowd, even as we share their suspicion. 
 140 
We benefit and show benevolence to those who are already dependent 
on us in some way (which means that they are used to thinking of us as 
causes); we want to increase their power because in that way we 
increase ours, or we want to show them how advantageous it is to be in 
our power – that way they will become more satisfied with their 
condition and more hostile to and willing to fight against the enemies 
of our power.171 
 
In Melville’s novel, minstrelsy is not quite – or not unambiguously – white labor’s 
exploitation of blackness. The Guinea is an entertainer-cum-businessman whose 
blackness is the central aspect of his advertising. His labor, such as it is, involves 
occupying the debased position of a disabled, disenfranchised black man, and thereby 
reminding onlookers of their own social advantages, and allowing them to exercise their 
power over the subaltern supplicant.172  
So where the man in cream offers the crowd what he thinks it ought to want, the 
Guinea finds what the crowd wants and offers it to them. What they share, though, is a 
lack of authority: neither is able to demonstrate to the crowd that it has any good reason 
to believe him or reward him. John Ringman’s signal development, in this procession, is 
his self-representation as a social equal. Like the Guinea, Ringman has nothing to sell but 
his own hard-luck story, but instead of allowing himself to be debased, he draws himself 
level with the social status of his auditors; instead of selling the opportunity to humiliate 
                                                 
 
171 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1974), p. 86. Melville’s treatment also reflects Oscar Wilde’s assertion that “charity 
degrades and demoralizes… It is immoral to use private property in order to alleviate the horrible evils that 
result from the institution of private property. It is both immoral and unfair.” Wilde, The Soul of Man 
Under Socialism (Portland, Me: T.B. Mosher, 1905), p. 11. 
 
172 While handing a half dollar to the Guinea, the merchant Henry Roberts drops his business card; at this, 
“shuffling a pace nigher, with one upstretched hand he [the Guinea] received the alms, as unconsciously, 
his one advanced leather stump covered the card” (CM, 25). The Guinea’s “leather stump” might give us 
pause, here. If he is an avatar of the confidence man, the fact that he can remove his own legs suggests that 
his body is a sort of blank canvas that is not white by default, so to say he is in “blackface” is just as much 
of a misnomer as to say his other avatars are in “whiteface.” If, on the other hand, he is merely a 
panhandler, he may be in blackface, but our suspicion is based on the most circumstantial of evidence.  
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him, Ringman tries to embarrass others into generosity. Of all the characters, Ringman is 
most like Thomas Wilson, the watch-thief, who wins confidence by sheer audacity, force 
of charisma, and the assertion of his own social worthiness. He positions himself as the 
social equal, even the colleague, of the merchant Henry Roberts: “I met you, now some 
six years back, at Brade Brothers & Co.’s office, I think. I was traveling for a 
Philadelphia house. The senior Brade introduced us, you remember; some business-chat 
followed, then you forced me home with you to a family tea, and a family time we had” 
(CM, 27). He is, essentially, a cold-reader, an ersatz psychic who guesses after the 
biography of his target until he hits on something close to the bone. 
In offering a series of vague, widely applicable personal statements about 
Roberts, Ringman’s acquisition of the merchant’s confidence relies on the cold-reading 
technique twentieth century psychologists call the “Barnum effect,” or in other words, 
“the fact that a cleverly worded ‘personal’ description based on general, stereotyped 
statements will be readily accepted as an accurate description by most people.”173 
According to Denis Dutton,  
while a Barnum description may gain in believability when it is thought 
to be derived from a “credible” source, such as a professional 
psychologist, it may have even more charm for a subject if it is thought 
to be derived from a mystical or “incredible” source, such as the lines 
on the palm of the hand, or the order of cards from a Tarot deck. Much 
depends here on the prior beliefs and predispositions the subject brings 
to his or her encounter with the description.174 
 
                                                 
173 Jon E. Roeckelein Dictionary of Theories, Laws, and Concepts in Psychology (Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood Press, 1998) p. 67. The phrase was coined, following Donald G. Patterson’s “personality 
description after the manner of P.T. Barnum,” by Paul E. Meehl: “I suggest – and I am quite serious – that 
we adopt the phrase Barnum effect to stigmatize those pseudosuccessful clinical procedures in which 
personality descriptions from tests are made to fit the patient largely or wholly by virtue of their triviality; 
and in which any nontrivial, but perhaps erroneous, inferences are hidden in a context of assertions or 
denials which carry high confidence simply because of the population base rates, regardless of the test's 
validity.” Meehl, “Wanted – a Good Cookbook,” American Psychologist, 11.6 (Jun, 1956): 263-272 
 
174 Denis Dutton, “The Cold Reading Technique,” Experientia 44 (1988): 326-32 
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Indeed, in this way, Ringman is able to overwhelm Roberts’s defenses with a barrage of 
pseudoscience and dubious philosophy, which hang heavy with the authoritative weight 
of jargon. Roberts doesn’t remember their acquaintance, Ringman says, because of the 
lingering effects of a “brain fever,” which has made his memory untrustworthy: “You 
see, sir, the mind is ductile… but images, ductilely received into it, need a certain time to 
harden and bake in their impressions,” lest a trauma or “casualty… will in an instant 
obliterate them, as though they had never been” (CM, 28). He convinces Roberts to doubt 
his own memories by offering an account of memory itself that seems authoritative. In 
Lockean terms, Roberts’s memories have been “quite erased from the tablet” (CM, 28). 
Ringman jumbles together the authoritative languages of natural philosophy and 
obscurantist jargon in order to put Roberts in a position of dependence on his own 
expertise: “Now, those who have faithless memories, should they not have some little 
confidence in the less faithless memories of others?” (CM, 27).  
 The man in gray, a self-represented charity agent of the Seminole Widow and 
Orphan Asylum, is the first of The Confidence-Man’s “avatars” to offer a service on 
behalf of a constituency, rather than for his own benefit. Though in some sense a 
supplicant, the man in gray does not beg for himself, but on behalf of less fortunate 
persons, which is reflected in the narrator’s description of him: “Upon a cursory view,” 
he “might have seemed, like the man with the weed, one of the less unrefined children of 
misfortune; but, on a closer observation, his countenance revealed little of sorrow, though 
much of sanctity” (CM, 37). “But recently founded,” the Asylum he represents is 
ostensibly meant to provide for the relatives of those Seminoles who were casualties of 
the Second Seminole War (1835-1842). (The “asylum” provided to survivors by the 
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government was forced removal to a reservation in Oklahoma.) The man in gray, then, 
provides personal exculpation for the American oppression of “those cruelly-used 
Indians” (CM, 53). He offers not just the opportunity to benevolent giving, but the 
promise of publicity in reward: “Let me take down name and amount. We publish these 
names” (CM, 43).  
So charity, in The Confidence-Man, is only partly an exercise in personal non-
complicity or exculpation. John Truman – the transfer-agent and president of the Black 
Rapids Coal Company – tells the hapless collegian that he has just, “quite rudely,” 
declined the advances of John Ringman – the man with the weed; and, “not three minutes 
afterwards, I felt self-reproach, with a kind of prompting, very peremptory, to deliver 
over into that unfortunate man’s hands a ten dollar bill… Yes, it may be superstition, but 
I can’t help it; I have my weak side, thank God” (CM, 54). So the impulse to charity, in 
this case, is spurred by conscience, fostered by guilt. But Truman also speaks of charity 
as a voluntary tax to be paid when a surplus has been accumulated: he and his confreres 
in the coal concern “have been so very prosperous lately in our affairs… that really, out 
of my abundance, associative and individual, it is but fair that a charitable investment or 
two should be made” (CM, 54-55).  
Similarly, the man in white – the Seminole charity agent’s principle interlocutor – 
is so rich that his generosity is recreational: for him, “charity was in one sense not an 
effort, but a luxury; against too great an indulgence in which his steward, a humorist, had 
sometimes admonished him” (CM, 46). The man in white’s black servant embodies and 
reflects the systemic corruption that enables and is engendered by differential resources. 
The narrator offers a striking meditation on the rich man’s hands:  
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if you watched them a while, you noticed that they avoided touching 
anything; you noticed, in short, that a certain negro body-servant, 
whose hands nature had dyed black, perhaps with the same purpose that 
millers wear white, this negro servant's hands did most of his master's 
handling for him; having to do with dirt on his account, but not to his 
prejudices. But if, with the same undefiledness of consequences to 
himself, a gentleman could also sin by deputy, how shocking would 
that be! But it is not permitted to be; and even if it were, no judicious 
moralist would make proclamation of it. (CM, 44) 
 
While also warning him against giving overmuch, the servant does the man in white’s 
literal dirty work, thus allowing him to keep his hands clean. The man in white, in short, 
illustrates the inadequacy of traditional ethics in a world of global capital. It would be 
“shocking” for a “gentleman” to “sin by deputy,” but fortunately, it is impossible; and 
even if it were possible, it could only go unspoken. His moral spotlessness is all but 
literally purchased by his wealth, and Melville is here suggesting an intimate (if 
submerged) connection between moral authority, purchasing power, and institutional 
legitimacy. 
 A pressing ambiguity, here, is the man in white’s status as a slave-holder, which 
we can only infer. The narrator dwells on his “goodness,” which serves as an oblique 
euphemism for, or corollary of, his wealth: “Such goodness seemed his, allied with such 
fortune, that, so far as his own personal experience could have gone, scarcely could he 
have known ill, physical or moral” (CM, 43). As opposed to “righteous” men like 
William Wilberforce – leader of the charge to abolish the slave trade in Britain – the 
narrator says, the man in white is merely good (“that superior merit, probably, was not 
his” [CM, 44]). The man in white’s goodness is figured as a kind of innocence born of 
obliviousness; he is not even aware of moral evil, “by observation or philosophy,” let 
alone capable of its commission: “for that, probably, his nature, by its opposition, 
imperfectly qualified, or from it wholly exempted him” (CM, 43-44). He is too wealthy 
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to do or to know wrong, but his goodness is, to the narrator, ironized in such a way that it 
becomes suspicious, if not outright deplorable: “it is to be hoped that his goodness will 
not at least be considered criminal in him. At all events, no man, not even a righteous 
man, would think it quite right to commit this gentleman to prison for the crime, 
extraordinary as he might deem it” (CM, 45). It is legal to own slaves, in other words, 
and therefore unpunishable; his goodness is criminality stripped of its legal content.  
The man in white’s moral oblivion corresponds to his juridical innocence. He is 
good because he commits no crime, but he is not righteous because he lacks the 
conscience and consciousness to acknowledge that what he does is wrong. So the man in 
white is a member of America’s bourgeoisie, the finance aristocracy. He is, in other 
words, a kind of proto-robber baron, accumulating by exploitation only to give (a small 
sliver) back by what seems like unconditioned generosity.175 In appealing to the man in 
white’s obvious concern for profit, the man in gray describes himself as “no Fourier, the 
projector of an impossible scheme, but a philanthropist and a financier, setting forth a 
philanthropy and a finance which are practicable” (CM, 48, my italics). That is, he 
combines pure altruism and businesslike efficiency into an attractive (and impossible) 
package.  
Civic discourse in Melville’s day was characterized by an optimism that was 
sincere as it was bombastic: the belief that self-improvement and general reform were 
compatible, even mutually necessary, ideals. As Wendy Gamber puts it, "almost all 
                                                 
175 Slavoj Žižek sees the legacy of the robber barons in liberal communists, those big business 
philanthropists, who are “true citizens of the world. They are good people who worry… They see the 
‘deeper causes’ of today’s problems… So their goal is not to earn money, but to change the world, though 
if this makes them more money as a by-product, who’s to complain!” Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008), 20.  
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antebellum reformers... believed that it was possible not only to change the world, but to 
perfect it.”176 This overwhelming ambition led to a near-unbearable tension between 
“optimism and anxiety, self-determination and coercion” (134). Since the world was 
perfectible, it stood to reason that it was the burden and responsibility of its inhabitants to 
perfect it; and the persons most adequate to the task would be those experts versed in the 
problems faced by a postlapsarian society.  
 Irony, on the other hand, is not exactly the antithesis of expertise, but it does 
evade the logic of expertise, which develops through the accrual of knowledge into 
doctrine and routine into program. Scott Carpenter offers a useful account of irony’s 
relationship – though not quite its equivalence – with trickery: 
In traditional rhetoric, the figure most closely associated with 
fraudulence is, of course, irony. As an unmarked figure (that is, a 
rhetorical device that has no distinguishing syntax or other markers), 
irony is indistinguishable from its opposite at the same time that it 
bears a different value – just as the best counterfeit coin will be 
opposite to but indistinguishable from its legitimate counterpart, so, the 
ironic utterance may be the exact replica of its ‘sincere’ or ‘literal’ twin, 
differentiated only by the most intangible of mirages: intent.177 
 
Artistic ambiguity – which is to say, irony employed for aesthetic ends – offered a kind 
of non-programmatic, or perhaps Socratic, form of expertise to those coterie writers and 
intellectuals who rejected the anti-individual imperatives professional writing as a craft 
like any other, a depthless and automated skill like screwing screws or nailing nails. This 
coterie was quintessentially transnational in scope, and offers a rationale for the French 
                                                 
 
176 Wendy Gamber, “Antebellum Reform: Salvation, Self-Control, and Social Transformation,” in Charity, 
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History, ed. Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003) 129–33, p. 129. 
 
177 Scott Carpenter, Aesthetics of Fraudulence in Nineteenth-Century France: Frauds, Hoaxes, and 
Counterfeits (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009) p. 153-54. 
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Symbolists’ repurposing of Edgar Allan Poe’s aesthetic theory – predicated on gaps and 
lurches rather than evidentiary logic – as a species of ironically anti-dogmatic dogma.  
 Since Edmund Wilson’s Axel’s Castle, critics have noticed a certain similarity 
between American antebellum writing and the more sophisticated-seeming French 
symbolism that largely obviated it as the central site of literary modernity. According to 
Edmund Wilson, “by the middle of the century, the Romantic writers in the United States 
– Poe, Hawthorne, Melville, Whitman, even Emerson – were, for reasons which would be 
interesting to determine, developing in the direction of symbolism.”178 Still, even though 
“Poe’s critical writings provided the first scriptures of the Symbolist Movement,” it 
remains the case that “[t]he Symbolist Movement proper was first largely confined to 
France and principally limited to poetry of rather an esoteric kind” (12, 22). Though he 
took pains to apologize for their relative backwardness – they “wrote no masterpieces” – 
Charles Feidelson followed Wilson in delegating the writers of the “American 
Renaissance” as proto-symbolists: “Considered as pure romantics, they are minor 
disciples of European masters. Their symbolistic method is their title to literary 
independence… [A]s symbolists they look forward to one of the most sophisticated 
movements in literary history; however inexpert, they broaden the possibilities of 
literature.”179  
 The transnational turn in American studies might also offer a compelling rationale 
to contest these genetic narratives of literary influence. In the 1850s – whether or not in 
                                                 
 
178 Edmund Wilson, Axel's Castle: A Study in the Imaginative Literature of 1870-1930 (London: Penguin, 
1993) p. 12. 
 
179 Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1953) p. 4.  
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the wake of a specifically French 1848 – literary artists on both continents struggled to 
establish a vocational, writerly specialty that would foreground the labor of writing, 
which was always exemplified by the mastery of tropes (which is to say, the ironic and 
multifarious bending and splaying of overt meaning) in fiction, poetry, and even 
discursive prose. Melville and Flaubert were locked, then, in a mutual struggle with the 
phenomenon best diagnosed by their Atlantic contemporary, Karl Marx, in The 
Communist Manifesto (1848). The ascendance of the moneyed bourgeoisie – and the 
failure of their revolutionary program – signaled, for Marx, the end of “the motley feudal 
ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors,’ and… left remaining no other nexus 
between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment.’” In 
universalizing capitalism, the bourgeoisie “has resolved personal worth into exchange 
value, and in place of numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, 
unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious 
and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.”180 
With this came the nineteenth century’s intensification of the division of labor, in which 
“the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all 
charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine.” All wage laborers, 
“who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of 
commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the 
fluctuations of the market” (479). Ultimately, the “alienation of the worker in his product 
means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists 
outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power of its 
                                                 
180 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd 
edition, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 475.  
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own confronting him.” In this, Melville and Flaubert exemplify the struggle that Western 
intellectuals – from Theodor Adorno and Edward Said to Richard Rorty and Bruce 
Robbins – have waged, ironically, from within the ostensibly legitimate, putatively 
professional space of the academy: the struggle to be an expert in multiplicity, endless 
complexity, and the variegated splay of the totality of nothing short of existence itself, 
without the responsibility of aiding industrial production, or of morally edifying or 
spiritually fortifying the layperson. They strive to codify a type of labor that would be 
fully unalienable, like the rights of democracy, while being endowed with the air of 





“ARM OF THE LORD, AWAKE!”: 





“The individual leader or leadership group who might lead the Negro 
Revolution into a phase of mass insurrection is not yet discernible. 
Such a person would have to combine charisma with organizational 
ability. Had he lived, Malcolm X might have been the type of leader 
who, with his lieutenants, would have been the nucleus for the building 
of a revolutionary army.” 
-Killian  
 
“I do not pretend to be a divine man, but I do believe in divine 
guidance, divine power, and in the fulfillment of divine prophecy. I am 
not educated, nor am I an expert in any particular field – but I am 




In recent years, Martin Delany’s Blake has become a minor cause célèbre among 
literary scholars of a transnational bent. In his foundational study, The Black Atlantic, 
Paul Gilroy posits Blake as an antidote to a perniciously conservative strain of black 
nationalism. The novel imagines a community organized on the principle of “black 
solidarity,” Gilroy writes, that is “explicitly anti-ethnic and opposes narrow African-
American exceptionalism in the name of a truly pan-African, diaspora sensibility.”181 In 
Gilroy’s analysis, Delany’s novel moves us beyond race and nation, which, it recognizes, 
are not adequate frameworks for political theory, action, or organization. In Blake, 
blackness is “a matter of politics rather than a common cultural condition.”182 This new 
                                                 






basis for blackness, which emphasizes struggle rather than some shared past or bloodline, 
furnishes a new form of group identity: a transnational, ethnically non-essential black 
community that finds a “deeper unity” in its “common orientation to the future.”  
A mounting body of criticism – one that rejects, or reconceives the sufficiency of, 
narrowly national and/or racial frames of reference – testifies to timeliness and success of 
Gilroy’s challenge to absolutism and essentialism. Following Gilroy’s lead, for instance, 
Gregg Crane argues that Blake’s Cuban community is a “pluralistic coalition of maroon 
and free blacks of various shades, classes, and national and ethnic origins.”183 In this 
account, Delany’s novel stages a search for a new form of corporate citizenship; Blake’s 
community, then, knocks the autonomous individual from its perch atop political 
discourse, positing instead “the pluralistic group as the central possessor of rights.” As in 
Gilroy, the emergent principle of solidarity Crane traces is at once oppositional and 
egalitarian: 
In contrast to the ‘white’ definition of the American ‘political 
community’ through reference to the past ‘custom and policy of 
country’ and a national interest in racial dominion, parallel ‘black’ 
conversations in Blake develop an African American alternative – 
creating a pluralistic community and determining individual rights 
through a present dialogue that discovers and establishes a civic 
consensus.184 
 
By this account, Delany’s novel denigrates the political value of liberal-bourgeois 
individualism and ethnicity-based solidarity alike, elevating in their stead a collective 
mood of utopian futurity based on shared political interests, and set against common 
                                                 
183 Gregg Crane, "The Lexicon of Rights, Power, and Community in Blake: Martin R. Delany's Dissent 
from Dred Scott," American Literature 68.3 (1996): 527-53, 530. Crane reads Blake as a response to Justice 
Taney’s Dred Scott decision, which rescinded any and all forms of citizenship from black Americans, 
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184 Crane, 540.  
 152 
enemies. “By focusing on the pluralistic group as the central possessor of rights,” Crane 
claims, Delany thus “fuses Anglo-American natural rights rhetoric and an African 
emphasis on community.”185  
Gilroy and Crane are surely right to emphasize those aspects of Blake that resist, 
undermine, or delegitimize established forms of authority – particularly those institutions 
and traditions that uphold the ideological constellation of slavery, prejudice, segregation, 
and oppression. The legitimacy of plantation slavery depended on a vast body of 
constitutional rationalizations and juridical precedents, a long history of patriarchal social 
organization, and an unfortunately robust tradition of racialist philosophy, all of which 
Delany opposed in no uncertain terms. Blake’s community is defined by what it is not, 
and by what it opposes.186  
In balancing inclusivity and exclusivity as organizing principles, this community 
is not altogether different from any other; as A.P. Cohen argues, the term “seems to imply 
simultaneously both similarity and difference. The word thus expresses a relational idea: 
the opposition of one community to others or to other social entities.”187 Such readings 
do not so much overstate the novel’s progressive or emancipatory commitments as they 
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186 “Community” – usually inflected in a utopian and/or transnational sense – has become perhaps the 
central term of analysis in contemporary Blake scholarship. According to Leslie W. Lewis, “the community 
constructed by the sharing of Blake's secret is defined by their African diasporic, or… their nonwhite 
identities, rather than their slave status.” Lewis, Telling Narratives: Secrets in African American Literature 
(Urbana: Illinois UP, 2007), 57-8. In Liberation Historiography, John Ernest offers an accessible gloss of 
his argument, in Resistance and Reformation, that the novel form enabled Delany to “imagine a community 
not yet realized, and in that way formulate an ideological map of destiny, gathering together a fragmented 
community under the banner of revolutionary resistance to the mechanisms and assumptions of a white 
supremacist culture.” Ernest, Liberation Historiography: African American Writers and the Challenge of 
History, 1794-1861 (Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP, 2004), 131.  
 
187 Anthony P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (London: Routledge, 1993), 12. 
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underestimate its engagement with, and investment in, potentially authoritarian modes of 
political arrangement and social influence, and the status differences buried under the 
sheen of solidarity. I want to resist what I see as the tendency to insulate Blake from 
aspects of Delany’s thought – elitism, parochialism, obfuscation – that are less amenable 
to the approbation of critical radicalism in its prevailing modes. I emphatically do not 
mean to suggest that Blake is somehow fundamentally reactionary or crypto-
conservative; like its author, the novel dissolves Manichean political poles (as if they 
were stable to begin with).  
Though these critics are well aware of Delany’s ambivalent and ambiguous 
politics – in Gilroy’s words, “Delany is a figure of extraordinary complexity whose 
political trajectory… dissolves any simple attempts to fix him as consistently either 
conservative or radical” (BA, 20) – their analyses largely ignore the possibility that 
Delany’s novel is characterized by a similarly akimbo political posture. Blake is instead 
taken to embody an ideological coherence over and above its author’s notorious 
intellectual volatility. Solidarity is not, of course, an absolute or monolithic concept. 
Indeed, some affective links conceal or justify more fundamental imbalances in power, 
prestige, or privilege. That the book is discussed in terms of “community” rather than 
“black nationalism” is, in part, an attempt to sheer away the enormous weight of history. 
It is can also, though, be read as a recuperative gesture, since, as Raymond Williams 
notes, “community” is “unlike all other terms of social organization (state, nation, 
society, etc)” in that “it seems never to be used unfavorably, and never to be given any 
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positive opposing or distinguishing term.”188 Though the discourse of black nationalism 
is backgrounded in these discussions, one of that discourse’s potentially problematic 
assumptions is preserved. As Wahneema Lubiano has shown, black nationalism’s 
“strategies for ‘liberation’ in the U.S. context have cohered around the ‘fact’ that within 
the discourse of white supremacy, all blacks are equally debased, and that for the most 
part class has not mediated any of the effects of racism. Black nationalism is predicated 
on the notion of racial solidarity across class lines.”189 
In this chapter, then, I argue that Blake reimagines civic affiliation and political 
authority in predominantly charismatic terms. That Blake’s community exists at all is a 
testament to his personal magnetism – his ability to draw others into, and arrange them 
within, a constellation around him. The novel is most compelling, as I see it, precisely in 
its fraught efforts to imagine a pluralistic community balanced precariously atop an inner 
circle of elect (and eventually, elected) elites. The community is held together, as Gilroy 
demonstrates, by its members’ shared resistance to the hegemonic values of white 
supremacy, and by their corresponding rejection of the institutional and intellectual 
legitimacy annexed by the beneficiaries of Atlantic slavery. More interesting, for my 
purposes, is the complex fantasy of election that serves as the community’s vertical axis. 
Exclusivity in this sense does not simply separate those on the inside from undesirable 
others; In Blake’s nominally pluralistic community, that is, the many are managed and 
instructed by a few, and those few are managed and instructed by Henry Blake. Over the 
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University Press, 1985 [1976]), 76. 
 
189 Wahneema Lubiano, "Standing in for the State: Black Nationalism and 'Writing' the Black Subject," in 
Is It Nation Time ed. Eddie S. Glaude, Jr. (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2002), 159. 
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course of the novel, the nature of Blake’s organization – and hence, of his community – 
shifts from an essentially evangelical model (Blake as itinerant minister) in the first half, 
to an essentially administrative model (Blake as ranking official) in the second. Blake 
dramatizes the new and shifting positions of social privilege produced by the charismatic 
leader’s emergence, the consolidation of his doctrine, and the conglomeration of his 
followers. 
A Halo of Feelings and Dreams 
Blake’s plot verges between pleasantly weird flights of fancy, patently absurd 
coincidences, and grotesque portrayals of humanity’s capacity for cruelty, oppression, 
and debasement – to say nothing of its abiding tone of perseverant endurance. 
Generically, the book’s first half is a kind of pseudo-apocalyptic picaresque: Galvanized 
by the sale and removal of his wife, Maggie, a slave named Henry Holland – née Carolus 
Blacus, alias Henry Blake – concocts a “plan” for the liberation of all New World slaves. 
After arranging for the escape and safe passage of his son to Canada, and escaping 
himself, Blake proselytizes his way through the American South, cultivating a vast and 
shadowy syndicate of coconspirators. Then, with no discernable proximate cause, Blake 
abandons this established organization, and the spatial confines of the American South 
itself, to embark instead on a mission to rescue his wife from the Cuban plantation that 
holds her, and simultaneously to create a new organization of Caribbean free blacks and 
slaves.  
In each of its two halves, Blake’s plot – and Blake’s plot along with it – turns on 
his “secret organization,” which ostensibly aims to liberate slaves, to elevate all blacks, 
and to raze the foundations of New World slavery. Beyond these rather limited 
 156 
parameters, little can be affirmed or alleged about the secret without resorting to 
assumption or speculation. As several critics have suggested, Blake’s secret remains a 
secret, and, as with Pulp Fiction’s iconic briefcase, the obscurity of its contents 
constitutes the novel’s abiding interpretive problem.190 Because its concluding chapters 
have never been recovered, we have no way of knowing whether Delany’s novel ends 
with a triumphal, bloodless revolution; with a brutal massacre of slave-owners at great 
cost to the revolutionaries; with some gradual progress made through level-headed 
reform and tenacious diplomacy; or, just as plausibly, with disappointment and political 
paralysis.  
Henry Blake is a “uniquely heroic and intelligent character,” writes Robert 
Levine, whose “potential to bring about ‘the redemption of his race’ is clear from the 
opening chapters of the novel, as Delany emphasizes just how different he is from other 
slaves.”191 It is, though, deceptively difficult to identify the substance of this difference. 
The air of mystery is further complicated by a roiling constellation of half-defined, 
mysteriously co-implicated terms that seem to designate tactics subordinated to Blake’s 
broader strategy: Blake speaks of “designs,” “schemes,” “secretions,” “plans,” “projects,” 
“measures,” “intelligence,” “communication,” and so forth. In light its generally credited 
                                                 
190 Several critics have hazarded guesses. As Robert S. Levine observes, “Though he never reveals his 
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obscurity – the air of secrecy enveloping the secret itself – it is somewhat surprising to 
discover that we do, in fact, learn the secret; or, at any rate, the narrative permits us to 
overhear a statement that Blake calls “the secret.” In his first gathering with Charles and 
Andy, his first followers, Blake declares, “I now impart to you the secret, it is this: I have 
laid a scheme, and matured a plan for a general insurrection of the slaves in every state, 
and the successful overthrow of slavery!”192 Taken as the definition of a concept (“the 
term ‘secret’ entails the predicates…”) this is heady, but forbiddingly vague, stuff; as a 
strategy, it is empty of tactics – a goal without a program. We’re not sure what Blake 
means by “insurrection” or “overthrow” – both strongly connote, but do not necessarily 
mandate, overt violence – nor can we be sure whether the “plan” is a tautological 
restatement of the “scheme,” or an entirely discrete phase of the campaign as a whole.193 
If, on the other hand, we suspend our disbelief – if we accept the declaration on its own 
terms, and trust that it accurately reflects Blake’s fictional reality – the statement starts to 
look like a performance of prophecy. Blake makes a truth claim about the future based, 
not on evidence or probability, but on a mystical insight into providential design. Blake’s 
success is assured, in this case, and only awaits its inevitable culmination.  
When Charles questions the prospects of a vast secret society geared towards 
synchronized insurrection, in light of “the present ignorant state of our people in the slave 
States,” Blake’s response is as unspecific as it is startlingly evocative:  
This difficulty is obviated. It is so simple that the most stupid among 
the slaves will understand it as well as if he had been instructed for a 
year… So simple is it that the trees of the forest or an orchard illustrate 
                                                 
192 Martin R. Delany, Blake: Or, the Huts of America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 39. Further citations 
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193 The latter ambiguity does not seem to be the product of simple compositional sloppiness, since it recurs, 
and is compounded, in the novel’s second half: after rescuing his wife from slavery, Henry “detail[s] to her 
his plans and schemes; and the next day imparted his grand design upon Cuba” (B, 191). 
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it; flocks of birds or domestic cattle, fields of corn, hemp, or sugar 
cane; tobacco, rice, or cotton, the whistling of the wind, rustling of the 
leaves, flashing of lightning, roaring of thunder, and running of streams 
all keep it constantly before their eyes and in their memory, so they 
can’t forget it if they would.  (B, 39) 
 
As Blake tells it, the secret seems obvious to the point of self-evidence; every sign in the 
book of nature becomes a cryptogram, and all share the same solution. The whole world 
of creation becomes a vast web of hieroglyphics, and every individual sign conveys an 
identical meaning: the secret. Deeming themselves “fools… that we didn’t know it long 
ago,” Charles and Andy marvel at the plan’s intuitive simplicity. Charles comes to see the 
secret as a manifestation of divine presence: “Surely God must be in the work” (B, 40).  
Crucially, Blake’s message is reproducible and transmissible; simply learning the 
secret serves as a qualification to teach it to others. Before leaving Mississippi, Blake 
recruits his two friends as intellectual ambassadors – evangelists whose mission is to 
spread the scheme as if it were the gospel – and offers one last directive:  
You must now go on and organize continually. It makes no difference 
when, nor where you are, so that the slaves are true and trustworthy, as 
the scheme is adapted to all times and places… All you have to do, is to 
find one good man or woman – I don’t care which, so that they prove to 
be the right person – on a single plantation, and hold a seclusion and 
impart the secret to them, and make them the organizers for their own 
plantation, and they in like manner impart it to some other next to them, 
and so on. In this way it will spread like smallpox among them. (B, 41) 
 
An individual’s acceptance of the plan and willingness to join, or to start a new franchise 
of, the organization takes the form of infection – or, perhaps, of religious conversion. If 
the plan is caught (like smallpox), it is neither learned nor chosen. Its transmission is not 
subject to the rules of rational discourse and argument. Blake does not persuade his 
auditors – he enchants them.  
So, I argue, Blake’s capacity to disseminate his program, and thereby win 
converts, transcends the limitations, and evades the parameters, of everyday discourse; 
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we might describe it as a species of charismatic communication. In a nuanced analysis of 
charisma as a social force, Eva Horn argues that charismatic authority is inescapably 
dependant on “techniques of self-promotion and self-stylization… Like a theatrical role, 
charisma has to be ‘performed’: it has to be displayed before an audience as a specific 
and remarkable way to speak, gesture, and communicate. Thus it intrinsically has an 
aesthetic side: charisma is born with the representation of an individual as extraordinary 
and ‘gifted.’”194 By itself, the performance is insufficient; an audience must credit the 
performance, and affectively invest in the performer in order to complete the charismatic 
circuit. In recognizing charisma, the audience both creates and legitimates the charismatic 
leader. In this sense, charisma is “a quality that lies in the ability to capture the 
imagination of a community and focus its hopes, affects, and dreams on the charismatic 
figure” – and, in so doing, to secure “a bond of enchantment” among the members of that 
community.195 Charisma is, then, less a predicate of character than an intersubjective 
effect – an affective and affiliative bond radiating throughout the charismatic community. 
It is, in other words, less something an individual possesses than something that happens. 
In Max Weber's seminal theory, charisma is “a certain quality of an individual 
personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed 
with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or 
qualities.”196 At its most mundane – as a “certain quality” that leads to its possessor being 
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treated as “specifically exceptional” – charisma might manifest itself in any number of 
affective impressions: trustworthiness, warmth, generosity, gravitas, humor, and so forth. 
In the more rarefied sense that attracts Weber, the concept encompasses those “sacred 
values that have been most cherished, the ecstatic and visionary capacities of shamans, 
sorcerers, ascetics, and pneumatics of all sorts” (ES, 246). The charmed novitiate 
recognizes his or her charismatic hero “as the innerly ‘called’ leader of men. Men do not 
obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him.”197 Charisma’s 
“‘objective’ law emanates concretely from the highly personal experience of heavenly 
grace and from the god-like strength of the hero,” who “seizes the task that is adequate 
for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission” (ES, 246).  
Charisma wobbles the boundary between secular distinction and religious 
election, since “it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him 
as their charismatically qualified leader… If they recognize him, he is their master” (ES, 
247, 246). But this mastery is precarious, since its “only basis of legitimacy,” and the sole 
function capable of sustaining it, is “personal charisma so long as it is proved; that is, as 
long as it receives recognition” (ES, 244). The would-be leader’s “charismatic claim 
breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent” 
(ES, 246). Public crisis is especially conducive to the formation of charismatic affiliations 
in underprivileged, oppressed, or exploited groups that receive little physical comfort or 
spiritual sustenance from their experience of mundane reality: “The sense of dignity of 
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the negatively privileged strata naturally refers to a future lying beyond the present, 
whether it is of this world or another,” writes Weber, and this hardscrabble optimism 
“must be nurtured by the belief in a providential ‘mission’ and by a belief in a specific 
honor before God” (ES, 190). This messianic or providential rhetoric is more than a mere 
metaphor; according to Weber, “The specific form of charismatic adjudication is 
prophetic revelation” (ES, 1115). As a genuinely political force, charisma is intimately 
connected to the founding moments and founding figures of new religious and (often 
utopian) political movements.  
In one sense, then, charismatic communities are democratizing, in that they 
provide solidarity, shared principles, and a common orientation. In another sense, though, 
they are elitist, exclusive, and inescapably hierarchical, since they are centered on some 
heroic figure of special merit, who delegates to and confides in a trusted, inner circle. As 
“a figure of social integration and unity,” writes Horn, the charismatic leader functions 
like a king, with the crucial difference that the former upholds “the modern ideal of the 
people as sovereign… [T]he leader is part of the people and thus a figuration of the 
people as ultimate political actor, but spotlighted by a halo of feelings and dreams.”198 
Henry Blake is just such a figuration, and just such a figurehead. The important thing 
about the secret is not what it contains, but the effect it has – the intimacy it engenders, 
and the recognition it provokes.  
Initiation into the organization, then, is less a matter of accumulated knowledge 
than a change in the style of thought. Glenn Hendler usefully redirects our attention from 
the contents of the plan, which are “quite mysterious,” to the form of its transmission: 
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The novel, he argues, “emphasize[s] the act of counterpublic communication over its 
content… [T]he point of the group seems to consist mainly in a communicative exchange 
that constitutes and reproduces both a political counterpublic and a racialized 
revolutionary identity, rather than any particular political action.”199 The group’s 
communicative interchanges “may be epistemologically empty, but they are affectively 
full.”200 It may be, though, that Blake’s communiqués are not so much epistemologically 
empty as epistemologically askew; they may or may not contain some elemental 
propositional content – we haven’t the evidence to know for sure. What seems clear is 
that the emotional impact of such messages, when they are received, is in excess of what 
we expect from persuasion brought about by rational discussion.  
Even if his lesson is easy to learn, and the education is more emotional than 
intellectual, it still must be taught. Blake’s proselytizing mission aims to give the people 
– his people, black people – what they want, but only by awakening in them desires they 
did not know they had. Figured in the novel as the power to elicit belief – belief in 
himself, belief in his plan – Blake’s communicative power allows him to overcome 
differences in education, intelligence, and situation. But Blake commands recognition 
only and exactly to the extent that he receives recognition. As such, the novel routinely 
stages, for its readers, scenes of recognition. Even if Blake routinely denies his own 
specialness, other characters – his friends and followers, and even his avowed enemies – 
are eager to nominate and venerate him. So, upon hearing the plan for the first time, 
Andy admiringly observes that Blake “is fit fah leadah,” though Blake is hesitant to 
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accept the mantle: “I greatly mistrust myself, brethren, but if I can’t command, I can at 
least plan” (B, 41). Andy dismisses the gesture of humility, even as he subordinates 
himself to Blake’s command: “I calls ‘im boss, ‘case ‘e ain’t nothing else but ‘boss’” (B, 
41).  
Those slaves ready to receive his message, and to enter into his “errand,” greet 
Blake as something between a prophet and a messiah, even if they have never met, or 
even heard, of him. In Texas, Blake encounters a family that, the narrator tells us, 
“enter[s] at once into the soul of his mission, seeming to have anticipated it” (B, 84). The 
paterfamilias, Sampson, “believing much in the Providence of God,” says he has 
“recently had it ‘shown to’ him – meaning a presentiment – that a messenger would come 
to him and reveal a plan of deliverance.” Having seemed to fulfill this augury, Blake 
leaves “the state of Texas to the consequences of a deep-laid scheme for a terrible 
insurrection” (B, 85). Arkansas’s slave communities are “pretty well organized already,” 
and have “a good general secret understanding among themselves,” even though they 
have never met, or even heard of, Blake. This ostensible preparedness and seeming 
autonomy, though, do not obviate their need for Blake, who they immediately recognize 
as their deliverer; as one slave tells him, “we long been waitin’ foh some sich like you to 
come ‘mong us. We thang God dis night in ouh soul! We long been lookin’ foh yeh, 
chile!” (B, 89).  
In this – though in little else – the character he most resembles is Professor 
Moriarty, the sinister doppelganger and nemesis of Sherlock Holmes: “He is the 
Napoleon of crime, Watson. He is the organizer of half that is evil and nearly all that is 
undetected in this great city. He is a genius, a philosopher, an abstract thinker… He does 
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little himself. He only plans. But his agents are numerous and splendidly organized” 
(217). Blake too organizes a type of crime, with the obvious and essential difference that 
it is just and justified crime meant not to exploit an existing, stable order but to overturn 
an existing, unstable one. Since a good deal of Blake’s plot follows Blake as he 
“spread[s] his secret in front of us,” Leslie W. Lewis is surely right to claim that “the 
community comprised of those who know the secret, the in-group being constructed 
before our eyes, very definitely does not include us.”201 This exclusivity – our exclusion 
from the in-group – is, as several critics have pointed out, a function of the secret’s 
impressive capacities as a tool for community building.202  
The essentially emotional, non-symbolic nature of this communication is 
especially significant in that it enables a new kind of inclusivity for Blake’s counterpublic 
– his community. Belonging depends not on literacy, or on badges of distinction, but on a 
shared desire. As Nancy Fraser has argued, “discursive interaction within the bourgeois 
public sphere,” the official public of reading men and exclusive cliques, “was governed 
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202 According to John Ernest, “what is finally most striking about the work is its air of mystery, of secrets 
suggested but untold, and of an organization powerful because it is, in fact, and will remain, a secret” 
(Ernest, 112). Ernest sees secrecy as such – the form of secrecy, rather than some specific content or 
message – as the book’s fundamental concern; Delany, he writes, “devoted the narrative above all to a 
determined mystery” (Ernest, 111). Similarly, Leslie W. Lewis writes, “the great secret of Delany's novel is 
never explicitly told to his American readers, and it concerns African American and then Pan-African 
community rather than American identity... [T]he community comprised of those who know the secret, the 
in-group being constructed before our eyes, very definitely does not include us” (Lewis, 56-57). According 
to Rebecca Skidmore Biggio, “community-building secrecy is, in and of itself, the central and consistent 
insurrectionary message of the novel” (Biggio, 439). Biggio questions the ready association of Blake’s plan 
with the necessity of mass murder: “Blake’s mode of resistance,” she argues, “is the establishment and 
extension of an alternative community rather than an overt violent action” (Biggio, 451-52). It is “white 
fear of black conspiracy” that provides “the very basis on which the community is founded” (Biggio, 443). 
As she points out, “Blake’s survival depends on and his masculinity is defined by his ability to remain 
hidden and to conquer adversaries through mysterious skills that are never really explained” (Biggio, 448). 
Blake’s mastery of the mysterious secret, together with his “mysterious skills,” which verge on 
superpowers, are closely related to what I am calling his charismatic authority. 
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by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and markers of status 
inequality,” and these protocols “functioned informally to marginalize women and 
members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them from participating as peers.”203 In 
contrast to this sanctioned form of engagement in the official public sphere – an 
imaginary convention of learned (mostly white) men (and fewer women), engaging one 
another as equals in learned prose – Blake insists that neither prior education nor native 
intelligence is a necessary prerequisite for its absorption. The organization is not a public 
of letters, but a public of voices, all of which flow from the tributary of Henry Blake’s 
mouth.   
“A man of good literary attainments” though he may be, Blake is no writer (B, 
17). Blake is a talker. This fact alone opens a chasm between Blake’s protagonist and its 
author. Delany received an intensive education in classics at a rare black-run free school 
at a time when less than two percent of the black population was formally schooled. 
Delany was, though, a harsh critic of classical education, which he found “only suited to 
the wealthy, or those who have a prospect of gaining a livelihood by it,” and an equally 
staunch advocate for vocational training: “Let us have an education, that shall practically 
develope [sic] our thinking faculties and manhood; and then, and not until then, shall we 
be able to vie with our oppressors (R, 212). Though his own career was in some respects 
a sustained and tragicomic succession of vocational near misses and disappointed 
ambitions, Delany managed to accrue a dazzling array of credentials; he made 
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noteworthy headway as a “journalist, editor, doctor, scientist, judge, soldier, inventor, 
customs inspector, orator, politician, and novelist” (BA, 19). He was not, and had no 
designs to be, an imaginative writer, by nearly any definition, for nearly the length of his 
career. When he wrote and spoke, he wrote and spoke as an intellectual – with a political 
agenda always in view, if obscure.204 
He was especially dismissive of high-flown expression, which he saw as self-
indulgence, or worse, as an evasion of the duty to struggle. He had no patience for the 
Romantic expression of private experience, nor for ineffable beauty, nor felicities of 
style, but rather thought of “literature” as an instrument – at times, a weapon: not an 
intrinsic good or autonomous aesthetic sphere, but a broad field of contestation 
encompassing journalism, criticism, political activism, and public debate. According to 
his critical calculus, “A practical precept of one sentence is worth a page of unintelligible 
jargon” (R, 99). This was the root of his relentless advocacy of practical, rather than 
classical, education. If, he reasoned, “a knowledge of all the various business enterprises, 
trades, professions, and sciences, is necessary for the elevation of the white, a knowledge 
of them also is necessary for the elevation of the colored man; and he cannot be elevated 
without them.” After all, it was solely by merit of “their literary attainments,” broadly 
construed, that white men had become “the contributors to, authors and teachers of, 
literature, science, religion, law, medicine, and all other useful attainments that the world 
now makes use of” (Con, 70).   
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The fantasy informing Blake is the further reduction of prose, until “unintelligible 
jargon” is entirely supplanted by a singular “practical precept.” All laws can be traced 
back to this higher law, which can be grasped intuitively. The secret renders even basic 
literacy superfluous; all that is needed is “the right person.” Through this hierarchy-
leveling, performative power of transparent speech – the ability to mediate meaning with 
no intermediary – Blake spreads both the secret and the discipline necessary to maintain 
the organizational structure needed to keep it from being prematurely set in motion. 
For all its inclusivity, though, Blake’s plan is never entirely detached from 
Blake’s person. In the book’s more vatic moments, its hero comes to seem a vessel of 
divine vengeance, and a harbinger of the coming Armageddon: “From plantation to 
plantation did he go, sowing the seeds of future devastation and ruin to the master and 
redemption to the slave, an antecedent more terrible in its anticipation than the warning 
voice of the destroying Angel in commanding the slaughter of the firstborn of Egypt” (B, 
83). Throughout his pilgrimage, Blake “scatter[s] to the winds and sow[s] the seeds of a 
future crop, only to take root in the thick black waters which cover it, to be grown in 
devastation, and reaped in a whirlwind of ruin” (B, 112). Some critics have concluded, 
from such portentous rhetoric, that the teleological motor driving the organization is, in 
fact, mass murder. According to Nell Painter, for instance, the reader looks on as Blake 
“painstakingly construct[s]… an underground government ready to take control of a 
black American nation – after Blake and his fellow revolutionaries have overthrown and 
killed all slaveholders” (Painter, 158).  
In light of such interpretations, the most striking aspect of insurrectionary 
violence in Blake is its almost total absence from the plot. Though Blake is “compelled” 
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to travel from state to state as “a messenger of light and destruction,” the balefulness of 
the narrator’s rhetoric conceals the essentially pedagogical nature of Blake’s crusade:  
Light, of necessity, had to be imparted to the darkened region of the 
obscure intellects of the slaves, to arouse them from their benighted 
condition to one of moral responsibility, to make them sensible that 
liberty was legitimately and essentially theirs, without which there was 
no distinction between them and the brute. Following as a necessary 
consequence would be the destruction of oppression and ignorance (B, 
101). 
 
Just as light displaces dark, in the narrator’s metaphysical commentary, so truth and 
virtue displace deception and depravity, and the world, duly enlightened, is rid of 
“oppression and ignorance.” Along with this heroic conception of Blake as a teacher-
prophet comes a paternalistic and condescending conception of slaves, whose “obscure 
intellects” and “benighted condition” render them, by implication, morally irresponsible, 
and even subhuman. Slaves remain indistinct from brutes, that is, so long as the bringer 
of light, Henry Blake, has yet to visit them (or when they have refused to let him). 
The most tantalizing – and so, perhaps, the most disappointing – of Blake’s secret 
convocations takes place in New Orleans: Blake is led into “one of the most secret and 
romantic-looking rooms,” where is convened “a party of fifteen, the representatives of the 
heads of that many plantations, who that night had gathered for the portentous purpose of 
a final decision on the hour to strike the first blow” (B, 102). The group accepts Henry at 
once, and shortly agrees on dubbing him “da King.” One woman praises God, she says, 
“Faw wat I feels an’ da knowledge I has receive dis night! I been all my days in darkness 
till now! I feels we shall be a people yit!” (B, 104). The group shares Blake’s 
revolutionary ideal, and is ready to come to a conclusive timeline for action. In Leslie W. 
Lewis’s useful formulation, “the communities formed in both part 1 and part 2 of the 
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novel can best be characterized as communities of believers.”205 What they believe in, 
most concretely, is Blake’s access to some higher plane on which the plan is fully 
formed, even if the world is not yet ready to be executed.  
Again and again, though, interruption and deferral win out. The revolutionary 
party in New Orleans is crashed by an impatient drunkard named Tibs who, “bent on 
mischief,” asks, “what yeh all ‘cided on? I say dis night now au neveh!” (B, 104). 
Though Henry tries to reason with the rabble-rouser, and to explain that waiting is the 
only sensible plan at this point, he only succeeds in further enflaming Tibs’s mischievous 
ardor:  
“My friend,” said Henry, “listen a moment to me. You are not 
yet ready for a strike; you are not yet ready to do anything effective. 
You have barely taken the first step in the matter, and – –” 
“Strangeh!” interrupted the distracter. “Ah don’o yeh name, 
yeh strangeh to me – I see yeh talk ‘bout ‘step’; how many step man 
got to take fo’ ‘e kin walk? I likes to know dat! Tell me that fus, den 
yeh may ax me what yeh choose!” 
“You must have all the necessary means, my brother,” 
persuasively resumed Henry, “for the accomplishment of your ends. 
Intelligence among yourself on everything pertaining to your designs 
and project. You must know what, how, and when to do. Have all the 
instrumentalities necessary for an effective effort, before making the 
attempt. Without this, you will fail, utterly fail!” (B, 105).  
 
Though the other black Louisianans immediately see him as a leader and a mastermind, 
Tibs explicitly foregrounds his inability to recognize, and his unwillingness to cede 
authority to, Blake. The great planner is a stranger to Tibs; and Tibs, through his 
insistence on immediate and rash action, is “determined on distracting their plans” (B, 
105). Finally, Tibs, “the betrayer,” takes to the streets by himself, brandishing “a 
formidable array of deathly weapons,” and yelling, “Insurrection! Insurrection! Death to 
every white!” (B, 106). The spectacle sets of a flurry of panic in white society – the army 
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is called in, and something close to marshal law instituted. His hopes for organized 
activity and synchronized action dashed, Blake “admonishe[s]” his Louisianan 
colleagues, “as his parting counsel, to ‘stand still and see the salvation’” (B, 108). The 
message, in this case, is: don’t do nothing, but don’t do anything unauthorized, either; 
wait for the signal, for Blake knows best when the time has come. 
The organization, then, is marked by a broad streak of paternalism. The plan is 
meant, first and foremost, to benefit slaves: to abrogate the material and administrative 
armature that props up the peculiar institution. Even if slaves have a crucial role to play 
in Blake’s plan, they are also treated as dangerously volatile, or as potential fifth columns 
eager to curry favor with white authorities. Due in no small part to this pedantic streak, 
Delany has long been accused of elitism – of sharing in the “authoritarian tendencies” of 
“the black leadership class,” which aspired, as Wilson J. Moses puts it, to “organic 
collectivism under authority.”206 According more than a few of his critics, Delany 
believed that the figure he cut, in person and in prose, could and should provide the 
pattern for all theretofore unenlightened blacks to follow, if only they cared enough (or 
were smart enough) to realize it. In a particularly vigorous critique, Nell Painter argues 
that Delany “never questioned his assumption that the most intelligent of the race – 
however defined – should decide what the masses should do, and he saw unquestioning 
acceptance of ‘intelligent’ leadership as the duty of the masses. As a prime example of 
colored intelligence, Delany saw his role as instructing the rest of the race.”207 Delany’s 
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was “an elitist, not a democratic, creed,” Painter argues, that aspired to mobilize “the 
masses” as “a mute, docile work force to be led by their betters – their black betters, but 
their betters nonetheless.”208  
Religion and the Red River 
Many recent critics have distanced Blake from – or at least, not emphasized its 
ideological reliance on – the rhetoric and logic of antebellum Protestant evangelicalism. 
One of Gilroy’s more provocative claims, for instance, relates to the status of religion in 
Blake: in its Cuban setting, he argues, the novel demonstrates that “Black survival 
depends on forging a new means to build alliances above and beyond petty issues like 
language, religion, skin colour, and to a lesser extent gender,” and that, because religion 
“marks… petty ethnic differences with special clarity, its overcoming signifies the 
utopian move beyond ethnicity and the establishment of a new basis for community, 
mutuality and reciprocity” (BA, 28-29). In the service of this utopian magnanimity and 
inclusiveness, Gilroy argues, Delany “used his hero Blake to convey criticisms of religion 
in general and Christianity in particular” (BA, 28). Delany imbues Blake with 
“skepticism and strictly instrumental orientation towards religion, which he saw as a 
valuable tool for the political project he sought to advance” (BA, 28). Gilroy celebrates 
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Blake’s “refus[al] to ‘stand still and see salvation’ wherever it was offered to him: by the 
rituals of the white church on the plantation, in the Catholic church or in the superstitions 
of the conjures” (BA, 28).  
Certainly Blake’s is an “instrumental orientation towards religion,” but it is worth 
considering whether it is a strictly instrumental orientation – or whether it is any more 
instrumental than any other orientation towards religion. Gilroy is surely right insofar as 
the phrase “religion in general and Christianity in particular” designates, in Blake, a set of 
oppressive institutions and superstitious folk practices; and Blake’s religious rhetoric can 
indeed seem like ornamental embellishment of an essentially secular message: “I am not 
fit,” he declares at one point, “for a spiritual leader; my warfare is not Heavenly, but 
earthly; I have not to do with angels, but with men; not with righteousness, but 
wickedness… If I ever were a Christian, slavery has made me a sinner; if I had been an 
angel, it would have made me a devil! I feel more like cursing than praying – may God 
forgive me!” (B, 103). Blake’s emphasis, here, is clearly on the this-worldly field of 
political struggle.  
Early in the novel, Blake justifies his repudiation of “standing still” on the 
grounds that “that part was intended for the Jews, a people long since dead. I’ll obey that 
intended for me” (B, 21). Blake invokes instead a contradictory injunction from the New 
Testament: “‘Now is the accepted time, today is the day of salvation.’ So you see, Daddy 
Joe, this is very different to standing still” (B, 21). Despite this seeming emphasis on 
immediate action, Blake does not hesitate to enjoin his followers to do just what he will 
not – to stand still. Indeed, it becomes something of a slogan for the organization.209 
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Early in his pilgrimage, Henry encounters “old man Nathan,” who he deems “all that 
could be desired, and equal to the task of propagating the scheme.” Having heard Blake 
out, Nathan feels, for the first time, “an implied meaning, in the promise of the Lord”:  
“Now Laud!” with uplifted hand exclaimed he at the conclusion of the 
interview. “My eyes has seen, and meh yeahs heahn, an’ now Laud! I’s 
willing’ to stan’ still an’ see dy salvation!” (B, 73).  
 
Nathan’s patience, his willingness to wait for deliverance, is justified by the this-worldly 
endgame of Blake’s scheme, in which “salvation” becomes something that will arrive 
before death, and is therefore something that must be earned. In this sense, it is crucially 
distinct from the slave’s understanding of the phrase, by which heavenly rewards are 
offered after death for quietism and toleration of white dominance during life.  
Blake’s appropriation of the scriptural saying is a subversive and ironic act of 
cultural appropriation, but for this it is by no means unproblematic. He is willing to use 
the expression he condemns, and to let his followers apply it to their own situations, as a 
kind of argument from authority – you must do this because it must be done. His “advent” 
– taken literally, the first coming of the savior – in Nashville, Delany writes, “was like 
the application of fire to a drought-seasoned stubble field. The harvest was ripe and ready 
for the scythe, long before the reaper and time for gathering came. In both town and 
country the disappointment was sad, when told by Henry that the time to strike had not 
yet come; that they for the present must ‘Stand still and see the salvation!’” When one of 
the gathered rebels, “blinded by tears,” wants to know “how long we gots to wait dis 
way,” Blake can only plead ignorance and advise submission to providence:  
“I can't tell you how long, father; God knows best.” 
“An' how we gwine know w'en 'e is ready?” 




The divine sign that the “harvest” is ready to be gathered, in other words, is nothing more 
or less than the completion of the organization. Blake does not claim to know when this 
will be; only when it will look like when it arrives.  
In a fascinating account of intellectual modernization, Zygmunt Bauman observes 
that, where intellectuals and philosophes were concerned, “Priests, of course, stood for 
the spiritual hierarchy of the Church – a direct rival in the struggle for intellectual 
domination, an alternative intellectual elite to be disempowered and displaced.”210 Rather 
than seeing the novel as somehow against religion, it is useful to think of the 
“organization” as an emerging institution that is in competition with the church – a new 
player in the same market, for obedient believers. When Charles and Andy want to know 
more than Blake wants to reveal, he warns, “The plans are mine and you must allow me 
to know more about them than you. Just here, for once, the slave-holding preacher’s 
advice to the black man is appropriate, ‘Stand still and see the salvation’” (B, 38). As we 
have seen, this advice is appropriate much more often than “Just here,” but the advice is 
written in a different code – it is made to something new.  
The novel’s orientation towards religion, in other words, is pragmatic and 
instrumentalist, but this is not the same as saying that the novel is against “religion in 
general and Christianity in particular,” or that it narrates religion’s “overcoming” and 
replacement by something better. The distinction between politics and religion is 
anything but absolute in Delany’s novel; Robert Levine well captures the thorny tangle of 
pragmatism and prophecy in his description of Henry Blake’s “messianic, Moses-like 
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ability to get blacks ‘intelligently united’ against their oppressors.”211 Blake is both 
religious and not – heretical without being atheistic.212 Even when he has first learned of 
Maggie’s deportation, and rejected the tenets and rituals of the black church, Blake 
affirms, “I do trust the Lord as much as ever, but I now understand him better than I use 
to, that’s all. I don’t intend to be made a fool of any longer by false preaching” (B, 20). 
He intends, instead, to make others wise by true preaching – to make a movement of true 
believers.  
 Blake’s first excursion after his escape from the Franks plantation – south to 
Louisiana, through “Red River country” – is punctuated by his only act of lethal 
resistance to white tyranny. On the road, Blake 
met with no obstruction except in one instance, when he left his 
assailant quietly upon the earth. A few days after an inquest was held 
upon the body of a deceased overseer – verdict of the Jury, ‘By hands 
unknown.’ 
On approaching the river, after crossing a number of 
streams… he was brought to sad reflections. A dread came over him, 
difficulties lay before him, dangers stood staring him in the face at 
every step he took. Here for the first time since his maturity of 
manhood responsibilities rose up in a shape of which he had no 
conception. A mighty undertaking, such as had never before been 
ventured upon, and the duty devolving upon him, was too much for a 
slave with no other aid than the aspirations of his soul panting for 
liberty (B, 68-69).  
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Curiously, the narrator does not draw any kind of connection between the murder and 
Blake’s subsequent, disconsolate musing, though the two events occupy literally 
consecutive sentences. Instead, Blake’s anxiety is abstracted, and projected into politics, 
as Blake comes to realize that the successful implementation of his scheme will require 
more willpower than he has, and indeed, more than human willpower. The balance Blake 
strikes between divine submission and self-reliance is sustained only by constant 
vigilance and frequent renegotiation.  
Alone “in the wilderness, determining to renew his faith and dependence upon 
Divine aid,” Blake falls to his knees and petitions the heavens: “Arm of the Lord, awake! 
Renew my faith, confirm my hope, perfect me in love. Give me strength, give me 
courage, guide and direct my pathway, and direct me in my course!” (B, 69). Then, “as if 
a weight had fallen from him, he stood up a new man” (B, 69). His submission to and 
reliance on divinity thus reaffirmed, Blake is still tested by a landscape over-freighted 
with moral significance: he must cross the Red River, “too deep to wade, and on account 
of numerous sharks and alligators, too dangerous to swim” (B, 69). Alarmed by the sound 
of an approaching steamer, Blake seeks refuge in a cove, only to discover, “to his terror,” 
that he is surrounded by “a squad of huge alligators, which sought the advantages of the 
sunshine” (B, 69).  
His first impulse was to surrender himself to his fate and be 
devoured… escape being impossible except by the way he entered, to 
do which would have exposed him to the view of the boat… Meantime 
the frightful animals were crawling over and among each other, at a 
fearful rate. 
Seizing the fragment of a limb which lay in the cove, beating 
upon the ground and yelling like a madman… the beasts were 
frightened at such a rate, that they reached the water in less time than 
Henry reached the bank. Receding into the forest, he thus escaped the 
observation of the passing steamer, his escape serving to strengthen his 
faith in a renewed determination of spiritual dependence. (B, 70).  
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This strangely allegorical set piece serves several functions. Most clearly, it posits slavery 
as a fate worse even than death by alligator, thus reaffirming Blake’s conviction to 
remain free at any conceivable personal cost. It likewise accentuates the mutual 
inhospitability of the “wilderness” Henry must navigate, and the fact that every white he 
encounters potentially doubles as a roving patrol, legally mandated to enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Act and take him into custody. More puzzlingly, the scene deposits Henry 
right back where he started: on the wrong side of the river. After yet another “solemn 
reflection for Divine aid to direct him,” Blake finds – in anticlimactically short order – a 
natural raft that spans the river’s width and affords him safe crossing. With this mundane 
coincidence, coded by the narrative (implicitly but somehow blatantly) as a miracle, “His 
faith was now fully established, and thenceforth, Henry was full of hope and confident of 
success” (B, 70).  
Forever teetering on the edge of belief and doubt, hope and despair, Blake’s 
conviction must continually be renewed – and, simultaneously, his submission to a higher 
power must be continually reaffirmed. Yolanda Pierce has identified two distinctive 
features in nineteenth-century African-American conversion narratives. First, “the quest 
for literacy” serve as “an integral part of the conversion experience in African-American 
narratives. Literacy becomes linked with conversion in that the thirst for literacy equals 
(and supersedes in some instances) the thirst for knowledge of salvation and God.”213 
Second, these narratives “resemble Paul's experience on the road to Damascus. The 
supernatural world, where God himself intervenes and alters the laws of the universe, 
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collides with the physical world resulting in signs and wonders, callings and responses,” 
and, in the new convert, “a transformation so complete that it facilitated a change of 
identity, even a change of name.214  
In Blake, the quest for literacy is almost irrelevant, which partly explains why it 
has been somewhat neglected by critics like Louis Gates, Jr. and Houston Baker, who 
valued Frederick Douglass for his dramatization of the acquisition of literacy (and 
literariness) in all its fragmented splendor. Though he narrates his own crucial conversion 
experience – he learns to read – Douglass, writes Gates, “has been a trickster. As with all 
mediations, the trickster is a mediator and his mediation is a trick – only a trick – for 
there can be no mediation in this world.”215 True or not, this metaphysical claim finds 
little support in Blake, which precisely depicts acts of mediation. Blake’s world is not this 
world, and Blake’s medium of charismatic communication obviates the need for the kind 
of self-reflexive literacy that stands in for consciousness in the criticism of the linguistic 
turn.  
By comparison, representations of consciousness in Blake are remarkably flat. In 
the type of conversion experience it imagines, Delany’s novel finds a kindred spirit less 
in Douglass’s Narrative than in great Methodist evangelist George Whitefield. Nancy 
Ruttenburg writes, “Offering himself to his audiences as a charismatic model of the ‘new 
man’ – both an exemplary convert and a masterful converter of others – Whitefield used 
his ‘wonderful Power’ to mobilize people in the name of a new vision of personal, 
                                                 
214 Pierce, 10. 
 
215 Henry Louis Gates, Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the 'Racial' Self (New York: Oxford UP, 1990), 
93. 
 179 
spiritual, and community life. This vision entailed the establishment of a radical itinerant 
ministry in each of the major colonial denominations” (430).216 Just as Blake is made a 
new man, through a kind of divine intervention, Blake is, in his capacity as a divine 
proxy, able to make men anew.  
So, for instance, Blake encounters a “young mulatto freeman” named Lewis 
Grimes, who is chained to the deck of a southbound steamship (B, 83). Grimes has, he 
laments, been “stolen” by a white man, and is being taken to Texas, where he anticipates 
being “enslaved for life!” (B, 82). To Blake’s suggestion that he run away, Grimes retorts 
that he is handcuffed and closely guarded. Blake’s subsequent advice functions, again, as 
the trigger for an awakening: 
“Well don’t you submit, die first if thereby you must take 
another into eternity with you! Were it my case and he ever went to 
sleep where I was, he’d never waken in this world!” 
“I never thought of that before, I shall take your advice the 
first opportunity. Good-bye sir!” (B, 82) 
 
Though Grimes does not learn anything new, per se, Blake does inspire him to adopt a 
posture of vengeful militancy. His presence and passion furnish an abrupt shift in 
Grimes’s consciousness. Grimes, however, drifts off down the river, still handcuffed on 
the ship’s deck, never to be heard from again in this novel.  
The only prerequisite for those prospective initiates who would learn the secret is 
the desire – however latent or deeply buried – to be free. However straightforward this 
seems, Delany’s idiosyncratic conception of discipline complicates things.  Throughout 
his career, Delany used slavery and freedom in different, but not always distinguishable, 
senses – sometimes as terms to describe material conditions, and sometimes as terms to 
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describe opposed modes of consciousness. In his somewhat neglected pamphlet on “The 
Origin and Objects of Ancient Freemasonry,” Delany offers a miniature taxonomy of 
slave types, in which he distances certain types of unsympathetic slaves – “the criminal 
and the voluntary bondsman,” who have “forfeited their Masonic rights by willing 
degradation” – from “the captive, an entirely different person… who has greater claims 
upon our sympathies than the untrammeled freeman” (R, 57). Such captives embody “the 
brave, the high-minded, the independent-spirited, and manly form of a kindred brother in 
humanity, whose heart is burning, whose breast is heaving, and whose soul is wrung with 
panting aspirations for liberty – a commander, a chieftain, a knight, or a prince, it may be 
– still he is a captive and by the laws of captivity, a slave” (R, 57).  
Clearly, the concept of enslavement sketched here is spiritual or psychological in 
character, and not at all dependent an individual’s legal status or de facto social role. 
When princes and captives meet on a level field, Delany writes, each greets the other as 
“a kindred brother in humanity,” and each recognizes in the other a “longing aspiration 
for liberty, and a manly determination to be free” (R, 58). If a captive’s “mind and 
desires” are “free,” and his “person… unencumbered with all earthly trammels or 
fetters,” he merits initiation and instruction (R, 58). Only the man “who voluntarily 
compromised his liberty was recognized as a slave by Masons,” Delany argues, as 
illustrated by the fact that “Moses, (to whom our great Grand Master Solomon, the 
founder of the temple, is indebted for his Masonic wisdom,) was born and lived in 
captivity for eighty years, and by the laws of his captors a slave” (R, 57-58).  
If slavery is an inherently and absolutely illegitimate system that is only 
legitimated through casuistic manipulations and cynical corruptions of jurisprudence, 
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Blake seems to argue, it is especially illegitimate for someone like Henry Blake (who is 
himself a great deal like Moses). The novel form allows Delany to imagine, in the 
character of Henry Blake, a black man who is simultaneously free and enslaved, elect and 
exiled, high born and debased – a deposed noble awaiting restoration. Blake, then, begins 
as an exile, a nomadic interloper who agitates against white power in white power’s 
epicenter: the plantation system. Even while he is still Colonel Franks’s slave, in the eyes 
of the law, Blake rejects the idea that his enslavement is significant as an experiential 
reality. Because he does not consent to it, he is unimpressed by its formal existence. “I’m 
not your slave,” he tells Franks, “nor never was and you know it! And but for my wife 
and her people, I never would have stayed with you till now” (B, 19). Blake conceives of 
slavery as a battle of wills with the Colonel, who, he says, “seeks every opportunity to 
crush out my lingering manhood, and reduce my free spirit to the submission of a slave. 
He cannot do it, I will not submit to it, and I defy his power to make me submit” (B, 29). 
This concrete and traumatic instance of injustice brings Blake into acute awareness of the 
systemic injustice built into the American scene. Henry is able to free himself through an 
exercise of agency, simply by refusing to accept the legitimacy of his enslavement, 
suggesting that, in the world of Blake, slavery entails tacit submission.   
Henry Blake’s central objection to the extant black church is precisely that it has 
been instrumentalized at the expense of black people, and made to serve the interests of 
the plantocratic hegemony. As he tells his cousin Placido, “I still believe in God, and 
have faith in His promises; but serving Him in the way that I was, I had only ‘the shadow 
without the substance,’ the religion of my oppressors, I thank God that He timely opened 
my eyes” (B, 197). If, Blake reasons, blacks were to “drop the religion of our oppressors, 
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and take the Scriptures for our guide and Christ as our example,” they might cease to “be 
disciplined in our worship, obedience [sic] as slaves to our master, the slaveholders, by 
associating in our mind with that religion, submission to the oppressor’s will” (B, 197). It 
is impossible to practice “the religion of our oppressors” without simultaneously 
becoming “disciplined” into “submission.” 
 In an editorial aside, Blake’s narrator posits that slavery is as much a state of mind 
as a material condition. He observes two types of “discipline” – one imposed, the other 
achieved:  
The mere slave, as such, was deficient in discipline, except that which 
unfitted him for self-reliance. That was the curse which blighted his 
moral prospects, the blow which riveted upon him the links of an 
unyielding chain; the burden which, with mountain weight, pressed his 
mind to the earth, only to be thrown off by the force of an extraordinary 
self-exertion, verified the sentiment that – 
 
The day that makes a man a slave,  
Takes half his worth away. (B, 239).  
 
Slaves lack the good kind of discipline that would enable self-reliance, but they are 
disciplined by the ideological constraints of white supremacy. These images – the 
“unyielding chain” and “mountain weight” – figure, for Delany, an actual condition of 
mental and psychic debasement and dependence, which can only be broken or thrown off 
by “the force of an extraordinary self-exertion.” But this self-exertion is not self-
generating – not even in the case of Henry Blake, who only rebels against his 
enslavement after he learns Maggie, his wife, has been sold.  
Glenn Hendler has argued that Blake’s personal trauma serves as the catalyst for 
his (seemingly literal) conversion experience: “Blake is always already ideologically 
coherent, and his plan is fully formed from the moment it comes to him after his wife is 
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sold.”217 In this sense – its immediate, almost autotelic conceptual maturity coupled with 
its perpetual practical unreadiness – Blake’s plan partakes in “the charismatic ideology of 
creation” derided by Pierre Bourdieu. This ideology, Bourdieu writes, “prevents us 
asking who has created this ‘creator’ and the magic power of transubstantiation with 
which the ‘creator’ is endowed… thereby avoiding any enquiry beyond the artist and the 
artist’s own activity into the conditions of the demiurgic capability.”218 For Bourdieu, this 
way of thinking is a pernicious mystification obscuring the fields of fields of social and 
productive forces that create the “creator,” by lending the creation an intelligible social 
context.  
In Blake, this charismatic ideology is a tropological gambit. Delany dares us to 
believe that Blake possesses some “magic power of transubstantiation.” Upon first 
revealing his plan, Blake is filled “with fear and trembling, at the thought of what has 
been the fate of all previous matters of this kind. I approach it with religious fear, and 
hardly think us fit for the task; at least, I know I am not. But as no one has ever 
originated, or given us anything of the kind, I suppose I may venture” (B, 38). Nervous 
about the failure of previous insurrectionary plots, and confident of the absolute novelty 
of his own insurrectionary plot, Blake places himself within the tradition of slave 
resistance – but he also exceeds that tradition, and inaugurates something new. Almost 
simultaneously, that is, Blake directs our attention to “previous matters of this kind,” and 
denies that “anything of the kind” has ever been “originated.” We are meant to take 
seriously the claim that the book’s protagonist is “the Leader of the Army of 
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Emancipation and originator of the scheme to redeem them from slavery and an almost 
helpless degradation,” but we are not – any more than the book’s characters – meant to 
know when the blueprint is ready to become a building (B, 251).  
By means of this charismatic ideology, Blake is able to engineer a division of 
labor, and to delegate interests, tasks, and objects to various (subordinate but 
collaborative) associates. We see this most strikingly in Blake’s delegation of murder. A 
prodigious a planner and leader, Blake is ill equipped to strike the first blow in the 
general uprising, and is less willing to kill in cold blood, than he is to advise others to do 
the same. This realization, though, prompts him to a conceptual innovation: a curious 
division of labor takes shape in the organization, most particularly in his delegation of 
violent rebellion and lethal force. In the next scene, after he has crossed the river of 
symbolism, Blake learns of a brutal slave driver named Jesse, who “treat black folks like 
dog, he all de time beat ‘em, when da no call to do it… Da white folks make ‘im bad” (B, 
77). Blake promises that, “after tonight, he’ll never whip another” (B, 77). Asking after 
“a real clever good trusty man,” Blake is directed to Moses, a former preacher, who once 
“kill a man, ole po’ white oveseeah!” (B, 79). The two men confer – off-screen, as it 
were, out of earshot of the reader. “The next day Jesse the driver was missed, and never 
after heard of. On inquiry being made of the old man Moses concerning the stranger, all 
that could be elicited was, ‘Stan’ still child’en, and see da salvation uv da Laud!’” (B, 
79). Presumably, Moses has murdered Jesse – but only presumably, since Jesse simply 
goes missing. The secretive nature of this act means it is rebellious without being 
revolutionary; it is intended to ameliorate the material condition of this particular slave 
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community, without inciting more violence, or even overtly demonstrating that black 
violence against white authority is possible.  
Blake is willing, he says, to “do anything not morally wrong, to gain our freedom; 
and to effect this, we must take the slaves, not as we wish them to be, but as we really 
find them to be” (B, 126). Having reconvened with Charles and Andy in Mississippi, 
Blake complains that “this confounded ‘good treatment’ and expectation of getting freed 
by their masters… has been the curse of the slave.” The well-treated slave’s contentment 
“makes him obedient and willing to serve and toil on, looking forward to the promised 
redemption. This is just the case precisely now in Kentucky. It was my case.” Indeed, he 
admits, if Colonel Franks had continued to treat Blake well, “I would doubtless have been 
with him yet… A ‘good master’ is the very worst of masters. Were they all cruel and 
inhuman, or could the slaves be made to see their treatment aright, they would not endure 
their oppression for a single hour!” (B, 127).  
“Had I dealt with Franks as he deserved, for doing that for 
which he would have taken the life of any man had it been his case – 
tearing my wife from my bosom! – the most I could take courage 
directly to do, was to leave him, and take as many from him as I could 
induce to go. But maturer reflection drove me to the expedient of 
avenging the general wrongs of our people, by inducing the slave, in 
his might, to scatter red ruin throughout the region of the South. But 
still, I cannot find it in my heart to injure an individual, except in 
personal conflict.” 
“An has yeh done it, Henry?” earnestly inquired Andy. 
“Yes, Andy; yes, I have done it! and I thank God for it! I have 
taught the slave that mighty lesson: to strike for Liberty. ‘Rather to die 
as freemen, than live as slaves!’” (B, 128) 
 
It is not easy to say which question Andy asks, nor which question Blake answers: Did 
Blake kill a man in personal conflict? Did he succeed in teaching the slaves to scatter 
ruin? Exactly how did he teach “the slaves that mighty lesson: to strike for Liberty”? This 
pattern – from indecisive hesitation to an assertion of divinely inspired self-assurance – 
recurs throughout the novel, and mirrors Blake’s oscillation between enthusiasm for 
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revolutionary violence and his tendency to undercut that enthusiasm by taking a cautious, 
wait-and-see approach.  
Delany observes, in The Condition, that the “colored races” are “highly 
susceptible of religion,” and that this would be a crowning virtue, but for the fact that 
“they carry it too far. Their hope is largely developed, and consequently, they usually 
stand still – hope in God, and really expect Him to do that for them, which it is necessary 
that they should do themselves (Con, 64). As Delany sees it, an overdeveloped adherence 
to the black church fosters submission to white authority, and to a kind of quietism that 
places salvation steadfastly in the hereafter. This pernicious tendency towards quietism 
and abjection, Delany writes, “arises from a misconception of the character and ways of 
the deity” (Con, 64). Delany traces God’s existence in three discrete spheres – the 
“Spiritual, Moral, and Physical” – each of which obeys its own “natural” law of 
development, and each of which can be influenced by a corresponding form of human 
activity. What’s more, “a compliance with or a violation of either of these laws 
determines the result of all human affairs” (R, 154). In their reliance on prayer to redress 
earthly injustices and imbalances, Delany argues, black people habitually misalign their 
actions and their intended goals: “we make use of heavenly means for the attainment of 
earthly ends, while our oppressors make use of earthly means for the attainment of 
earthly ends” (R, 155). They can influence the “Physical” domain, but only, Delany 
writes, by “go[ing] to work” (Con, 65). For this reason, Delany’s most strident message 
is, “Our elevation must be the result of self-efforts, and work of our own hands” (Con, 
71).  
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In the best traditions of self-reliant reformism, Delany hoped that black 
achievement would hasten the demise of antiblack racism, and throughout his political 
writing, he consistently championed the causes of liberation, equality, and universal 
fraternity. The instruments he advocated in pursuit of these ends – elevation (of status) 
and accumulation (of capital) – were considerably worldlier. Delany’s “self-help frame of 
reference,” writes Floyd J. Miller, presupposed an American social field “so fluid that 
blacks who worked diligently, learned trades, followed moral precepts, and practiced 
personal thrift could overcome the burdens of caste.”219 If, Delany reasoned, whites are 
authorized to instruct and advise blacks 
in religion, in medicine, in law, then may we also, if we only determine 
that it shall be so, sell to them as well as buy from them; give advice to 
them in matters of religion, medicine, and law, as well as receive 
advice from them in these matters. But we must qualify ourselves for 
these various departments first, which is comparatively an easy matter. 
We must have farmers, mechanics, and shopkeepers generally among 
us. By these occupations we make money – these are the true sources 
of wealth. Give us wealth and we can obtain all the rest. (R, 155-56) 
 
Production and consumption could become a two-way street, if only blacks could control 
their share of capital and the means of production.  
This clash in Delany’s writing, between optimism for future elevation and his 
tendency to chide blacks who were not yet “elevated,” caused something of a conceptual 
problem. As Miller puts it, “The peculiarly critical nature of his self-help ideology 
compelled him to view as laggards those blacks who failed to rise in the social order. On 
the other hand, his perceptions of the existing reality led Delany to acknowledge that the 
restrictions placed upon blacks made no allowance for ability or respectability” (Miller, 
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123). If blacks were responsible for their own debasement – even partially, even if only 
by misguided complicity – then it followed that individual self-exertion would be 
sufficient to gain, if not equality, at least respectability. However, if hard work, good 
manners, and measurable success had no effect on systemic discrimination, then blacks’ 
ambitions would be exposed as quixotic pretensions. The potential ability of black 
individuals to better themselves was nothing less than a microcosm for the ability of 
black people to better their world.  
Ill-treated slaves are especially primed to receive Blake’s plan precisely by their 
experience in slavery. The “character of this organization,” Blake says, is such that 
“punishment and misery are made the instruments for its propagation… Every blow you 
receive from the oppressor impresses the organization upon your mind, making it so clear 
that even Whitehead’s Jack could understand it as well as his master” (B, 40). As such, 
abuse, mistreatment, and oppression become instruments in their own overcoming. Like 
that strain of Marxian utopianism whose hopes for revolution are predicated on 
capitalism’s ever-increasing brutality and the perfection of its exploitative apparatus, the 
ultimate success of Blake’s plan is actually threatened by the prospect of moderate 
reform. Whereas contentment breeds complacency, the frustrated experience of injustice 
serves as the fuse for revolutionary change. 
The best-treated and most contented slaves he encounters, in Kentucky, are also 
the least amenable to Blake’s brand of education. He finds that, though they share “a 
universal desire for freedom, there were few who were willing to strike. To run away, 
with them, seemed to be the highest conceived idea of their right to liberty. This they 
were doing, and would continue to do on every favorable opportunity, but their right to 
 189 
freedom by self-resistance, to them was forbidden by the Word of God.” They have, in 
other words, misinterpreted – or failed to reinterpret – the injunction to “stand still,” since 
their fondest anticipation is of what white people can do for them, rather than what they 
can do for themselves – which is to say, in the logic of the novel, what Henry Blake can 
teach them to do for themselves. “Satisfied that self-reliance was the furthest from their 
thoughts, but impressing them with new ideas concerning their rights, the great-hearted 
runaway bid them ‘Good bye, and may God open your eyes to see your own condition!’” 
(B, 123). Again, Blake’s lesson is encapsulated in a conversion experience – a visionary 
glimpse of the “condition” of life, though it is, in this case, a vision unseen.  
Institutionalized Charisma: Parliament in Cuba 
Vehement opposition to white claims of mastery over black experience or black 
reality is a key refrain throughout Delany’s generically multifarious body of work. In a 
characteristic instance, he rebukes those (white) “politicians, religionists, and 
abolitionists,” who “presumed to think for, dictate to, and know better what suited colored 
people, than they knew for themselves” (Con, 38). The problem was not simply that these 
pretentions of superior understanding were misguided or delusional; they corroded the 
reality inhabited by black people and white people alike. For antebellum black 
intellectuals like Delany, argues Vincent Harding, the impetus to create an autonomous 
infrastructure of black institutions “was tied to the defiant black movement beyond the 
white structures of slavery… Indeed, organization was a testing, a proof of black 
capacities for ‘self-improvement,’ a denial of white rights to create the black world.”220 
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Delany “recognized the brokenness of the black community and searched urgently for the 
setting in which healing might take place,” whether that setting was to be within or 
without the boundaries of the United States. Delany’s various projects, Harding observes, 
“were part of the movement toward a positive freedom which was the core of his larger 
vocation”; his legacy serves as “a reminder that independent black organizing was in 
itself an intimation of the future’s wholeness, a suggestion that black people might one 
day repossess their lives.”221 From this perspective, it is impossible to disentangle Blake 
from the long histories of black struggle, resistance, activism, and radicalism. Delany’s 
constant goal was the elevation of his race, and his efforts were always in the service of 
that goal: In a culture of white supremacist hegemony and slave power, a black man 
publicizing his own exemplarity, even extraordinariness, is a clearly radical idea.  
It is also, in significant ways, profoundly retrograde. Blake’s organization can 
usefully be compared to Eric Hoffer’s concept of the mass movement. In The True 
Believer, Hoffer observes,  
The uncanny powers of a leader manifest themselves not so much in 
the hold he has on the masses as in his ability to dominate and almost 
bewitch a small group of able men. These men must be fearless, proud, 
intelligent and capable of organizing and running large-scale 
undertakings, and yet they must submit wholly to the will of the leader, 
draw their inspiration and driving force from him, and glory in this 
submission.222  
 
As I have suggested, individual knowledge of the secret inheres in the experience of 
comprehending, or becoming conscious of, one’s place in the black community, and the 
black community’s oppression by the white establishment. It is an experiential, not a 
factual, truth; better yet, it is a kind of posture – but a posture that can only be struck after 
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Blake is identified and recognized as the head of the organization, whether this 
recognition takes a vaguely Protestant or strictly secular form.  
In an incisive critique of charismatic leadership’s role in twentieth century black 
political and literary culture, Erica R. Edwards argues that, “as a structuring fiction for 
liberatory politics, charisma is founded in three forms of violence” – historical, social, 
and epistemological.223 The fiction collapses the historical richness of “a heterogeneous 
black freedom struggle” to make room for disingenuous, “top-down narrative of Great 
Man leadership”; it “perform[s] social change in the form of a fundamentally 
antidemocratic form of authority”; and it “structur[es] knowledge of black political 
subjectivity and movement within a gendered hierarchy of political value that grants 
uninterrogated power to normative masculinity.” Though I hesitate to describe any 
narrative frame as categorically violent, Edwards’s insights map well onto Blake’s 
dramatization of the charismatic will to power. Rather than simply withholding Blake’s 
mysterious message, the book performs a kind of a dialectical oscillation between 
revelation and concealment, between opacity and transparency. The secret operates as a 
kind of black box, a closed system whose operations are indistinguishable to outside 
observers, and only fully intelligible to Blake himself. In this, Blake is a great deal like 
Moses, who, Edwards writes, “in the mythical story of political revolution and national 
founding, is definitive of charisma.”224 As an intermediary positioned between the 
profane and the transcendent, Moses is able to squelch all opposition, settle all debate, 
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and secure consent on the grounds of a super-rational insight into the unseen, divine 
Word. Moses serves “as the supermasculine translator of God’s authority; the ‘proofs’ 
confirming his appointment as charismatic leader all issue from his potent rod.”225  
Rodless or not, Blake is the “Arm of the Lord,” and as such, the instrumental 
manifestation of divine will. Though the analogy can be stretched too far, it is instructive 
to place Blake’s organization in the context of Hanna Arendt’s description of 
authoritarianism, as a pyramid-shaped “governmental structure whose source of authority 
lies outside itself, but whose seat of power is located at the top, from which authority and 
power is filtered down to the base in such a way that each successive layer possesses 
some authority, but less than the one above it.”226 Blake’s authority, like Moses’, is 
predicated on his position as an intermediary – a servant of God. In fact, Blake 
increasingly attributes the workings of the plan, and his own actions, to God’s agency. In 
a prayer before the Cuban Council, he affirms, “We are more and more sensible that 
without thy divine aid, we can do nothing. O, guide and direct us in this the greatest of 
undertakings: be a leader in our wilderness traveling; director of our wilderness 
wanderings; chief in our wilderness warfare… Be our great Captain, I pray thee” (B, 
292). Blake’s protestations of personal inadequacy and ineptitude become especially 
significant insofar as they shift the locus of responsibility, agency, and authority upwards, 
from Blake’s fragilely contingent personhood to Providential design.  
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At the same time, Blake accrues an almost comical array of honorary titles, 
distinctions, and positions. He is, according to the narrator, “the Leader of the Army of 
Emancipation and originator of the scheme to redeem them from slavery and an almost 
helpless degradation” (B, 251); he is “the leader of the great movement” (B, 263); he is 
elected “the President of the Council and Commander in Chief” (B, 285). In the closing 
pages, Blake comes to be called, by his colleagues and the narrator both, “the Chief” (B, 
290). All other men and women are, if not Blake’s servants, certainly not his equals. In 
the second half of the novel, Blake becomes a ranking official, and his organization 
becomes a rank-and-file administration. In Weberian terms, his prestige and influence are 
increasingly routinized and upheld by a bureaucratic network. Genuine charisma, Weber 
explains, “cannot remain stable” in its “pure form,” because it “rests on the legitimation 
of personal heroism or personal revelation. Yet precisely this quality of charisma as an 
extraordinary, supernatural, divine power transforms it, after routinization, into a suitable 
source for the legitimate acquisition of sovereign power by the successors of the 
charismatic hero” (ES, 262). If its beneficiaries are to “enjoy a secure social position in 
place of the kind of discipleship which is cut off from ordinary worldly connections,” 
charismatic authority must be “traditionalized or rationalized” (ES, 246). 
As Robert Levine sees it, the organization comes to function as “a sort of black 
Masonic network in the slave South, with himself as grand master.”227 I want to argue 
Blake, in fact, abandons his Southern organization because it is not enough like a 
Masonic network – it is too geographically vast, composed of too many disparate 
communities, and too outmanned by white slave power. If the novel’s first half follows a 
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quasi-secular reverend’s evangelical mission through the slave states, its second half 
dramatizes the construction of a kind of church on those same quasi-secular principles. In 
contrast to the sprawling network necessary to cover the entirety of the American South, 
Cuba affords a considerably more intimate setting for association, which comes to be 
characterized by sustained relationships and precisely delegated vocational roles. This 
Cuban coalition quickly sprouts parliamentary and military branches, elects officials, and 
formalizes command chains. What emerges is not a radically democratic community, nor 
an authoritarian regime, but a constellation of new status groups which strive to preserve, 
enhance, and consolidate the powers and privilege they are able to force into being. 
In its new location, and under new management structure, the movement achieves 
a kind of frictionless self-direction: “so completely were they organised, and systematic 
their plans, that whatever might be going on among them in Matanzas those in Havana 
were conversant with it, and that which might take place in Havana was at once known 
to… every part of the colony” (B, 282). The organization aims towards broad 
democratization, and simultaneously erects and legitimates, in its corporate structure, a 
stratified hierarchy of legislators and leaders. In the first case, the Council’s first order of 
business is to determine its “policy”; Blake insists, “The rules laid down, whatever they 
may be, should be plain, simple, and at once comprehensible to every black person, 
however illiterate” (B, 285). As with his earlier declaration that even “the stupidest” 
slaves will have equal access, Blake here aims to create a kind of transparent Constitution 
that mediates without signifying. It must be understood on the basis, not of what one 
knows, but of identity. Everyone is, potentially, included – the question is, included in 
what?  
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Certainly not in the “Council,” a governing body of notables and worthies whose 
merit is determined by some undisclosed organ of evaluation. The Council is initially 
composed of “unacquainted” officials, who share “doubts and fears… not only for their 
fidelity to each other, but also of their acceptance on account of their humble social 
positions as inferiors and domestics in society” (B, 283). The narrator endorses their 
presence and membership, since each among them has “been redeemed from the 
degradation of captivity, chosen among the self-reliant of their people, received into 
seclusion and acknowledged as equals in the Council” (B, 282). This ostensibly 
democratic flatness is misleading, however, as it sidesteps a clear disciplinary hierarchy. 
That the members of the Council are treated as “equals in the Council” is not surprising, 
since the representative leaders are initiated into what amounts to a secret society, “to 
whom alone the Hero was known.” When the President and General enters one seclusion, 
“as if by magic, the whole company simultaneously rose to their feet”; an “amateur 
orchestra, instrumental and vocal,” strikes up a song, “in strains most impressive,” whose 
lyric begins, “All hail thou true and noble chief / Who scorned to live a cowering slave; / 
Thy name shall stand on history’s leaf, / Amid the mighty and the brave!” (B, 250). Blake 
has a pretty good gig, perks-wise; on the other hand, when one seclusion is scheduled to 
begin, “a servant enter[s] the drawing room announcing that the Council Chamber was in 
readiness” (B, 282). The rest of this servant’s life is lived off the page, while the narrator 
attends to the magistrates who aim to inherit the legitimate governance of Cuba.  
Ensconced in his new base of operations, Blake seems altogether to forget about 
his designs on, and associates in, the American South. In fact, I would argue, Blake’s two 
organizations are essentially independent – isolated each from the other, seemingly 
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without contact. The Cuban revolutionaries can expect no foreign aid in their struggle 
because, Placido explains, though “Hayti is a noble self-emancipated nation,” she is “not 
able to aid us,” and Liberia is “too weak, and too far off” (B, 289). The possibility of aid 
from the syndicate Blake has organized throughout the American South is not even 
mentioned. Blake further emphasizes the necessity of communal self-reliance: “you must 
‘tread the winepress alone’ so far as earthly aid is concerned, only looking above to He 
who ‘tempers the storm to the shorn lamb’ and directs the destiny of nations” (B, 289).  
So, the charismatic community becomes an inchoate institution, locked in 
corporate competition with the white establishment. In the book’s second half, 
insurrection is eclipsed by diplomacy – or so it has seemed to some of Delany’s most 
discerning readers. Over time, the organization, writes Christopher Castiglia, 
becomes an end in itself. The institutional drive of Delany’s 
‘organization’ directs revolutionary impulses away from material 
equality and toward internalized ‘readiness.’ But ‘readiness’ within 
Blake’s organization, as within institutionally more generally, is a 
never-ending business… orienting citizens always toward institutional 
abstraction and its horizon of futurity where… revolution hovers as the 
(never recovered) fulfillment of a labor that in and of itself proves 
unsatisfying.228  
 
Yet revolution remains a powerful rhetorical device, and a latent political force. As Blake 
tells the assembled Council, “You know my errand among you; you know my sentiments. 
I am for war – war upon the whites. ‘I come to bring deliverance to the captive and 
freedom to the bond.’ Your destiny is my destiny; the end of one will be the end of all” 
(B, 290).  
On the other hand, the revolutionary army does relatively little in the way of 
revolutionary war, at least in the narrative as we have it. Speeches are made; debates are 
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had; consensus is reached and broken; resolutions are passed; but threats of revolutionary 
activity are consistently punctuated by hiccups and hesitations. To take one striking 
instance:  
“In the name of God, I now declare war against our oppressors, 
provided Spain does not redress our grievances!” proclaimed Blake (B, 
292).  
 
Blake’s declaration of war – precisely the performative utterance that should change the 
army’s real status from a state of peace to a state of war – is immediately undercut by the 
provision that, should Spain prove amenable to negotiation, war will not already have 
been declared. Blacks in Cuba are not loyal to Spain because Spain has not enfranchised 
blacks in Cuba; their revolutionary ardor is a function of their status as non-citizens. They 
have “petitioned and prayed for a redress of grievances,” but been met with ridicule, and 
subject to “greater restrictions” by the existing government. So, argues Placido to the 
Council, if the Grand Army were to “strike for liberty, it must also be for independent 
self-government, because we have the prejudices of the mother-country and the white 
colonists alike to contend against. Whereas, were we, as we should be, enfranchised by 
Spain we would then only have the opposition of Cuba and Porto Rico, and should be 
loyal to Spain” (B, 289).  
Because both diplomacy and insurrection remain viable, if opposed, strategies, the 
book’s second half preserves the division of labor that delegated violence to those with 
violent tendencies. Because of this, I depart from Jeffory A. Clymer, who claims that 
“Blake embodies the possibility… that Cuba’s wealthy people of color can learn to 
forego their class privilege and instead join forces with the island’s slave population in an 
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effort to overthrow Spanish rule and form a Pan-African republic.”229 For Clymer, this is 
exemplified by Gofer Gondolier, a disillusioned chef who is inspired to a new degree of 
aggressive militancy after a white merchant seizes and horsewhips Ambrosina, a black 
woman, for accidentally bumping into his wife in the street – an exhibition of arbitrary 
violence and cruelty as unjust as it is legally permissible. This scene, Clymer argues, 
“dissolves class distinctions among people of color by inciting the black working-class 
cook… to acts of revolutionary violence.”230 But this fact reinforces class distinctions as 
much as it dissolves them. Gondolier’s willingness to take up the role of hostile insurgent 
frees the black gentry to occupy less volatile, and presumably less dangerous, roles in the 
revolutionary coalition. Gofer guards the door during seclusions, “armed with a cutlass 
and his fearful Cuban carver” (B, 283). He declares himself “anxious to do somethin’, an’ 
ef the general there hurry up this thing an’ give me a chance, I’ll show ‘im what I kin do. 
I’m no speaker, but whenever there’s any carving to be done, give me a chance; I’m your 
man” (B, 291). But his willingness to engage in “acts of revolutionary violence” is not the 
same as agency; Gofer cannot legitimate the use of violence himself.  
In the book’s final scene – a meeting of the Council in seclusion to discuss the 
attack on Ambrosina – Placido hears the council members’ “sighs, tears, prayers and 
expressions of vengeance by Gofer Gondolier, who had no scruples in assuming to 
himself this particular duty of political dispensation” (B, 311). Here, the division of labor 
becomes more explicit, as the infantryman and enforcer comes up against the authority of 
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the Council, as embodied in the Council’s “Minister of War and Navy,” Montego – a 
man of “wealth and refinement.” Gofer complains, 
“…we ought to by this time be able to redress our grievances. 
Some men are born to command and others to obey; and it is well that 
this is the case, else I might be a commander; and ef I was, I might 
command when orders should not be given.” 
“This is you [sic] failing, Gondolier,” said Montego; “and one 
good reason why you should not hold command. I want no better 
under-officer, as orders received would be strictly executed.” 
“Yes, General, I know my ‘failing,’ and it’s useless to talk to 
me about ‘policy’ and nonsense when a bloodhound is tearing out my 
vitals. ‘Discretion’ at such a time. Give me a revolver, knife, club, 
brickbat, or anything with which to defend myself, and I’ll put a 
varment to flight” (B, 310) 
 
Gondolier delivers the book’s famous last line, though more than once it has 
misattributed it to Blake: “Woe be unto those devils of whites, I say!” (B, 313). It’s easy 
to miss the echo, here, of the drunkard Tibs’s pernicious and over-eager call for 
“Insurrection! Insurrection! Death to every white!” (B, 106). The crucial distinction is 
that, where Tibs is uncontrollable – outside the discipline of the organization – Gofer is 
willing to submit to the leadership of the Council. His inclusion is predicated on his 
subordination, and his subordination is necessitated – as with Tibs – by his desire for 
vengeance. Gofer, too, must stand still and see the salvation – must wait until the 
appointed time.  
Extending the Gilroyian logic of communitarian solidarity to Delany’s Masonic 
attachments, Corey D.B. Walker argues that Masonry offered Delany “a critical 
oppositional strategy designed to inaugurate his vision of an African diasporic nation.”231 
(A Noble Flight, 110). In Blake, writes Walker, “Delany seizes on and revolutionizes the 
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radically egalitarian and democratic principles of the fraternity as Blake instructs his 
collaborators that ‘All you have to do, is to find one good man or woman.’”232 While 
there were certainly democratic elements and democratizing tendencies in antebellum 
Freemasonry, particularly in the black community, the exclusive emphasis on these 
elements and tendencies elides half the story. As Margaret C. Jacob has shown, the 
characteristic “masonic identity” was keyed to “the belief that merit and not birth 
constitutes the foundation for social and political order” (Jacob, 9). However 
meritocratic, Freemasonry was not “inherently democratic in the modern sense. Although 
they spoke of all brothers as ‘equal,’ this did not obviate the role the lodges played as 
places that replicated social hierarchy and order… The lodges mirrored the old order just 
as they were creating a form of civil society that would ultimately replace it.”233  
Delany’s own tract on Freemasonry is both an attack on and a defense of 
freemasonry’s elitism. Masonry, he writes, was “originally intended for the better 
government of man,” but this mission has waned, while the exclusion and social 
stigmatization of oppressed peoples have become the norm (R, 52). He sums up the 
Masonic lineage – and its moral-pedagogical imperative – thus:  
What is God that man should be his image, and what knowledge should 
man obtain in order to be like God? This wisdom was possessed in the 
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paradoxical, and ironic landscape of democracy in the United States” (Walker, A Noble Fight, 4). This 
seems to me spot-on; I object only to the narrower implications of “radical” democracy and egalitarianism, 
disencumbered from the drive to authority inseparable from political organization. 
 
233 In the unlikely event that despotic social arrangements were “abolished, masonry lost its raison d'etre. 
Prior to this abolition it could be seen as having been a school of civic sociability, an alternative to the 
traditional” (Jacob, 12). “The goal of government by consent within the context of subordination to 
‘legitimate’ authority was vigorously pursued” by London lodges (Jacob, 46). Living the Enlightenment: 
Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
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remotest period by the wise men of Egypt and Ethiopia, and handed 
down only through the priesthood to the recipients of their favors, the 
mass of mankind being ignorant of their own nature, and consequently 
prone to rebel against their greatest and best interests. (R, 54) 
 
The wise men of all ancient cultures, Delany writes, “taught the same as necessary to his 
government on earth – his responsibility to a Supreme Being, the author and Creator of 
himself. But the mythology of those days, not unlike the scientific theology of the days in 
which we live, consisted of a sea of such metaphysical depth, that the mass of men were 
unable to fathom it” (R, 57).  
The privileged wisdom of Masonry provides Delany with a precedent for his 
idealized, hyper-rational education platform. In the olden days, he writes, 
Man adhered but little, and cared less, for that in which he could never 
be fully instructed, nor be made to understand, in consequence of his 
deficiency in a thorough literary education – this being the exclusive 
privilege of those in affluent circumstances. All these imperfections 
have been remedied, in the practical workings of the comprehensive 
system of Free and Accepted Masonry, as handed down to us from the 
archives at Jerusalem. All men, of every country, clime, color, and 
condition, (when morally worthy,) are acceptable to the portals of 
Masonic jurisprudence. (R, 57) 
 
All free men – again, construed as men who desire to be free, regardless of their material 
condition – are “acceptable” and educable under “Masonic jurisprudence,” the wisdom 
“handed down” from Jerusalem, but traceable to the great men of Africa. Though the 
prospect gives him pause, Delany is moved, in the pamphlet’s concluding paragraphs, “to 
tell the world that, as applied to Masonry, the word – Eureka – was first exclaimed in 
Africa? But – there! I have revealed the Masonic secret, and must stop!” (R, 67). The 
remarkable ingenuity of this conclusion springs from Delany’s recalibration of reference; 
he shifts Masonic secrecy’s proper domain from metaphysics to family romance.  
At its highest levels of esoteric instruction, Masonry purports to reveal “the 
universe. Here all instruction ends. Things are seen as they are; and nature, and the things 
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of nature, are given to be comprehended” (quoted in Fellows, 114). Delany suggests that 
Masonry’s most fundamental secret is not what it understands but, on the contrary, what 
it disavows: its black ancestry. Africans, Delany insists, were “the authors of this 
mysterious and beautiful Order” (R, 55). This reflects Delany’s belief that “the first 
flowering of all wisdom was among the blacks of Africa,” as Victor Ullman puts it, and 
that therefore white Masons – George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and eleven other 
signers of the Constitution among them – owed their intellectual, fraternal, and even 
religious heritage to ancient Ethiopian and Egyptian thinkers, whom Delany classed as 
black Africans (Ullman, 76). Delany’s celebration of African heritage doubles as a 
critique of the hypocrisy and ingratitude of white Masons, who have perverted the 
institution by excluding the very people who originated it. Apologizing, with no little 
irony, for his “slip of the tongue,” Delany justifies his “disclosure” of the “secret” with 
the compensation that “I may have made the world much wiser” (R, 67). 
Soon after arriving on the island, Blake cryptically declares, “I have come to 
Cuba to help to free my race; and that which I desire here to do, I’ve done in another 
place” (B, 195, my italics). What is Blake claiming he has done, here? Freed his race? 
Helped to free his race? Desired to help to free his race? Blake’s aim, in the novel’s first 
half, has been “to complete an organization in every slave state” within two years (B, 42). 
Though he ostensibly completes (or very nearly completes) the task, Blake leads no 
insurrection – nor does he overthrow any slaveholders. What Blake does do is establish a 
charismatic community, and that community becomes, in a crucial sense, the organization 
for a broader, better, more democratic basis of political organization. It is, I think, putting 
the cart before the horse to claim that identify has no significant role to play in the 
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composition of Blake’s community; but in its basis as a legitimacy-hungry counterpublic, 
the Cuban community provides a social imaginary at once more inclusive and militantly 
opposed to the conventional mores of America’s almost spontaneous philosophy of white 
supremacy. The tragedy of Blake, then, is also its triumph – an alternative to the 
American consensus is only achievable through a kind of magic trick – or, to once again 






WHEN THE GOING GETS WEIRD, THE WEIRD TURN PRO 
 
 
“Ah, Jesus… another bad tangent. Somewhere in the back of my mind I 
recall signing a contract that said I would never do this kind of thing 
again; one of the conditions of my turning pro was a clause about 
swearing off gibberish…”  
–Hunter S. Thompson 
 
“But as my breakfast-time mantra says, I am a professional. And they 
don't give out awards for that sort of toe-tap foolishness.” 
 –John Jeremiah Sullivan 
 
“(I would like you to believe that I kept working out of some real 
professionalism, to meet the deadline, but that would not be entirely 
true; I did have a deadline, but it was also a troubled time, and working 




For a handful of years, now numbering in the high-single digits, this project has 
served as a squalid laboratory for a series of variously reckless experiments – in close 
reading, historicism, and interdisciplinary research guided more by curiosity than 
coherence. I have spent some time tracing the contours of a particular (ambitious, defiant, 
urban, Northern, male) mode of antebellum authorship onto a bespoke map of 
developments and revisions in a constellation of related terms and concepts: expertise, 
elitism, professionalization, performance, authority, critique, science, fantasy. In many 
ways, though, my watchwords have been ambivalence and ambiguity. I am interested in 
overlaps and blurring, the intersections of clearly defined zones. Martin Delany’s 
firebrand enthusiasm for abolitionism, for instance, cannot be entirely separated from his 
embattled relationship with more established public figures (and erstwhile allies) like 
Frederick Douglass and Harriet Beecher Stowe. Allies and enemies were not always, for 
Delany, discrete categories. Poe tended to antagonize his most powerful friends and 
admirers until such terms of endearment no longer applied. Melville’s towering optimism 
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for the uncompleted project of American democracy was only matched by his 
disappointment with the project’s stubborn intransigence.  
If I have, to this point, told the stories of Poe, Melville, and Delany as individuals, 
what is the story of the three stories, the metastory of the study, and the history of the 
composite protagonist? All three came of age in the profoundly weird era of Jacksonian 
Democracy, when laissez-faire was less an economic policy than an article of faith – 
though the federally funded transportation infrastructure and centralized financial 
institutions that would crucially shape the contours of American sociopolitics, right down 
to our own moment, flew in the face of the Democrats’ anti-interventionist ideology. The 
1820s and early 1830s had birthed the labor movement in America, as skilled laborers, 
craftsmen, and “mechanics” in Philadelphia and New York formed trade associations, 
organized state conferences, and eventually formed the first national, general unions. 
Then came the Panic of 1837. The Panic triggered widespread layoffs, creating a huge 
pool of cheap labor. Organizing efforts ground to a halt, and most of the burgeoning 
associations folded. The Panic effectively killed the labor movement in America until 
after the Civil War. At almost the same time, in much the same environment, the private 
sector surged; corporations accrued capital and influence.  
After 1840, the lion’s share of passengers who hurtled through space at 
unprecedented speeds on parallel rails and replica rivers ended up in cities. There was no 
law against pettifogging. State-of-the-art training in pathology and treatment was 
perfectly compatible with quackery. An honest-to-God clergyman was hard to find in the 
madding crowd of ministers, reverends, pastors, elders, preachers, revivalists, and 
messiahs. The air was thick with the spirit of reform, for while reform wasn’t cheap, the 
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spirit was free. Poe, Melville, and Delany launched themselves into this social scrum as 
aspiring authors, scribbling mercenaries, freelance nomads. They trudged between 
Boston and New York, Richmond and Philadelphia, Baltimore and Rochester, Edinburgh 
and Ontario. The three men were dispositional freelancers – the type who would rather 
complain about being broke than complain about hating work. They wrote on spec or by 
contract. They were self-employed in the precarious way independent contractors are 
self-employed, which is to say that they only paid themselves when someone else paid 
them first. 
Poe, Melville, and Delany strove to succeed in a field (writing) that has never 
been a bastion of rigorous criteria. The market’s rise to hegemony simplified the 
problem, at least from one perspective (i.e., the perspective of the market): If literary 
works are pure commodities, then merit means maximum profitability at minimum labor 
cost. But thinking about literary merit through this lens of economic reductionism is so 
weird as to seem radical (e.g., the Prosperity Gospel, or Donald Trump ranking his all-
time favorite books as The Bible and The Art of the Deal, in that order). To proud 
American non-conformists, popularity is more apt to be evidence of artistic bankruptcy, 
of appealing to the lowest common denominator. On the other hand, the the three could 
not quite afford to strike the pose of Romantic isolatos. Indeed, Poe, Melville, and Delany 
participated in, and sometimes organized, a range of literary and political associations. 
Poe and Melville at different times both hitched their wagons to Evert Duyckinck’s 
Literary Young America, and Delany was a fixture of the Black Convention Movement. 
They wrote in neither purely literary nor wholeheartedly commercial modes. What this 
meant for Melville, as expressed in his famous “dollars damn me” letter to Hawthorne, 
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was that “the product is a final hash, and all my books are botches.” Truth-telling was 
something to be admired and pursued, but it was also essentially impossible, particularly 
when “telling” was in any measure an occupational activity. “Try to get a living by the 
Truth – and go to the Soup Societies. Heavens! Let any clergyman try to preach the Truth 
from its very stronghold, the pulpit, and they would ride him out of his church on his own 
pulpit bannister.”234 
 In his seminal “The Man of Letters as a Man of Business,” William Dean Howells 
acknowledged, with a mix of professional pride and gentlemanly distaste, that not only 
has “story-telling” become “a fairly recognized trade,” but that, since the Civil War, the 
trade has developed “a money-standing in the economic world.”235 If, by the first decade 
of the twentieth century, story-tellers could make a living, and even a decent one, as 
story-tellers, the job remained an odd fit in the America whose capital was Wall Street. 
Even the successful exponent of the métier “must still have a low rank among practical 
people; and he will be regarded by the great mass of Americans as perhaps a little off, a 
little funny, a little soft!” (6). Howells admits to feeling a certain embarrassment at 
treating the man of letters straightforwardly as a man of business, because the job is just 
newfangled and exotic and perhaps schmaltzy enough to strike a discordant note when it 
is recruited to play with more conventional jobs. If treating the novelist as just any clock-
punching wage worker desacralizes the artist’s office, Howells points out a potentially 
depressing fact about the structure of the modern world: “At present business is the only 
human solidarity; we are all bound together with that chain, whatever interests and tastes 
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235 William Dean Howells, “The Man of Letters as a Man of Business,” Literature and Life: Studies (New 
York: Harper & Bros., 1902) 30-31. 
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and principles separate us, and I feel quite sure that in writing of the Man of Letters as a 
Man of Business I shall attract far more readers than I should in writing of him as an 
Artist” (3). While it’s true, Howells says, that “we had authors, and very good ones” in 
antebellum America, he cannot “remember any of them who lived by literature except 
Edgar A. Poe, perhaps; and we all know how he lived; it was largely upon loans. They 
were either men of fortune, or they were editors or professors” (7). Poe himself was, of 
course, an editor, but he had a powerful knack for clashing with management on 
questions of fair pay, editorial oversight, and office decorum. His reputation increasingly 
preceded him, and Poe increasingly lived up to it.  
 Autonomy, the great object of Poe’s desire, shrank from his grasp like grapes from 
Tantalus. Of course – to devolve for a moment into post-Kantian platitudes – autonomy, 
“self-law,” is impossible in anything like its strict sense. Poe knew this, and saw its horror 
and its beauty: Eureka’s theory of the universe is a theory of material interconnectedness, 
a vastness filled with atoms, each pulling and pushing every other, all being pushed and 
pulled. Even matter and spirit are, in Eureka, interconnected (i.e., not autonomous). On 
the other hand, Poe didn’t like to be told what to do. He chased freedom into the mass 
market of popular art, but the ideal of financial self-sufficiency (which he never so much 
as sniffed) was crucially instrumental: it would permit creative self-direction and 
indifference to meddling. (The ideal of creative freedom is perversely dependent on 
financial self-determination, which helps explain why few working-class kids start art 
rock bands).  
 Even more than did Poe, Melville lived on loans, particularly from the prominent 
jurist – and Melville’s father-in-law – George Lemuel Shaw. Melville was in ever-
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growing debt – not least to his own publishers, who awaited their remuneration for 
advances – and relied on charity for years, a predicament he found as both inescapable 
and unendurable. Melville’s letters to Shaw, mostly written in the period of The 
Confidence-Man’s conception, (unprofitable) publication, and (indifferent) reception are 
painful to read: the prideful aloofness to Melville’s gratitude is clearly meant, but does 
not quite manage, to disguise his sense of helplessness and humiliation. Melville was a 
charity case, and he knew it. It is, then, no accident that the sharpest grifters in The 
Confidence-Man ask for charity, too – but they ask as agents, as benevolent mediators 
between the needy and the benevolent public.  
 Ironically and tragically, Melville’s career was at its most commercially successful 
and least emotionally agonizing when his brother, Gansevoort Melville, took care of the 
business side. Gansevoort, a prominent fixture and successful orator for the Democratic 
Party, essentially campaigned for his brother’s nascent career as a novelist as one might a 
first-time nominee. He coaxed an endorsement from Washington Irving, the undisputed 
doyen of American letters, and secured established publishers – John Murray in England, 
Wiley & Putnam in New York – for Typee, Herman’s debut novel. Then Gansevoort died. 
Evert Duyckinck was the closest Melville ever came to replacing Gansevoort. But 
Duyckinck – the spiritual leader and editorial overseer of Young America, a political 
faction-cum-high culture clique – had his own agenda that, Melville was surprised to 
learn, did not quite rhyme with Melville’s own. Duyckinck had for years been calling, 
and was still waiting, for a Genius to spring up from the democratic throng, and 
summarily to smash Old World tradition, to overturn England’s rules of and rule over art, 
and to inaugurate a great, lasting, Democratic tradition of American literature. Melville, 
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not unmoved, gave him Moby-Dick. It turned out not to be what Duyckinck had had in 
mind, quite. Duyckinck’s chilly dismissal of Melville’s toweringly ambitious and equally 
idiosyncratic tour de force was a not-insignificant factor in the etiology of Melville’s 
shattering authorial identity crisis, which hounded him throughout the fifties and lingered 
for the rest of his life. Melville’s new style of storytelling broke the old rules, but it also 
broke the rules that Duyckinck hadn’t yet been able to get down clear in black and white. 
He would, he was sure, know them when he saw them, and for this reason, Duyckinck 
believed that American literature would have to wait for American criticism. Once some 
gifted analyst had blazed the trail by formulating and systematizing principles, but not 
until then, America’s autochthonous Genius would take care of the rest.  
 In a twist that will surprise no one who has stuck with me from the beginning, the 
best candidate Duyckinck had found for the role of America’s critic was Edgar Allan 
Poe. In November 1844, Poe became the newest, and probably the most cynically 
motivated, Young American. Where in years past he had dismissed literary nationalism 
as complacent provincial prejudice, the Poe of 1844 couldn’t get enough of the stuff. It 
was, for a time, great for his career.236 Meanwhile, under Duyckinck’s philosophico-
editorial guidance, Young America embraced Poe’s “critical ideals” only far enough to 
retrofit those principles to fit the skeleton of literary nationalism. Never one to toe the 
party line, Poe was alarmed to discover he had become the party line. In her analysis of 
Poe’s seeming enthusiasm for self-destruction after 1844 – a longstanding critical puzzle 
– Meredith McGill argues, “the crisis for Poe is not that he is forced to embrace literary 
nationalist ideals in order to advance his career. Rather, his autonomy is jeopardized 
                                                 
236 For Poe’s lit-nat period, see J.G. Kennedy, “‘a Mania for Composition”: Poe's Annus Mirabilis and the 
Violence of Nation-Building,” American Literary History 17.1 (2005): 1-35. 
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when the literary nationalists embrace his principles, invoking him as an idealized figure 
of independent judgment within their discourse.”237 That the Poe’s personal collapse, his 
frantic escape from the clutches of Young American dogma, and his turn toward 
speculative cosmology all happened at roughly the same time was only literally a 
coincidence. He reached hard for a kind of intellectual ascendancy more resistant to 
appropriation, to dogmatization. This effort culminated in Eureka.  
 The publication of the tract was, to Poe, epochal — a genuine event. In his personal 
correspondence, Poe regarded (or, at the very least, worked very hard to pretend to 
regard) his future influence as guaranteed and well deserved: “What I have propounded 
will (in good time) revolutionize the world of Physical and Meta-physical Science.”238 
Poe’s pitch for Eureka was colorful enough for inclusion in the memoirs of George 
Putnam, its (eventual, reluctant) publisher. As Putnam tells it, Poe trumpeted his 
completion of a work of such “momentous interest” that “Newton’s discovery of 
gravitation was a mere incident compared to the discoveries revealed.” This revelation 
would ripple outward, revolutionizing not just thought but also the life and business of 
the man lucky enough to win the right to publish it: Eureka would, he said, “at once 
command such universal and intense attention that the publisher might give up all other 
enterprises, and make this one book the business of his lifetime.” Amused more than 
inspired by Poe’s giddy suggestion that an “edition of fifty thousand copies might be 
sufficient to begin with,” Putnam ventured to issue “not upon fifty thousand, but five 
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hundred.”239 The edition sold poorly; Eureka netted its author $14, all from an advance 
Putnam seems to have given partly out of pity, and partly as a bribe to get Poe to leave 
his office. (Poe later drafted and signed a contract stipulating that he, Poe, would “repay 
the said amount of Fourteen Dollars and I also engage not to ask or apply for any other 
loans or advances from said Putnam in any way.”240) 
 Delany ran in a different circle, but the social dynamics are, to a certain extent, 
familiar. The National Negro Convention Movement had served, since 1830, as a prime 
hub in emergent black-led efforts at black-led political organization and black-led civil 
institutions. The discussions, at the conventions themselves and in the parallel 
conversations in the black abolitionist press, were undertaken in a collaborative spirit, 
and though they shared goals and values, the delegates increasingly came to incompatible 
conclusions about the imminent prospects, advisable means, and moral imperatives 
behind shibboleths like “elevation” and “present condition.” In its early years, the 
movement had wholeheartedly hitched its star to the Garrisonian strategy of “moral 
suasion,” the idea that pro-slavery crusaders could be converted, in the profoundest sense, 
into abolitionists through proselytizing. Moral suasionists sought to cure America’s (and 
Americans’) moral diseases with rhetorical nostrums: truth will triumph over error; love 
must defeat hate; sympathy evaporates cruelty; repentance redeems sin. It wore the rose-
tinted goggles of American reform – the nation, it thought, would inevitably be perfected, 
and we must only work hard, and be disciplined, to usher in the millennium.  
 The individual moments in Delany’s career makes a certain overarching sense 
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when you entertain the hypothesis that Delany was driven by an urgent call – something 
between a desire and a drive – to beat Frederick Douglass, the movement’s most 
prominent figure. The nimble Douglass tended to be a half step ahead of Delany – a 
schooner and a frigate, a fly and an elephant, etc. But on the political, even revolutionary, 
efficacy of moral suasion, Delany was leagues ahead. Its naif optimism and abhorrence of 
force, he argued, did more to preserve white supremacy than overthrow it; its 
overwhelming faith in moral probity and good manners and nonviolent conflict resolution 
made the enemies of racism docile when they should have been hostile. Douglass stuck to 
his moral suasionist guns (assuredly loaded with blanks) even after 1850, a year wherein 
every branch of American government seemed bent on making the situation for blacks, 
even or even especially free blacks, worse: the executive-legislative Compromise 
included the Fugitive Slave Laws, and the high court’s Dred Scott decision ruled that 
blacks could not be citizens – nor, therefore, Americans in any legally significant sense.  
 Delany was, perversely, a victim of his lifetime of (relative) liberty. As one 
abolitionist colleague wrote to Garrison in 1842, “The public have itching ears to hear a 
colored man speak, and particularly a slave. Multitudes will flock to hear one of his 
class.”241 Douglass’s Garrison-published Narrative (1845) sold 30,000 copies in fifteen 
years. Harriet Beecher Stowe unwittingly provided a template that both Delany and 
Douglass, with his Heroic Slave, would try to follow, when her philosophically 
thoughtful, politically urgent longform piece of fiction turned out to be a popular smash 
to boot. Uncle Tom’s Cabin sold 300,000 copies in its first year in print (1852, after being 
serialized the previous year), and provided Stowe with annual royalties that averaged 
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$10,000 for the next two decades. By comparison, sales of Delany’s self-published 
political treatise, The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored 
People of the United States, Politically Considered (1852), were statistically 
insignificant. The book earned its author not a dime.  
 The novel also established, all but singlehandedly, Harriet Beecher Stowe as an 
authority on the black American experience and the politics of slavery. When Frederick 
Douglass visited Stowe, in 1853, with the goal of obtaining “some method which should 
contribute successfully, and permanently, to the improvement and elevation of the free 
people of color in the United States,” Delany was coolly outraged. In a letter rebuking 
Douglass’s reliance on a white woman for uplift of oppressed blacks, Delany — after 
faux-diplomatically claiming to speak “in all due respect and deference to Mrs. Stowe” 
— seethes, “she knows nothing about us, ‘the Free Colored people of the United States,’ 
[and] neither does any other white person—and, consequently, can contrive no successful 
scheme for our elevation; it must be done by ourselves.”242 Douglass’s response, that 
Delany has only shown that he “knows nothing about Mrs. Stowe,” prompts Delany to 
backtrack: his depiction of Stowe’s absolute ignorance was “ironical, and not intended to 
be taken in its literal sense; but I meant to be understood in so saying, that they know 
nothing, comparatively, about us, to the intelligent, reflecting, general observers among 
the Free Colored People of the North” (R, 232). It is, of course, rhetorically playful 
nonsense to say that a categorical absolute (“nothing”) is merely relatively absolute 
(nothing only in comparison to something else). But Delany’s point is that Stowe 
capitalized, financially and reputationally, on the black experience of the black condition, 
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despite what Delany saw as her constitutive blindness to that experience. Implied here is 
a kind of proto-Black Arts view that black experience is a prerequisite to black 
knowledge, and black knowledge a prerequisite to black leadership: No white person has 
any positive knowledge of the black condition as it is lived, so white efforts to describe 
black reality amount to so much fumbling for a light-switch in a cornfield. 
 Most obviously, Douglass and Delany’s dispute was over the virtues and evils of 
emigration – the project of establishing a nation, populated and governed by expatriated 
African-Americans, beyond the geographical and ideological boundaries of the United 
States. Douglass said no; Delany said yes. More interestingly, their debate is also over 
expert knowledge: who has it, how they got it, and how one knows they have it and 
deserve it. Delany’s polemical intent, then, is to pry open a space for black authority on 
black reality. If it is true that black people “have always fallen into great errors in efforts 
of this kind, going to others than the intelligent and experienced among ourselves,” 
Delany wonders, “Why, in God’s name, don’t the leaders among our people make 
suggestions, and consult the most competent among their own brethren concerning our 
elevation?” (R, 224, 225). He acidly observes that “nothing that has as yet been gotten up 
by our friends, for the assistance of the colored people of the United States, has even been 
of any pecuniary benefit to them. Our white friends take care of that part.” The fact that 
“Douglass’s printing establishment” is a rare exception to this rule, Delany implies, is 
both a tribute to Douglass’s industriousness and an implicit condemnation of his 
willingness to collaborate with the white establishment — to sell out the cause for his 
own financial interests. Ultimately, Delany “would not give the counsel of one dozen 
INTELLIGENT COLORED freemen of the RIGHT STAMP, for that of all the white and 
 216 
unsuitable colored persons in the land” (R, 234).  
  Delany went on to emigrate to Canada for freedom from domination, freedom from 
America, but this geographical distancing also distanced him personally from the political 
project of abolitionism; during the Civil War, he returned to the States in search of 
political power — freedom to remake the nation whose principles he cherished, whose 
practices he abominated. He seems to have written his only novel, at least mostly, while 
living in Chatham, Ontario — a period of limited opportunities for civic engagement and 
political activism. Of course, he hoped to replicate the cataclysmic success of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, but he also was driven to point out the structural imbalance and ideological 
absurdity that made a white woman from New England the nation’s leading expert on the 
black experience. The badge of Delany’s knowledge about blackness was his blackness – 
a credential he insistently held against his friend, collaborator, and nemesis, Douglass.    
I’ve thought of this dissertation as a sort of prehistory, a snapshot of an (but not 
the) inaugurating moment in the writerly struggle to earn prestige and stability without 
losing the license of dilettantish dabbling. Poe, Melville, and Delany were not wealthy 
men. They struggled to attract patrons. They tended to overrate the earning potential of 
the works they scribbled, often painstakingly, often in a slapdash rush. They also wrote, 
in a sense, in a pre-professional era – but writing has always been, in a sense, a para-
professional activity. Trying to situate one’s position in the “professional” field has long 
been a preoccupation of American writers. This conclusion’s subtitle is Hunter S. 
Thompson’s densely ironic maxim, “When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.” It is 
most often taken to mean something about taking lots of drugs to write in the pocket of 
inspired, brilliant nonsense, and surely there is some of that. But I think there is 
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something else there, too, something more plangent and searching. Thompson’s “the 
weird” preexist the situation of weirdness. Mobilizing what he fondly called “freak 
power” against the corruption of oligarchies (class, wealth, politics) was what Thompson 
did best, and he always did it through writing. Writing is nobody’s best bet for 
professional status, if professional status means middle-class normalcy. But an ideal of 
professionalism – the ideal of disinterest, and the innerly-felt sense of a calling, of doing 
a job for something more than money – came to inform the (generally rather deviant, at 
least statistically) occupation of writing the moment it came into being. That moment, as 
I have tried to show, was right around 1840, and writers like Poe, Melville, and Delany 











Anon. “Expert Testimony and Fees for Experts,” Medical Era 16.2. 1898. 17. 
Anon. Review of “A Treatise on the Urethra” by Benjamin Phillips, The American 
Journal of the Medical Sciences 16. 1835.  
Abbott, Andrew Delano. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 
Labor. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1988. 
Adapting Poe: Re-imaginings in Popular Culture, ed. Dennis R. Perry and Carl H. 
Sederholm. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Adeleke, Tunde. “Black Biography in the Service of a Revolution: Martin R. Delany in 
Afro-American Historiography,” Biography 17.3 (1994): 248-267.  
----. "Martin R. Delany's Philosophy of Education: a Neglected Aspect of African 
American Liberation Thought." Journal of Negro Education. 63.2 (1994): 221-36.  
Allen, Michael. Poe and the British Magazine Tradition. New York: Oxford UP, 1969. 
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New 
York: Viking Press, 1968. 
Aristotle, Selections, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995.  
Auden, W.H. “Introduction to Edgar Allan Poe: Selected Prose and Poetry,” in The 
Recognition of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Eric W. Carlson. Ann Arbor: Michigan 
University Press, 1966. 220-30.  
Banning, Stephen A. “The Professionalization of Journalism,” Journalism History 24.4. 
(Winter 98). 157-164. 
 219 
Barnes, Julian. “The Art of Fiction No. 165,” interview by Shusha Guppy, available at 
http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/562/the-art-of-fiction-no-165-julian-
barnes 
Barnum, P.T. The Life of P.T. Barnum. Urbana: Illinois UP, 2000. 371.  
Barthes, Roland. Writing Degree Zero. New York: Hill and Wang, 1968.  
Bauman, Zygmunt. Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity, and 
Intellectuals. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell UP, 1987. 
Baym, Nina. “Melville's Quarrel with Fiction,” PMLA 94.5. 1979): 909-923. 
Beaver, Harold. introduction to his edition of The Science Fiction of Edgar Allan Poe. 
New York: Penguin Books, 1976. vii – xxi.  
Beecher, Catharine Esther and Harriet Beecher Stowe, The American Woman's Home: or, 
Principles of Domestic Science; Being a Guide to the Formation and 
Maintenance of Economical, Healthful, Beautiful, and Christian Homes. New 
York: J.B. Ford and Co., 1869. 
Beecher, Catharine Esther. “Preface to the Third Edition,” A Treatise on Domestic 
Economy, For the Use of Young Ladies at Home, and at School. New York: 
Harper & Bros, 1849. 
Beecher, Catharine Esther. A Treatise on Domestic Economy, For the Use of Young 
Ladies at Home, and at School. Boston: Marsh, Capen, Lyon, and Webb, 1841. 
Beecher, Henry Ward. “The Study of Human Nature,” Popular Science Monthly 1. 
1872): 327-35, 328. 
Bell, Michael Davitt. The Development of American Romance. Chicago: Chicago UP, 
1981. 
 220 
Bellis, Peter. “Melville's Confidence-Man: An Uncharitable Interpretation,” American 
Literature. 59.4. 1987): 548-569. 
Bender, Thomas. Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic 
Intellectuals in the United States. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993. 
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction 
of America. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
Blair, John G. "Puns and Equivocations in Melville's The Confidence Man," American 
Transcendental Quarterly, 22. 1974. 
Bledstein, Burton J. The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the 
Development of Higher Education in America. New York: Norton, 1976. 
Bloom, Harold. “Inescapable Poe,” in Poetics of Influence, ed. John Hollander. New 
Haven: H.R. Schwab, 1988): 279-95.  
Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Invention of the Artist's Life.” Yale French Studies. (1987): 75-
103. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1996. 
Bowen, Merlin R. “Tactics of Indirection in Melville's The Confidence-Man,” Studies in 
the Novel. 1.4. (1969). 
Brand, H.W. American Colossus: The Triumph of Capitalism, 1865-1900. New York: 
Anchor Books, 2010. 
Bressoud, David M. “Historical Reflections on Teaching the Fundamental Theorem of 
Integral Calculus.” The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 118, No. 2. 
February 2011. pp. 99-115.  
 221 
Brink, André. The Novel: Language and Narrative from Cervantes to Calvino. New 
York: New York University Press, 1998. 129, 139, 146. 
Brown, Marshall. “Three Theses on Gothic Fiction,” The Gothic Text. Stanford UP, 2005. 
1-7. 
Buell, Lawrence. “The Last Word on The Confidence-Man?” Illinois Quarterly 35 (Nov. 
1972): 15-29, p. 15.  
Buell, Lawrence. New England Literary Culture from Revolution Through Renaissance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986. 
Carpenter, Scott. Aesthetics of Fraudulence in Nineteenth-Century France: Frauds, 
Hoaxes, and Counterfeits. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009. 
Castiglia, Christopher. Interior States: Institutional Consciousness and the Inner Life of 
Democracy in the Antebellum United States. Durham: Duke UP, 2008. 
Cawelti, John G. “Some Notes on the Structure of The Confidence-Man,” American 
Literature. 27.3 (1957): 278-288. 
Cawelti, John G. Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and Popular 
Culture. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1976. 
Charvat, William. The Profession of Authorship in America, 1800-1870. Columbus: Ohio 
State UP, 1968. 
Clymer, Jeffory A. “Martin Delany's Blake and the Transnational Politics of Property,” 
American Literary History 15.4 (Winter 2003), 709-731.  
Cohen, Anthony P. The Symbolic Construction of Community. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Cole, Rachel. “At the Limits of Identity: Realism and American Personhood in Melville's 
Confidence-Man.” Novel: a Forum on Fiction. 39.3 (2006), 384-401. 
 222 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Biographia Literaria, in The Complete Works of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, vol. 3. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1884. 
Corfield, Penelope J. Power and the Professions in Britain 1700-1850. London: 
Routledge, 1995. 
Cowan, Brian. “An Open Elite: The Peculiarities of Connoisseurship in Early Modern 
England,” Modern Intellectual History 1.2 (2004): 151-83. 
Crane, Gregg. “The Lexicon of Rights, Power, and Community in Blake: Martin R. 
Delany's Dissent from Dred Scott,” American Literature 68.3 (1996): 527-53, 
530.  
Crompton, Rosemary. “Professions in the Current Context,” Work, Employment & 
Society, Special Issue (May, 1990): 147-66. 
Daniels, George H. American Science in the Age of Jackson. New York: Columbia UP, 
1968. 
Delany, Martin Robinson. Blake: Or, the Huts of America. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.  
----. The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the 
United States: And, Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party. Amherst, 
N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2004. 
----. Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader ed. Robert S. Levine. Chapel Hill: North 
Carolina UP, 2003. 
Dix, Dorothea. Memorial Soliciting a State Hospital for the Insane, Submitted to the 
Legislature of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Isaac Ashmead, 1845.  
Drew, Philip. “Appearance and Reality in Melville's The Confidence-Man,” ELH. 31.4. 
(1964), 418-442.  
 223 
Dutton, Denis. “The Cold Reading Technique,” Experientia 44 (1988), 326-32. 
Eagleton, Terry. The Function of Criticism: From the Spectator to Post-Structuralism. 
London: Verso, 1984.  
Edwards, Erica R. Charisma and the Fictions of Black Leadership. Minneapolis: 
Minnesota UP, 2012.  
Eliot, T.S. “From Poe to Valéry,” The Hudson Review 2.3. (1949), 327-42. 
Elmer, Jonathan. Reading at the Social Limit: Affect, Mass Culture, and Edgar Allan Poe. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1820-1872. Vol. 8. Edited by 
Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1912. 
----. “Plato; or, The Philosopher,” Representative Men, in Essays & Lectures. New York: 
Library of America, 1983. 
Ernest, John. Liberation Historiography: African American Writers and the Challenge of 
History, 1794-1861. Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP, 2004.  
Essig, Mark. “Poison Murder and Expert Testimony: Doubting the Physician in Late 
Nineteenth-Century America,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 14.1 
(2002): 177-210. 
Evelev, John. “The Literary Profession,” in Edgar Allan Poe in Context, ed. Kevin J. 
Hayes. New York: Cambridge UP, 2013. 
Feidelson, Charles. Symbolism and American Literature. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1953.  
 224 
Felman, Shoshana. “On Reading Poetry,” The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and 
Psychoanalytic Reading, ed. J.P. Muller and W.J. Richardson. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1980]): 133-56, 134, 135. 
Fisher, Benjamin Franklin. “Poe and the Gothic Tradition,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Kevin J. Hayes. New York: Cambridge UP 
(2002), 72–91.  
Forman, James. “Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century,” The Yale Law Journal. 
113.4 (2004), 895-938. 
Fraser, Nancy. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy," in Habermas and the Public Sphere ed. Craig Calhoun. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT UP, 109-42. 
Gamber, Wendy. “Antebellum Reform: Salvation, Self-Control, and Social 
Transformation,” in Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History, ed. 
Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 
129–33. 
Gates, Henry Louis. Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the 'Racial' Self. New York: 
Oxford UP, 1990. 
Gernsback, Hugo. “A New Sort of Magazine,” in Science-Fiction: The Gernsback Years: 
A Complete Coverage of the Genre Magazines from 1926 Through 1936, ed. E.F. 
Bleiler and Richard Bleiler. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998. 
Gibson-Wood, Carol. “Jonathan Richardson and the Rationalization of Connoisseurship,” 
Art History 7.1 (1984): 38-56. 
 225 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1993. 
Godwin, William. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013 
[1793]. 
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1959. 
Golan, Tal. Laws of Men and Laws of Nature The History of Scientific Expert Testimony 
in England and America. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2004.  
Graff, Gerald. Professing Literature: An Institutional History. Chicago: Chicago UP, 
2007 [1987]). 
Gruener, Gustav. “Notes on the Influence of E.T.A. Hoffmann Upon Edgar Allan Poe” 
PMLA 19.1. (1904), 1–25. 
Haber, Samuel. The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-
1900. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1991. 
Haggerty, George E. Gothic Fiction/Gothic Form. University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1989. 
Hall, Mark David. “Catharine Beecher: America's First Female Philosopher and 
Theologian” Fides et Historia 32.1. Winter/Spring (2000), 65-80. 
Haller, John S. Medical Protestants: The Eclectics in American Medicine, 1825-1939. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1994. 
Halttunen, Karen. Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture 
in America, 1830-1870. New Haven: Yale UP, 1982.  
 226 
Harding, Vincent. There Is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America. New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981. 
Harpham, John Samuel. “Detective Fiction and the Aesthetic of Crime,” Raritan, 34.1 
(2014): 121-141.  
Harris, Neil. Humbug: The Art of P.T. Barnum. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.  
Hartmann, Jonathan H. The Marketing of Edgar Allan Poe. New York: Routledge 2008.  
Haskell, Thomas L. The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social 
Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2000 [1977]. 
Hendler, Glenn. Public Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in Nineteenth-Century 
American Literature. Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP, 2001. 
Higham, John. “The Matrix of Specialization,” The Organization of Knowledge in 
Modern America, 1860-1920, ed. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1979.  
Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2010. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. Medical Essays 1842-1882. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1883. 
Horn, Eva. “Introduction,” New German Critique, special issue, Narrating Charisma 
Howe, David Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-
1848. New York: Oxford UP, 2007. 
Howells, William Dean. Literature and Life: Studies. New York: Harper & Bros., 1902. 
Irwin, John T. American Hieroglyphics: The Symbol of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics in the 
American Renaissance. New Haven: Yale UP, 1980. 
 227 
----. The Mystery to a Solution: Poe, Borges, and the Analytic Detective Story. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
Jackson, Leon. The Business of Letters: Authorial Economies in Antebellum America. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. 
Jacobs, Robert D. Poe: Journalist & Critic. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1969. 
Johnson, Samuel. A Dictionary of the English Language, 4th edition. London, 1773.  
Kaplan, Richard. “The Origins of Objectivity in American Journalism,” The Routledge 
Companion to New and Journalism Studies ed. Stuart Allan. New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
Kaufman, Will. The Comedian as Confidence Man: Studies in Irony Fatigue. Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1997.  
Keen, Paul. “‘The Most Useful of Citizens’: Towards a Romantic Literary 
Professionalism,” Studies in Romanticism 41.4. (Winter 2002): 627-654. 
Kelley, Mary. Private Woman, Public Stage: Literary Domesticity in Nineteenth-Century 
America. New York: Oxford UP, 1984. 
Knadler, Stephen. Remapping Citizenship and the Nation in African-American Literature. 
New York: Routledge, 2010.  
Larson, John Lauritz. The Market Revolution in America: Liberty, Ambition, and the 
Eclipse of the Common Good. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. 
Larson, Magali Sarfatti. The Rise of Professionalism: Monopolies of Competence and 
Sheltered Markets. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2013 [1977]).  
Lawrence, D.H. Studies in Classic American Literature. New York: Penguin Classics, 
1990 [1923]. 
 228 
Levin, Harry. The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne Poe Melville. Chicago: Ohio 
University Press 1980 [1958].  
Levine, Robert S. Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative 
Identity. Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP, 1997. 
Levine, Stuart. Edgar Poe: Seer and Craftsman. Deland, Fla.: Everett/Edwards, 1972. 
Lévy, Maurice. “Poe and the Gothic Tradition” ESQ 18.1 (1972), 19-29. 
Lewes, George Henry. “The Condition of Authors in England, Germany, and France,” 
Frazer’s Magazine 35 (1847).  
Lewis, Leslie W. Telling Narratives: Secrets in African American Literature. Urbana: 
Illinois UP, 2007.  
Lewis, R.W.B. Trials of the Word: Essays in American Literature and the Humanistic 
Tradition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.  
Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Llosa, Mario Vargas. “Flaubert, Our Contemporary,” trans. John King, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Flaubert, ed. Timothy Unwin. New York: Cambridge UP, 2004. 
Lowell, James Russell. A Fable for Critics: Or Better… a Glance at a Few of Our 
Literary Progenies. New York: G.P. Putnam, 1848. 
Lubiano, Wahneema. “Standing in for the State: Black Nationalism and 'Writing' the 
Black Subject,” in Is It Nation Time ed. Eddie S. Glaude, Jr.. Chicago: Chicago 
UP, 2002. 
Lucier, Paul. “The Professional and the Scientist in Nineteenth-Century America,” ISIS 
100.4. December 2009): 699-732.  
 229 
Macaulay, Thomas Babington. The Works of Lord Macaualay, vol. 7. London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1871. 
Macfarlane, Robert. Original Copy: Plagiarism and Originality in Nineteenth-Century 
Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Magaw, Malcolm. “The Confidence-Man and Christian Deity: Melville’s Imagery of 
Ambiguity,” in Explorations of Literature ed. Rima Drell Reck. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State UP (1966), 81-99.  
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Marx-Engels Reader ed. Robert C. Tucker. New 
York: Norton, 1978. 
Maurer, David. The Big Con: The Classic Story of the Confidence Man and the 
Confidence Trick. London: Century, 1999 [1940].  
McGill, Meredith. American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853. 
Philadelphia: Pennsylvania UP, 2003. 
Meehl, Paul E. “Wanted – a Good Cookbook,” American Psychologist, 11.6 (Jun, 1956), 
263-272. 
Melville, Herman. The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade: an Authoritative Text, 
Contemporary Reviews, Biographical Overviews, Sources, Backgrounds, and 
Criticism. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006. 
Miller, Floyd J. The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Emigration and Colonization, 
1787-1863. Urbana: Illinois UP, 1975.  
Mohr, James C. Doctors and the Law: Medical Jurisprudence in Nineteenth-Century 
America. New York: Oxford UP, 1993.  
 230 
Moses, Wilson J. The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925. Hamden, Conn: 
Archon Books, 1978.  
Nabokov, Vladimir. Lectures on Literature. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1980.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.  
Oates, Joyce Carol. “Afterword: Reflections on the Grotesque,” in Haunted: Tales of the 
Grotesque. New York: Plume Books, 1994.  
Painter, Nell Irvin. “Martin R. Delany: Elitism and Black Nationalism,” in Black Leaders 
of the Nineteenth Century, ed. Leon F. Litwack and August Meier. Urbana: 
Illinois UP, 1988.  
Paulding, James Kirke. “Hic Finis Fandi,” Salmagundi: Second Series, vol. 2. New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1835.  
Peeples, Scott. The Afterlife of Edgar Allan Poe. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004. 
Peirce, Charles S. Selected Writings, ed. Philip P. Wiener. New York: Dover, 1968. 
Perkin, Harold J. The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880. London: 
Routledge 1989) 
Peterson, Charles J. “Mr Poe’s Last Poem,” Philadelphia Saturday Gazette, in Edgar 
Allan Poe: The Critical Heritage, ed. I.M. Walker. London: Routledge, 1997.  
Pierce, Yolanda. “‘How Saul Became Paul’: The African-American Conversion 
Experience,” The Griot 19:2 (Fall 2000), 1-17. 
Plato, Gorgias, trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Poe Abroad: Influence, Reputation, Affinities, ed. Lois Vines. Iowa City: Iowa UP, 1999. 
 231 
Poe, Edgar Allan. Critical Theory: The Major Documents ed. Stuart Levine and Susan F. 
Levine. Urbana: Illinois UP, 2009.  
----. Essays and Reviews, ed. G.R. Thompson. New York: Library of America, 1984. 
----. The Letters of Edgar Allan Poe, 2 volumes, ed. John Ward Ostrom. New York: 
Gordian, 1966.  
----. Eureka ed. Stuart Levine and Susan F. Levine. Urbana: Illinois UP, 2004. 
----. Tales & Sketches volume 2, ed. Thomas Ollive Mabbott. Urbana: Illinois UP. 544.  
Poe's Pervasive Influence, ed. Barbara Cantalupo. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh UP, 2012).  
Polanyi, Michael. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. London: 
Routledge, 2005 [1958]. 
Pollin, Burton R. “Poe: The ‘Virtual’ Inventor, Practitioner, and Inspirer of Modern 
Science Fiction,” in Poe Messenger, 26.1 (1996). 18-45.  
Putnam, George Palmer. George Palmer Putnam: A Memoir. New York: Putnam, 1912. 
Reader, W.J. Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-
Century England. London: Weidenfeld, 1966.  
Reynolds, David S. Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in 
the Age of Emerson and Melville. New York: Knopf, 1988. 
Richardson, Charles. A New Dictionary of the English Language, vol. 1. London: 
William Pickering, 1836. 
Roeckelein, Jon E. Dictionary of Theories, Laws, and Concepts in Psychology. Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1998. 
Rogers, Henry Wade. The Law of Expert Testimony. St. Louis: Central Law Journal Co., 
1891 [1888]. 
 232 
Rogin, Michael Paul. Subversive Genealogy: The Politics and Art of Herman Melville. 
New York: Knopf, 1983.  
Ross, Sidney. “Scientist: The Story of a Word,” in Nineteenth-Century Attitudes: Men of 
Science. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. 
Rothman, David J. The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disordering the New 
Republic. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002 [1971]. 
Rothstein, William G. American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to 
Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1972. 
Rush, Benjamin. “On the Study of Medical Jurisprudence,” Sixteen Introductory 
Lectures. New York: Dabor Science Publications, 1977 [1811]. 
Ruttenburg, Nancy. “George Whitefield, Spectacular Conversion, and the Rise of 
Democratic Personality.” American Literary History. 5.3 (1993), 429-458. 
Ryan, Susan M. “Misgivings: Melville, Race, and the Ambiguities of Benevolence.” 
American Literary History. 12.4 (2000), 685-712. 
Schehr, Lawrence R. “Flaubert’s Failure,” in The Cambridge Companion to Flaubert. 
Scherman, Timothy H. “The Authority Effect: Poe and the Politics of Reputation in the 
Pre-Industry of American Publishing” Arizona Quarterly 49.3 (Fall 1993), 1-19.  
Schreiner, William H. Schreiner’s Sporting Manual. Philadelphia, 1841. 
Schudson, Michael. Discovering the News. New York: Basic Books, 1978.  
Sedgwick, Eve. Epistemology of the Closet. London: Penguin, 1994. 
Sellars, Charles. The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846. New York: 
Oxford UP, 1991. 
 233 
Shklovsky, Victor. “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, ed. 
Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis. Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1965.  
Smith, John Jay. Celebrated Trials of All Countries, and Remarkable Cases of Criminal 
Jurisprudence. Philadelphia: L.A. Godey, 1836.  
Sparks, Jared. The Life of George Washington. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1853. 
Stevenson, Robert Louis. “Poe,” in Edgar Allan Poe: Bloom’s Classic Critical Views. 
New York: Bloom’s Literary Criticism, 2008. 
The Book of Mormon, trans. Joseph Smith, Jr.. Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 1921. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. “The Notion of Literature,” New Literary History 38.1 (2007), 1-12. 
Trachtenberg, Alan. The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded 
Age. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
Tresch, John. “Extra! Extra! Poe invents science fiction!” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Kevin J. Hayes. Cambridge, 2002. 113-32. 
Turner, Sharon. The History of the Anglo-Saxons from the Earliest Period to the Norman 
Conquest, vol. 1. Paris: Baudry’s European Library, 1840. 
Twain, Mark. A Tramp Abroad, Following the Equator, Other Travels, ed. Roy Blount, 
Jr.. New York: Library of America, 2010. 
Veysey, Lawrence R. “Higher Education as a Profession: Changes and Discontinuities,” 
in The Professions in American History ed. Nathan O. Hatch. Notre Dame UP, 
1988. 
Walker, Corey D.B. A Noble Fight: African American Freemasonry and the Struggle for 
Democracy in America. Urbana: Illinois UP, 2008. 
 234 
Warner, Michael. “Professionalization and the Rewards of Literature: 1875-1900,” 
Criticism 27.1 (Winter 1985), 1-28.  
Warner, Michael. Publics and Counterpublics. New York: Zone Books, 2002. 
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York: 
Bedminster Press, 1968. 
----. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. Hans H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. 
New York: Oxford UP, 1946. 
Wellek, René. “De Quincey’s Status in the History of Ideas,” Philological Quarterly 23 
(1944): 248-72. 
Whalen, Terence. Edgar Allan Poe and the Masses: The Political Economy of Literature 
in Antebellum America. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999.  
Whewell, William. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. London: John W. Parker, 
1840. 
Whooley, Owen. Knowledge in the Time of Cholera: The Struggle Over American 
Medicine in the Nineteenth Century. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2013. 
Wilbur, Richard. “The House of Poe,” Library of Congress Anniversary Lecture. 1959. 
reprinted in Edgar Allan Poe: Critical Assessments, ed. Graham Clarke. East 
Sussex: Helm Information, 1991. 
Wilde, Oscar. The Soul of Man Under Socialism. Portland, Me: T.B. Mosher, 1905. 
Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society, 1780-1950. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983 [1957]. 
----. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed.. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1985 [1976]. 
 235 
Williams, Samuel. The Boy’s Treasury of Sports, Pastimes, and Recreations. London: D. 
Bogue, 1844. 
Wilson, Christopher P. The Labor of Words: Literary Professionalism in the Progressive 
Era. Athens: Georgia UP, 1985. 
Wilson, Edmund. Axel's Castle: A Study in the Imaginative Literature of 1870-1930. 
London: Penguin, 1993. 
Wimsatt, William K and Cleanth Brooks. Literary Criticism: A Short History. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959. 
Winch, Christopher. Dimensions of Expertise: A Conceptual Exploration of Vocational 
Knowledge. London: Continuum, 2010. 
Wood, Gordon S. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: A.A. Knopf, 
1992. 
Wood, James. How Fiction Works. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008.  
Wordsworth, William. “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface” in The Complete Poetical 
Works of William Wordsworth, vol. 10, Prefatory Essays and Notes. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1919. 
Worthington, Heather. The Rise of the Detective in Early Nineteenth Century Popular 
Fiction. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Wrobel, Arthur. “Introduction.” In Pseudo-Science and Society in 19th-Century America, 
edited by Arthur Wrobel. Lexington: Kentucky UP, 1987. 






About the Author 
 
Doug Tye was born in Iowa City, Iowa on Bastille Day, 1983. He received a B.A. with 
Honors in English from the University of Iowa in 2005, and an M.A. in English from the 
Johns Hopkins University in 2010.  
